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ABSTRACT
Botts, Tina Fernandes. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2011. The
Hermeneutics of Equal Protection Analysis. Major Professor: Thomas J. Nenon.
The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution is a hotly contested issue in contemporary constitutional
theory. Contemporary interpretations generally fall into one of two categories,
understood to be theoretically opposed: those derived through originalism and those
derived through non-originalism. From the perspective of an approach to constitutional
interpretation based in philosophical hermeneutics, however, there is a third alternative
available for thinking about what the Equal Protection Clause means known as legal
hermeneutics. Legal hermeneutics acknowledges the importance of the text, as
originalism does, in the determination of credible meaning, but also acknowledges the
roles of history, socio-historical context, and the identity of the interpreter, as nonoriginalism does. In this way, legal hermeneutics acts as a sort of middle road between
originalist and non-originalist approaches. However, the strength of legal hermeneutics
is not that it takes this middle road, but that it, unlike the other approaches, is grounded in
and faithful to the necessary structures of the interpretive process itself. The following
work uses legal hermeneutics to develop a more hermeneutically credible meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause than either originalist or non-originalist approaches are capable
of providing. The result is a meaning of the Equal Protection Clause according to which
(1) the Clause operates as a remedial measure to protect the equality rights of members of
marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups only, and (2) strict scrutiny is the
applicable level of judicial review for any hermeneutically credible violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
v
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“[H]ermeneutics has the task of revealing a totality of meaning in all its
relations.” – Hans-Georg Gadamer1
Chapter 1: Introduction
The subject of this work is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The customary, traditional or
mainstream way of determining the meaning of a given law – i.e., the way that is taught
in law schools – is to examine the text of the law itself, and perhaps the legislative history
of the law, together with a careful examination of the various court cases that have
applied the law and made judgments as to its meaning. For lawyers, this means
examining the most recent cases that have applied the law and prioritizing the decisions
of those cases that have the most precedential value. Determination of the precedential
value of a given case, on this method, means starting with the highest court in the land
that has made a decision about the what the law “means,” prioritizing that court‟s most
recent judgment, and then moving down through the lower court decisions from there.
The “meaning” of the law is understood to be the most recent decision as to its meaning
by the highest court to have addressed the issue. If the Supreme Court of the United
States has made a decision as to the “meaning” of a given law, then that decision is
authoritative. That the Supreme Court of the United States has this authority is known as
its power of “judicial review.”3 The case that contains the most recent decision as to a

1

Gadamer (1975, 1989: 467).

2

The Equal Protection Clause can be found in Section 1 of the Amendment, and states:
“No State shall …deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
3

Nowhere in the Constitution is the Supreme Court given this authority. But, ever since
the Supreme Court gave itself this authority in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
1

given law‟s meaning by the highest court to have addressed this issue is known as
“binding precedent,” a phrase meant to capture the idea that the determination made in
that case about the meaning of a given law is the current state of the meaning of the law
such that future courts are obligated to use that meaning as well.4 Sometimes the highest
court to have determined what a given law “means” changes its assessment of the
meaning of the law in question. When such a change happens, the court in question is
said to have “overturned binding precedent.” The overturning of binding precedent is
usually accomplished by what lawyers call “distinguishing” the formerly binding
precedent. “Distinguishing” the decision of formerly binding precedent usually involves
distinguishing the facts of the case. Doing so creates the illusion that the meaning of the
law itself has not changed, just the facts, which in turn creates the illusion that the
“meaning” of the law is something that is timeless, value-free, and unchanging.
But, occasionally, it is not sensibly possible to explain the overturning of binding
precedent by distinguishing the facts of the previous case. In those cases, among others,
the court deciding to overturn the previously binding precedent simply says its prior
assessment as to the meaning of the law was incorrect. “At one time we thought this is
what the law meant,” the court in effect holds, “but we now understand that we were
wrong.” The philosophical question that is at the center of the study that follows is, On
what basis does a given court justifiably make a decision as to the definitive meaning of

pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, that authority has become a part of standard
American law.
A process called “Shepardizing” is the final step in this process. Shepardizing means
determining if the top case found as a result of this process has been overturned, reaffirmed,
questioned, or cited by later cases.
4

2

any law? The case I have used to highlight some of the problems inherent in answering
that philosophical question is the case of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is something that has always been
contentious. From the very first Supreme Court cases to decide the meaning of the
Clause, The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873, to the Supreme Court‟s most recent decisions
as to the meaning of the Clause, i.e., Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, both
decided in 2003 and together known as “the Michigan cases,” the Supreme Court has
changed its assessment of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause many, many times.
Not only that, and what I think is particularly problematic about the way the court has
determined the meaning of the Clause, the Court has repeatedly held that the Clause
means different things for different groups of people, with no jurisprudentially sound
reason(s) guiding the differences. Specifically, and for the purposes of the following
work, according to the way the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause has (d)evolved
and changed over the years since its ratification in 1868 (i.e., according to current
interpretation of the meaning of the Clause, i.e., that which obtains under what I will call
Suspect Classification Doctrine),5 the Equal Protection Clause means different things for
the equality rights of the three groups of persons known as African Americans, women,
and homosexuals. And even more problematic than that, in my view, is the fact that the
rationales offered by the Supreme Court in recent years for their various interpretations of

5

In this work, I make a distinction between Suspect Classification Doctrine and Suspect
Class Doctrine. Suspect Classification Doctrine, on this view, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of certain traits while Suspect Class Doctrine prohibits discrimination against certain
groups. In both equal protection case law and equal protection scholarship, Suspect
Classification Doctrine and Suspect Class Doctrine are often used interchangeably, but it is one of
the purposes of this project to highlight the theoretical and practical differences between these
two, distinct approaches to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.
3

the Clause are very much out of touch with both the spirit of the Clause and some very
compelling facts about the nature of the interpretive process itself revealed to us through
philosophical hermeneutics (also known as the philosophy of interpretation), most
notably, the historicity of meaning.
The following work was motivated by two objectives. The first was a desire on
my part to find a way of determining meaning in the law that somehow acknowledged the
historicity of meaning but also attempted to locate something on the order of objectivity
in legal interpretation. I sought a way of determining meaning in the law that stepped
outside of the theoretical stand-off between the analytic and continental traditions in the
philosophy of law in an attempt to find real answers to real legal problems rather than
getting lost in theoretical abstraction. As is the case with most, if not all, stand-offs
between the two traditions, the stand-off in philosophy of law can be characterized as a
deep and abiding difference in perspective regarding the possibility of metaphysical and
epistemological foundations. Generally speaking, this stand-off plays itself out as a
marked polarization between the two traditions on answers to the fundamental questions
in philosophy of law such as What is the law? and What is the basis for a given
interpretation of a law? and What provides a given law with its authority or legitimacy?
For years prior to the instant project, I thought that this polarization in philosophy of law
implicated dire consequences for the prospect of anything on the order of definitive
answers in the law.
Each tradition had its attractive features. The analytic tradition‟s search for
objective meaning in the law satisfied both my intuition that such a thing existed but also
addressed my lawyerly concern for using philosophy of law to provide practicing lawyers

4

real guidance in answering the question of what a given law means for a given client in a
particular set of circumstances. The continental tradition‟s appreciation for the extent to
which meaning in the law is affected by factors such as context, language, history, time,
power, and particularity comported with my experience of how the same law is very
regularly understood to mean different things to different people in different times,
places, and circumstances. One need only look at how the two sides of any court case are
construed and presented by opposing counsel based on the exact same set of “facts” to
appreciate the veridical content of this perspective.
In an approach to meaning in the law known as legal hermeneutics (which is
heavily based in philosophical hermeneutics), both the analytic and continental traditions
in philosophy of law are acknowledged as valuable and taken into account. Even more
compelling about legal hermeneutics for me, however, is that on its own terms legal
hermeneutics is not merely adopting a sort of practical compromise position between
these two standpoints in the way that, say, legal pragmatism does, or legal interpretivism.
Instead, the approach to meaning in the law taken by legal hermeneutics is grounded in
philosophical insights going back to Aristotle about the nature of what it means to
understand any text (not just legal texts) (Aristotle‟s On Interpretation).
Specifically, legal hermeneutics shows (based on profound epistemological and
metaphysical insights discovered and developed within philosophical hermeneutics) that
whenever one sets out to understand a text, one is engaged in the process of
interpretation. The meaning of the words on the page, in other words, the “black letter
law,” in no case jumps up and directly applies itself to our minds or brains in a manner
similar to the way in which Locke thought the “corpuscles” of which the material world

5

is comprised apply themselves directly to our sense organs (Locke 1690). Rather, the
subjectivity and facticity (colloquially, the reality, worldview, or schema of
intelligibility) of the interpreter(s), together with the socio-historical context in which the
interpretation takes place (the two central components of what I will call a given
“interpretive moment”) together dramatically effect what is taken by the interpreter to be
the meaning of a given text/law.”6
The second objective motivating this work was a long-time desire on my part to
protect, defend, and uphold the constitutional rights of the marginalized, oppressed, and
the subjugated.7 These two objectives came together and began a dialogue with each
other that lasted many years and that ultimately produced the question that is the subject

6

This hermeneutic insight is arguably similar to Nobel prize-winning physicist Werner
Heisenberg‟s discovery in the early twentieth century that an experimenter‟s attempt to measure
the momentum of a subatomic particle affects the value of the position of the particle. Similarly,
an experimenter‟s attempt to measure the position of a subatomic particle affects the value of the
momentum of the particle (Heisenberg 1927). This discovery i.e., the discovery that human
involvement in a given scientific experiment affects the values of the things to be measured by
the experiment, has generated what is arguably the central epistemological question in the
philosophy of science, i.e., Is it possible for humans to obtain objective scientific knowledge?
Notably, Heisenberg‟s 1927 paper is in German and originally referred to the phenomenon at
issue as Unbestimmtheit, which is German for "indeterminacy.” The 1927 paper uses the word
Unsicherheit or "uncertainty" only in an endnote. It was the English-language translation of
Heisenberg's textbook, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, published in 1930, that
translated Unbestimmtheit as "uncertainty" throughout the text and popularized Heisenberg‟s
discovery in the English-speaking world as his “Uncertainty Principle” (Cassidy 2009).
7

In this work, reference to marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups is meant to
refer to groups whose rights to equality in America is dramatically lower than the equality rights
of others. It is conceded that the question of whether a given group qualifies as marginalized,
oppressed, or subjugated is an empirical matter and one that is not dealt with directly here.
However, it is understood that certain markers are at least indicators of a group‟s qualifying for
this status. Things like level of income, levels of education, quality of healthcare, net worth,
healthy representation in the mainstream media, statistics on violence against the group,
representation in echelons of power and privilege, and testimony from the group members
themselves are understood to be helpful markers. Additionally, it is sufficient to qualify for the
requisite status if a given group is any one of the three descriptors: marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated, such that if any of these descriptors is appropriate, the equality status of the group in
question is understood to be sufficiently problematic.
6

of this study, i.e., What is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? The answer to this question has dire consequences for those meant to be
protected by the Clause, as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the primary text upon which the right to equality in American constitutional law is based
(Schwarzschild 1996, 1999). It is my considered view that Suspect Classification
Doctrine, the present method used by the Supreme Court for determining the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause, simply does not work for the marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated. Specifically, the way the Doctrine ties the level of judicial review used to
assess the constitutionality of a given law or policy to particular traits of human beings
(e.g., race, sex, sexual orientation) not only makes no sense in the abstract but operates to
undermine the rights to equality of those the Equal Protection Clause was arguably
designed to protect. I see the Supreme Court‟s usage of Suspect Classification Doctrine
as based on archaic notions of what it means to be racialized in America, what it means to
be a woman in America, and what it means to be a member of a sexual minority group in
America. It is my goal to find a way to clean-up and update the Court‟s thinking on these
topics so that the rights of oppressed groups can be better protected, and I intuitively
believe that the way to do that is to find and offer a better method of understanding just
exactly what the Equal Protection Clause “means.”
In Chapter 2, I will lay out the problem, which is the way in which Suspect
Classification Doctrine (the present method used by the Supreme Court of the United
States to determine the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause) has developed since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The reader will note that my approach
to examining the relevant case law is not through the lawyer‟s traditional case method

7

approach, but rather through an historical approach. Rather than simply laying out the
current state of binding precedent on the issue at hand, then, I have chosen to instead lay
out the historical development of the case law in chronological order as it pertains to
three specific groups (African Americans, women, and gay people) to highlight the way
in which the law has changed through time. I have also chosen this method to highlight
the way in which the law has changed in time for each of the three groups. While I
recognize the value of precedent and concede that if what we want to know is the
contemporary state of the law (a practicing lawyer‟s objective), the best way to discover
this is by determining what the current binding precedent is on the topic; as one who
understands the historicity of reason and the socio-cultural situatedness of meaning, it
was important to me to trace the historical development of the relevant case law, noting
any socio-historical or juridico-discursive forces which arguably helped form and shape
the law at any given point in time. I have thus presented in Chapter 2 the state of the law
on the topic of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause through an explication of the
historical development of that meaning. Through walking through that historical
progression with me in Chapter 2, the reader is meant to come to appreciate the degree to
which the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as presented by the Supreme Court is
to a large extent completely arbitrary, and what is of more grave importance, the degree
to which the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as presented by the Supreme Court
has been influenced by politics, non-self-reflexive intentionality, and outdated
misconceptions and stereotypes about what it means, particularly in America, to be black,
what it means to be a woman, and what it means to be gay.8
8

As is also mentioned below, although the present study addresses the question of what
8

Then, in Chapter 3, I will lay out in detail the theoretical basis for my approach to
legal interpretation, a fairly recent way of thinking about meaning in the law known as
legal hermeneutics. Legal hermeneutics has its origins in philosophical hermeneutics, or
an approach to meaning in general that is grounded in an investigation into the theoretical
structures supporting the phenomenon of interpretation itself. For the thinkers who have
played a role in the development of philosophical hermeneutics, there are necessary
structures to the way meaning is always ascertained, necessary structures to the process
of interpretation. Central to these structures is what is known as the hermeneutical circle,
or a perpetual moving from the part to the whole and back to the part again and so on.
Understanding, then, on this view, is always cyclical. One enters the circle of
understanding already from a certain vantage point. This vantage point affects how one
sees the part or the whole, depending upon which is attempted to be understood first.
One then moves from the part (or the whole) to the whole (or the part), back and forth,
with all of this always takes place in context. The socio-historical and cultural contexts
in which a given interpretation (or a given attempt at understanding, taken to be
synonymous with interpretation) takes place are understood to affect what is taken to be
understood as well, as does the identity of the interpreter (including the degree to which
this identity includes self-understanding). The identity of the interpreter will always
affect what is taken to be understood, on this view. Cartesian distance between mind and
body, between the observer (or interpreter) and the observed (or interpreted) is a fantasy.
In this sense, the hermeneutic circle of understanding includes not just parts and whole,
the Equal Protection Clause means or should mean for three specific groups (racialized
minorities, women, and gay people), this choice of groups is not meant to imply that Suspect
Classification Doctrine is any more effective for any other marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated
group, such as the poor, the disabled, or other ethnic minorities.
9

but also self, history, culture, and tradition. According to legal hermeneutics, what is true
of meaning in general is also true of meaning in the law. Chapter 3 will conclude with a
quote from Professor Gregory Leyh, who has edited an outstanding text on legal
hermeneutics. Paraphrasing, Leyh points out that if legal hermeneutics gets legal
interpretation right, then the received views and legal orthodoxies of mainstream legal
jurisprudence are stood on their lofty heads.
The reader should note that while traditional legal analysis of what the Equal
Protection Clause means is concerned with the descriptive question of predicting how
the Supreme Court will decide future cases based on its “binding” precedents, my legal
hermeneutical analysis is more concerned with the normative question of determining
how the Supreme Court should decide future cases based on an assessment of the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause grounded in the necessary structures of the
interpretive process itself. My claim is that the way the Supreme Court presently
determines what the Equal Protection Clause means – Suspect Classification Doctrine –
has resulted in Supreme Court decisions that are wholly out of step with the spirit of the
Clause and which are very often more reflective of the illegitimate prejudices of the
various Supreme Court justices that have interpreted the Clause over the years than
anything resembling a hermeneutically credible interpretation.
The reader should also note that it is not my claim, however, that legal
hermeneutics reveals one, clear, objective, timeless interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, for legal hermeneutics explicitly rejects the possibility of such an interpretation

10

per se.9 Instead, my claim is that legal hermeneutics provides us with tools to be able to
responsibly prioritize various interpretations of what the Supreme Court has said the
Clause means, primarily by taking sober account of the degree to which existing
interpretations of the Clause have been affected by the prejudices of previous interpreters
of the Clause, and by also taking into account what seems to be a blindness on the part of
the Supreme Court to the spirit of the Clause in recent years.10 Moreover, it is my further
claim that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause together with the contemporary
context of can together generate an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that is an
improvement upon existing interpretations. The idea is that a legal hermeneutical reading
of what the Equal Protection Clause means reveals a spirit of the text that, if taken
seriously and used as a guide to future interpretations (Supreme Court Decisions), will
help the Supreme Court to use the Equal Protection Clause to achieve the ideal of
equality for marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups.11

9

The fact that legal hermeneutics rejects even the possibility of one, clear, objective, timeless
interpretation of any law is one of the key ways in which legal hermeneutics can be distinguished
from Ronald Dworkin‟s legal interpretivism (described in Chapter 3), which explicitly states that
there is only one right way to decide any legal case, or to interpret any law. For Dworkin, if there
were a judge who possessed infinite powers of reason and insight, and who had access to every
law at all times -- a judge he famously called Judge Hercules -- such a judge could find the one
true correct decision in a case, or identify the one true meaning of a given law.
10

It is conceded that it is impossible to take a full and complete account of the prejudices of
previous interpreters of the clause. However, the claim being made is that the higher the level of
self-reflexivity of the interpreter at any given interpretive moment, the more likely the resultant
interpretation is credible or legitimate.
11

Moreover, the reader should be aware that owing to the nature of hermeneutical legal
interpretation, the question of who is protected by the Equal Protection Clause in theory has the
same answer as the related question of how the Supreme Court should interpret the Equal
Protection Clause in a given interpretive moment in practice. This should not be understood as a
flaw in the hermeneutical approach to legal interpretation but as a function of what philosophical
hermeneutics reveals as the necessary and intimate relationship between theory and practice.

11

Toward that end, in Chapter 4 I have generated two dialogues meant to
hermeneutically derive or generate a meaning of the Equal Protection Clause that is more
in keeping with the spirit of the Clause than Suspect Classification Doctrine. These
dialogues reveal that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is that it is there as a
remedial measure to protect the marginalized, the oppressed, and/or the subjugated.
Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause is meant to provide a constitutional basis upon
which to provide a federal remedy for those who find that their right to equal protection
under the law has been infringed by the government in virtue of their membership in a
group that has a history of having been subjected to unequal treatment under the law. It
is a clause that was added to the constitution for the specific purpose of ensuring equality
rights to those who are members of groups who are clearly excluded from the political
process by the government and who are simultaneously and as a direct and traceable
result of said state action subjected to widespread prejudice and discrimination.
In Chapter 5, I will discuss the findings in Chapter 4, draw some tentative
conclusions about what the findings mean and outline some recommendations for future
research.

12

“What I have come to understand is that the usual price of opposing
oppression is engendering further oppression, and yet, failing to oppose
oppression is even more unacceptable, even more costly.”
-- Robert St. Martin Westley1
Chapter 2:

The Problem: Suspect Classification Doctrine in Equal Protection
Analysis

What is Suspect Classification Doctrine?
Equal Protection Analysis is that body of jurisprudence according to which the
Supreme Court of the United States assesses the legitimacy of laws, governmental
policies, or other state actions which are alleged to be unconstitutionally discriminatory
and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Suspect Classification Doctrine is the
method of Equal Protection Analysis currently in place and used by the Supreme Court of
the United States.2 Specifically, the doctrine is an approach to effectuating the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause that has developed over the years through the process of
Supreme Court decisions on the issue of what the Clause means and how it should be
applied in particular factual circumstances and particular socio-historical contexts at
specific points in time. But, as the following summary of the historical development of
the case law on Suspect Classification Doctrine demonstrates, the doctrine is internally
inconsistent, circular and does not provide a clear guide for those seeking redress under
the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, while the Equal Protection Clause was meant
to protect marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated persons from unequal treatment under
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(Westley 1993: i).
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Kenji Yoshino, Chief Justice Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional Law, New York
University School of Law, has recently called the present approach to Equal Protection Analysis
the “New Equal Protection” and defines this as a jurisprudence that “systematically denie[s]
constitutional protection to new groups, curtail[s] it for already covered groups, and limits
Congress‟s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation” (Yoshino 2011: 748).
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the law, Suspect Classification Doctrine fails to do this. Specifically, Suspect
Classification Doctrine fails to protect the ideal of equal treatment under the law for all
contained in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I will use the
examples of African Americans, women, and sexual minorities to demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of the doctrine.3
According to Suspect Classification Doctrine, when a given law or governmental
policy that contains distinctions or classifications between groups of persons is before the
Court, before making an assessment on whether the law or policy violates the Equal
Protection Clause and is therefore unconstitutional, the Court must first decide which one
of three levels of judicial review should be used in the case. At present, there are three
levels of judicial review available: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational
basis test (Tribe 1988; Stephens & Scheb 2007).
Strict scrutiny is the highest and most intense level of judicial review and is
triggered when the law or policy in question contains what the Supreme Court calls a

In this work, I will use the terms “people of color,” “African Americans,” “blacks,” and
“Negroes” interchangeably. This group includes everyone who self-identifies as racially black,
everyone who is phenotypically black, and everyone who would be categorized as, or whose
ancestors would have been categorized as, black by the one-drop rule of the Jim Crow era. By
“women” I mean everyone who is understood to be female either by society at large or by law.
By “sexual minorities” I mean everyone who self-identifies as gay, homosexual, lesbian,
bisexual, pansexual, transgender, or queer and everyone whose sexuality is understood to be nonheterosexual by society at large or by law. In addition, although it is recognized that distinctions
can be made between the following terms for other purposes, for purposes of the project at hand,
the terms “homosexuals,” “gay people,” and “sexual minorities” will be used interchangeably.
Similarly, the terms “sexuality,” “sexual orientation,” and “sexual preference” will also be used
interchangeably.
3
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“suspect classification,”4 defined generally as a constitutionally impermissible distinction
between one group of persons and another, and defined specifically as a classification
based on a trait which itself seems to contravene established constitutional principles so
that any purposeful use of the classification may be deemed “suspect.”5
Intermediate scrutiny is a less intense level of judicial review and is triggered
when the law or policy in question contains what is known as a “quasi-suspect
classification”. Identification of the specific conceptual framework for the creation and
usage of the concept of a quasi-suspect classification, or for the creation and usage of
intermediate scrutiny, is a difficult task owing to the lack of consistency or conceptual
clarity in the development of these concepts (Kirp, Yudof, and Franks 1986: 90). It is
clear that intermediate scrutiny is used for those cases in which a suspect classification is
not involved, but in which the Supreme Court nevertheless wishes to review the case a
little more closely than it might otherwise do; but the exact process for determining when
this state of affairs is at hand is almost universally understood as unclear, other than by
the sort of classification involved.6 One suggestion is that decisions employing
intermediate scrutiny simply rely upon each justice‟s intuitive sense of whether the
classification in question is “benign” or “invidious” (Stephens & Scheb 2008: 473).
Another suggestion is that intermediate scrutiny was created to give titular
acknowledgment of the disadvantaged status of the group in question while
Strict scrutiny is also the level of judicial review used when a “fundamental right” is at
stake. Fundamental rights have been defined as those privileges and immunities “which are, in
their nature, fundamental.” Corfield v. Coryell 6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3,230 C.C.E.D.Pa. (1823).
4
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Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 938 (1984).
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For example, laws affecting women as a class are presently subject to intermediate scrutiny.
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simultaneously retaining judicial discretion to uphold legal classifications affecting the
group if doing so furthers some socio-political purpose deemed sufficiently “important”
(McKinnon 1991a).
The rational basis test is the lowest or least intense level of judicial review and is
used where neither a suspect classification nor a quasi-suspect classification is implicated
by the law. The rational basis test is the baseline approach to equal protection and is
marked by extreme judicial self-restraint and a concern for restricting the judicial role in
deference to the legislative branch (Barron & Dienes 2003). The rational basis test is the
default test for determining whether a given legal classification is constitutional and is
used where a legal classification is understood to be legally benign or constitutionally
harmless. Classical benign classifications are those impinging upon economic interests,
certain age restrictions like those applied to driving an automobile, and laws that restrict
professional practice to those who are qualified (Stephens & Scheb 2008: 454).
If the Court decides that the law in question involves a “suspect classification”
and if the court has therefore made the concomitant decision that strict scrutiny is the
appropriate level of judicial review, the Court has also decided that (1) the law or policy
in question is presumptively unconstitutional, that (2) the burden is on the government to
prove that the law is constitutional, and (3) in order to pass constitutional muster the law
must be shown to be “narrowly tailored” to meet a “compelling” state interest (Tribe
1988). This is a very difficult test for the government to meet. In practice, if a law,
policy, or other state action is assessed according to strict scrutiny, that law, policy, or
other state action most likely will be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
(Stephens & Scheb 2008).
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If the Court decides that a the law in question involves a quasi-suspect
classification and has therefore made the concomitant decision that intermediate scrutiny
is the appropriate level of judicial review, the Court has also decided that (1) the law or
policy in question is presumptively unconstitutional, and (2) the burden of proof is still
on the government; but, unlike under strict scrutiny, (3) in order to pass constitutional
muster the law must be shown to be “substantially related” to an “important” state
interest in order to stand, which is understood to be a less stringent test than strict
scrutiny, and, most importantly, (4) the government is often understood to have met its
burden of proof (Tribe 1988). In practice, if a law or policy is assessed under
intermediate scrutiny, that law sometimes will be held constitutional and sometimes held
unconstitutional. Employment of the intermediate scrutiny level of judicial review
signals that a more fact-sensitive, case-by-case approach to the law in question will be
used, with no particular likely outcome one way or another (Stephens & Scheb 2008).
If the Court decides that the rational basis test is the appropriate level of judicial
review, it has decided that (1) the law or policy in question is presumptively
constitutional, (2) the burden of proof is not on the government, as was the case with
strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, but on the person challenging the law to prove
the law‟s unconstitutionality (Tribe 1988). In practice, this means that if the government
is able to articulate any “legitimate” state interest, and also explain how the law or policy
in question is “rationally related” to that interest, the law in question will be upheld. Also
in practice, the government is almost always able to articulate a state interest that satisfies
this test and laws assessed according to the rational basis test are almost always upheld
(Stephens & Scheb 2008).
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The choice by the Supreme Court of which of these levels of judicial review
should be applied to a given law, governmental policy, or other state action, then, is
dramatically outcome determinative for the fate of the law. At present, only race and
ethnicity are suspect classifications (Tribe 1988; Stephens & Scheb 2008; Barron &
Dienes 2003), gender is understood as a quasi-suspect classification (Ibid.), and sexuality
or sexual orientation is not recognized as a constitutionally redressable classification at
all (Ibid.). What this means in practice is that, according to Suspect Classification
Doctrine, laws that discriminate amongst persons on the basis of race or ethnicity are
virtually always held unconstitutional, laws which discriminate on the basis of gender are
sometimes held unconstitutional and sometimes upheld depending upon whether the
Supreme Court finds the articulated governmental purpose for the law “important” or not
and/or whether the Court thinks the law in question is “substantially” related to the
achievement of that governmental interest, and laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexuality are presumed constitutional such that, in equal protection cases involving sexual
orientation, the burden of proof is always on the person challenging the law to prove that
the purpose offered by the government for the discriminatory law is illegitimate and/or
that there is no rational relationship between the purpose offered by the government and
the law or policy in question.
Race as a Suspect Classification
In the years since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause as regards racial discrimination has changed from the
interpretation in 1873 that the Clause protected only blacks to the view in the
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contemporary era that the Clause protects everyone (all “individuals”) from laws which
contain racial classifications.
Early Cases: Protecting Former Slaves
The very first cases to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment were a
conglomeration of cases decided in 1873 known as The Slaughterhouse Cases. These
cases stand for the proposition that the earliest interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause was that it was designed to protect former slaves only, and no one else. In 1869,
the Louisiana legislature had enacted a statute which gave a monopoly for the city of
New Orleans to a slaughterhouse. Several independent butchers filed suit in state courts
seeking injunctions against the monopoly.

The butchers were unable to obtain the

injunctions in state courts so they turned to the U.S. Supreme Court. Among other
things, they claimed that the Louisiana law denied them equal protection of the laws.
The Supreme Court held that the butchers had not been denied equal protection of the
laws. The Fourteenth Amendment, it held, was intended to protect former slaves and
could not be broadly applied.
The very next case to decide the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia. There, too, the Court made clear that the Equal
Protection Clause was designed as a protection for former slaves. The Equal Protection
Clause, the Court stated, was there to protect what it called “the colored race” from legal
discrimination against them as colored persons. Strauder was an African American man
who had been convicted of murder by an all-white jury. The law of the State of West
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Virginia at the time precluded non-whites from serving on juries.7 Strauder‟s contention
was that the West Virginia law violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The
Supreme Court agreed. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said, was intended to
secure to the recently emancipated race all of the civil rights enjoyed by others and
confers a positive immunity or right to exemption from legislation directed against them
as colored persons. This immunity, the Court said, implied an exemption for members of
the colored race from all discrimination (i.e., classification) that implied legal inferiority,
that lessened the security of their rights, or that amounted to an attempt to reduce them to
a condition of a subject race. The West Virginia law in question violated the Equal
Protection Clause, said the Court, because it discriminated against “the colored race” in
these ways.
Public v. Private Discrimination: the Rise of Separate But Equal Doctrine
But with the decision in The Civil Rights Cases, decided three years later in 1883,
the Court began to distinguish between racial discrimination on the part of the
government and private racial discrimination, and this distinction became one of the
bases upon which legalized racial discrimination in places of public accommodation was
established a few years later, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, discussed below. The
issue in The Civil Rights Cases was the constitutionality of a section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 that criminalized discrimination on the basis of any “previous condition of
servitude” in places of public accommodation. The Supreme Court said that this section
of the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional because, among other things, the Fourteenth

The West Virginia statute stated: “All white male persons who are twenty-one year of age
and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided.”
(Acts of 1872-1873, p. 102). The persons excepted were state officials.
7
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Amendment was a prohibition against government (or “state”) action only, not acts by
private citizens, such that a federal law that criminalized private racial discrimination
could not be sustained.8 In effect, the Supreme Court claimed, in The Civil Rights Cases,
that private discrimination against blacks did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and
was not unconstitutional. Much would be made of this public/private distinction as the
question of the constitutional rights of blacks in public accommodations and public
schools became an increasingly pressing one in the twentieth century.
The distinction the Court made in The Civil Rights Cases between public and
private racial discrimination was made again in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson,
decided in 1896. As mentioned above, this distinction formed the basis of what became
known as Separate But Equal Doctrine emerging from Plessy, or the view that the
dictates of the Equal Protection Clause could be satisfied by providing “equal”
accommodations for blacks and for whites, even if those accommodations were kept
“separate.”
At issue in Plessy was a Louisiana law known as the Separate Car Act which
required “equal, but separate” railway car accommodations for the “white and colored
races.” Violation of this law was a misdemeanor. Homer Plessy, a black man of mixed
racial ancestry, deliberately violated the law by sitting in a railway car designated for
“whites” only and was convicted of the misdemeanor. He appealed to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, who upheld the Louisiana law. Plessy appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Court agreed with the state supreme court and upheld the Louisiana law.

8

The doctrine of state action is an integral part of equal protection analysis, but is not directly
relevant to the issues that are the subject of the present inquiry. For further information on state
action doctrine, see (Tribe 1988) and (Stephens & Scheb 2008).
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Citing, among other things, The Civil Rights Cases, the Court reasoned that the private
owner of a railway car cannot be regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude;
and for this reason, there was no equal protection violation in the Louisiana law. While
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish legal distinctions between “whites”
and “coloreds,” the Court reasoned, the Amendment certainly could not have been
designed to abolish social distinctions.9
In addition, where public accommodations for “coloreds” were “equal” to the
accommodations provided for “whites,” the Court stated, there was no equal protection
violation, since the mere fact of social separation did not impose any badge of slavery.
Inherent in this conclusion are at least four sub-conclusions. First, taking the lead from
The Civil Rights Cases, the owner of a railway car is not a state actor, not acting on
behalf of the government, and only a state actor can impose the badges of slavery.
Second, even if the owner of a railway car were a state actor, and could impose the
badges of slavery, a constitutionally significant bright line can be drawn between “legal”
racial distinctions and “social” ones. Third, the owner of a private business is
constitutionally at liberty to make “social” racial distinctions.
The Separate But Equal Doctrine officially created by Plessy v. Ferguson had a
long reign. The doctrine was in place from 1896 to 1954 and had many distinctive
features, chief among them the official legal distinction between “white” Americans and
“black” Americans on the federal level by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Although what are known as Jim Crow laws or Black Codes had been appearing in state

9

In the twentieth century, however, this legal/social distinction would come to be challenged
as a pretense for attempts on the part of the government to perpetuate the unequal status of blacks
after the Civil War. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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statutory systems all over the south ever since the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862, 10
Plessy provided federal sanction for those laws and paved the way for more rigorous
enactment and enforcement of them (Tribe 1988; Stephens & Scheb 2008). Segregation
in public accommodations such as trains, buses, hotels, swimming pools, and other places
of public amusement became a way of life all over America, a legal and social fact that
became a part of the fabric and identity of the American culture. Some recent scholarship
has called this phenomenon the development in America of a “racial consciousness” that
has become a permanent feature of American life (Bell 1992; Banton 1988; Lawson
2008, Feagin 2006).11 These scholars argue that the idea that “the races” could or should
be socially segregated became regarded by many Americans, particularly subconsciously,
as a self-evident truth.
Separate But Equal Doctrine, then, was an early method of interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause that was established by the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson in
1896. Distinctive features of Separate But Equal Doctrine were (1) that it incorporated
into the official Supreme Court interpretation of the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause an explicit, federal endorsement of a legal differentiation between “black”
Americans and “white,” (2) that it made a constitutionally significant distinction between
“legal” racial discrimination and “social” racial discrimination, with “social” racial
discrimination considered constitutionally permissible, (3) that distinction between

10

Jim Crow laws or Black Codes were bodies of legislation enacted after the Civil War
by the southern states to maintain the socially and legally inferior position of former slaves after
the abolition of slavery. (Du Bois 1935; Kull 1994; Woodward 2002)
Ronald Dworkin has written, for example, that “American society is… a racially
conscious society; this is the inevitable and evident consequence of a history of slavery,
repression, and prejudice” (Dworkin 1977, 11).
11
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“whites” and “blacks” on the part of the owner of railway cars and other public
conveyances or public accommodation was considered a “social” distinction rather than a
“legal” one, and that (4) the concept of equality contemplated by the Equal Protection
Clause was thought to be achieved in public accommodations if “separate but equal”
facilities were provided for each of “the two races.”
The Meaning of “Equal”
In 1938, the court began to reconsider Separate But Equal Doctrine. In the case
of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, petitioner Lloyd Gaines, an African American, was
denied admission to the law school at the University of Missouri. The state of Missouri
admitted that Gaines was qualified in terms of his previous work and college credits to be
admitted into the law school, but asserted that it was contrary to the constitution, laws
and public policy of the State to admit a “negro” as a student at the University of
Missouri. There was provision made in the state statutes, however, for funding to be
provided for “negro” students to attend law schools out of state rather than attend law
school at the University of Missouri. Gaines considered the state‟s action in this case to
be an equal protection violation and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The
Court concluded that because the state of Missouri did not provide a separate but equal
law school for “negro” students, the decision of the state court not to admit Gaines had to
be overturned. In Gaines, then, while the Supreme Court did not repeal Separate But
Equal Doctrine, it did acknowledge the difficulties of providing separate but equal
facilities for every so-called negro student.12
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Four years later, in Sipuel v. Oklahoma Board of Regents (1948), the Court summarily
affirmed its holding in Gaines by holding that a law school admissions policy denying admission
24

Group Rights: Strict Scrutiny Begins
Then in 1944, the Court decided Korematsu v. United States. In that case,
Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district
court of remaining in San Leandro, California contrary to a law which directed that, after
May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area.
Korematsu appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the order violated his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause. Although the Court concluded that the order did not
violate Korematsu‟s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, it also
held that all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect and should be subjected to “the most rigid scrutiny.” In other
words, the Korematsu Court suggested that the Equal Protection Clause should be
understood or interpreted to provide special protection for a racial group when a given
law negatively implicates the rights of that group qua group.13 Note that this is a
different interpretation from the interpretation that the Equal Protection Clause was
meant to protect blacks only (à la The Slaughterhouse Cases), and a different
interpretation from the interpretation of the Clause that attempted to provide
constitutional support for legalized “social” or private discrimination (i.e., Separate But
Equal Doctrine). This new interpretation was that the Equal Protection Clause should be
understood to protect racial groups from laws specifically designed to deny them their

to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause where there was no other way in the state for the
petitioner to obtain the legal education that her qualifications warranted.
13

The Korematsu Court did not find racial classifications problematic per se, such that racial
classifications should be subject to closer judicial scrutiny than other sorts of classifications.
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civil rights. In other words, Korematsu set the precedent for strict scrutiny across the
board for what later became known as “suspect classes.”
Social v. Legal Equality
Six years later in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950), the Court picked
up on and reinforced its emerging view that public and private discrimination may not be
as separable as it had held in The Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson. In
McLaurin, officials at the University of Oklahoma had attempted to segregate a black
graduate student admitted as a candidate for a doctorate in education at the University of
Oklahoma from his white colleagues after he was admitted by a court order. In class, the
student was required to sit in a row of desks restricted to blacks. He was required to eat
at a designated table in the cafeteria and was even prohibited from visiting his professors
during their regular office hours in order to minimize his interactions with white students.
The Court held that these restrictions significantly detracted from the student‟s
educational experience and thus could not be justified. Instead, once the student was
admitted to the school, the school had an obligation to treat McLaurin the same as the
other students, as this was the only way the constitutional requirement that he receive an
“equal” education could be accomplished. Significant here is that the segregation to
which McLaurin was subjected was largely social, and that the Court found in this case a
relationship between the constitutional requirement of legal equality and the social
classification to which McLaurin was subject.
Separate = Inferior
Then, in Sweatt v. Painter (1950), the Court had an opportunity to assess the
constitutionality of an attempt by the state of Texas to provide a separate but equal law
26

school created solely for “Negro” students. Petitioner Sweatt, had been refused
admission to the University of Texas law school solely because he was a “Negro.” The
University of Texas law school was restricted to “white” students in accordance with
state law.14 “White” law students went to the University of Texas but “black” ones were
to be sent to the “Texas College for Negroes.” The Court found that the law school for
“negroes” was substantially inferior, in terms of both measurable and intangible factors,
to the whites-only law school and held that the Fourteenth Amendment therefore required
the University of Texas to admit Sweatt to the University of Texas law school. After
Sweatt, it seemed unlikely that the Supreme Court would continue to employ Separate
But Equal doctrine in the realm of publically funded education since the educational
services provided for blacks under that doctrine were in fact not “equal” but inferior.
Separate But Equal Overturned
Then, in 1954, the court explicitly overturned Separate But Equal Doctrine in
public education in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education (also known as
Brown I).

There, a unanimous Court held that separate educational facilities for black

children were inherently unequal, and that there was no place in publically funded
education for Separate But Equal Doctrine. The Court was unsure, however, as to how
desegregation of public education should be accomplished and did not make its first
decision on that issue until 1955 in a case known as Brown II.

In Brown II, faced with

widespread resistance, often violent, to its decision in Brown I in the South, the Court
decided to leave the decision as to how to accomplish desegregation of public education

14

See Tex.Const., Art. VII, §§ 7, 14; Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. (Vernon, 1925), Arts. 2643b
(Supp. 1949), 2719, 2900.
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to the federal district judges in the various states. The Court ordered that the states
proceed with “all deliberate speed”, a phrase that came to be associated with delaying
tactics on the part of the Southern states (Stephens & Scheb 2008: 459) . This decision
resulted in the usage of various delaying tactics for the next ten years or so by state and
local officials and the establishment of no clear guidelines regarding how to accomplish
equal educational facilities for all children (Ibid.). But, after Brown I and II, it was clear
that the Court considered Separate But Equal Doctrine to be unconstitutional and
ineffective at accomplishing the Fourteenth Amendment ideal of equality for blacks, at
least in the realm of public education. Then, in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education (1969), the Court stated that desegregation of public schools should occur “at
once”, signaling that it would no longer tolerate the South‟s delaying tactics (Ibid.).
Racial Classifications and Marriage
The usage of strict scrutiny for racial classifications was extended from the realm
of public education to the realm of marriage in Loving v. Virginia (1967). In that case,
Mildred Jeter, a “Negro” woman, and Richard Loving, a “white” man – both residents of
Virginia -- were legally married in the District of Columbia in 1958. Shortly after their
marriage, the Lovings returned home to Virginia where they were soon charged with the
crime of violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. The Lovings pleaded guilty to
the charge, and were sentenced to one year in jail. Their sentences were suspended on
the condition that they leave Virginia and not return to the state together for 25 years.
The Lovings appealed their convictions and sentences on the ground that Virginia‟s antimiscegenation laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The state of Virginia responded
that since the anti-miscegenation laws applied equally to whites and blacks, there was no
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equal protection violation. The Supreme Court disagreed. The court stated that criminal
penalties for interracial marriage arose as an incident to slavery, and that the antimiscegenation law in question was a development of Virginia‟s white supremacy laws,15
the central feature of which was the absolute prohibition of a “white” person marrying
anyone other than another “white” person. Using the emerging strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review, the Court held that there was patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justified the racial classification at
issue in the case. The fact that Virginia prohibited only interracial marriages involving
white persons, the Court said, demonstrated that the racial classifications were designed
to maintain white supremacy. The implication of the Court‟s decision was that a law
which is designed to maintain white supremacy is a law that violates equal protection and
that where this is the case, invidious racial discrimination has occurred and the
constitution has been violated.
The Loving case contains an unusually large amount of social analysis of the
problem of racism in America. The Court wrote, for example, at page 6:
Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on
the basis of racial classifications. Penalties for miscegenation arose as an
incident to slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the colonial
period. The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial
Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme nativism which
followed the end of the First World War. The central features of this Act,
and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a "white person"
marrying other than another "white person," a prohibition against issuing
marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that the applicants'
statements as to their race are correct, certificates of "racial composition"
to be kept by both local and state registrars, and the carrying forward of
earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage.
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See, e.g., Virginia‟s Racial Integrity Act of 1924.
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In other words, notable about Loving is that while its holding is that racial classifications
in marriage laws violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court‟s explanation
for why the particular racial classification at issue in Loving is unconstitutional is the
history of racial discrimination against blacks in Virginia. Virginia‟s anti-miscegenation
law could not be benign, the Court argued, because the social context indicated that antimiscegenation laws in Virginia had always been designed to perpetuate white supremacy,
and not because racial classifications per se (i.e., outside of the social context of the
history of racial discrimination against blacks in Virginia) were constitutionally
problematic.
Discriminatory Intent v. Disparate Impact
The case of Washington v. Davis (1976) added the new concept of “disparate
impact” to Equal Protection Analysis and is a key component of Suspect Classification
Doctrine. In this case,, Harley and Sellers, two “Negroes” whose applications to become
police officers in Washington, D.C. were rejected, filed suit against the District of
Columbia claiming that the D.C. Police Department‟s recruiting procedures, which
included a written personnel test known as “Test 21”, were racially discriminatory in
violation of the constitution.16 The police department claimed that the test was designed
to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension. Harley and Seller claimed
that the test bore no relationship to job performance, excluded a disproportionately high
number of “Negro” applicants, and for these reasons was unconstitutional. The Court
upheld Test 21. The test was racially neutral on its face, said the Court, and since no one,
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Since this action took place in the District of Columbia rather than in a state, the claim
was that Respondents‟ due process rights had been violated under the Fifth Amendment rather
than their rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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not even Harley or Sellers, was claiming that the test involved a racially discriminatory
intent, it was constitutional. The fact that the test had, or may have had, a discriminatory
impact was inapposite, said the Court. The test for the constitutionality of a law charged
with being racially discriminatory in violation of the constitution was whether the law
involved a racially discriminatory intent. The Court concluded that a law or policy
having merely a disparate impact will be upheld unless plaintiffs can show that it was
adopted to serve a racially discriminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, then, adds to
Suspect Classification Doctrine the idea that where there is no discriminatory intent,
more probing judicial review (a higher level of scrutiny) is not in order. But, the
problem with this interpretation is that state action that is neutral on its face but operates
to discriminate against blacks is understood as constitutionally sound. For this reason, an
equal protection jurisprudence that turns formalistically on facial discrimination will, as
Kenji Yoshino points out, “get it exactly backward” (Yoshino 2011: 767), ignoring the
fact that the history of legalized racial discrimination in America is a history of dressing
racism up in racially-neutral clothes.17 Using this distinction between discriminatory
intent and disparate impact, the Court has over the years shifted from providing redress to
African Americans for laws that on the surface appear race-neutral but in practice operate
to disenfranchise blacks, to not providing Equal Protection redress to African Americans
at all unless the law in question is on its face discriminatory against blacks. This has had
a dramatic chilling effect on the historical protection provided for African Americans
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For example, as was discussed above, the justification offered by the Supreme Court
for creating Separate But Equal Doctrine in 1896 and then perpetuating it for fifty-eight years was
that separate railway train accommodations, or separate water fountains, or separate schools for
blacks were perfectly equal to the accommodations for whites; and that such separate
accommodations were not racist in virtue of this “equality.”
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under the Equal Protection Clause (Yoshino 2011: 767). Arguably, however, the most
damaging interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to the equality rights of African
Americans was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), discussed next.
Bakke: The Seminal Case of Suspect Classification Doctrine
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), the Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny to a racial classification that not only had no disparate impact on
blacks, it had no discriminatory intent against blacks either. Rather, the policy in
question was actually designed to help blacks. In Bakke, a 37-year-old white male who
was twice denied admission to the University of California at Davis medical school
challenged the school‟s affirmative action policy, claiming that the policy violated his
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Strangely, the Court held that
laws which entail racial and ethnic classifications were subject to strict judicial scrutiny
across the board and without regard to whether the group discriminated against was in the
numerical minority or had suffered a history of political disenfranchisement.
The details of Bakke are important since Bakke marks the beginning of the
application of strict scrutiny to laws which discriminate against all racial classifications
across the board, the hallmark aspect of Suspect Classification Doctrine. The affirmative
action policy at issue in Bakke involved what has come to be known as a “quota system.”
The Cal-Davis medical school had two tracks for admission: the “regular” track and the
“special” track. The regular track required automatic rejection of anyone with a grade
point average below 2.5. Then, about one out of six of those remaining were
interviewed. After the interview, each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by each
of the committee members. This rating was known as a candidate‟s “benchmark score.”
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The benchmark score was calculated in terms of the interviewers' summaries, the
candidate‟s grade point average, the candidate‟s science course grade point average, the
candidate‟s Medical College Admissions Test scores, letters of recommendation,
extracurricular activities, and other biographical data. Based on the benchmark score,
offers of admission were made. The committee also had a waiting list. The chair of the
committee had the power to place people with “special skills” on the waiting list.
There were sixteen spaces available for “special” applicants. The special track
was run by a separate committee comprised primarily of members of minority groups.
The application forms at issue asked candidates whether they wished to be considered as
"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants or members of a "minority
group" (blacks, Chicanos, Asians, American Indians). If an applicant identified himself or
herself to be "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged", he or she would be
rated in a manner similar to the one employed by the general admissions committee. If a
candidate identified himself or herself as a member of a “minority group” (blacks,
Chicanos, Asians, and Native Americans), the candidate did not have to meet the 2.5
grade point cutoff. The special candidates were given benchmark scores and the top
choices were given to the general admissions committee. The special committee
continued to recommend candidates until 16 special admission selections had been made.
Bakke was twice considered and rejected under the regular admissions program.
In both years, special applicants were admitted with significantly lower scores than his.
After his second rejection, Bakke filed suit in state court asking the court to compel his
admission to the medical school, alleging that the special admissions program violated
his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amendment. The medical
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school cross-claimed for a declaration that its special admissions program was lawful.
The Supreme Court invalidated the school‟s special admissions program on the ground
that quota systems like the one used by the medical school operated so as to discriminate
against applicants like Bakke, i.e., white applicants, on the basis of race in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ordered Bakke‟s admission to the medical school.
As will be demonstrated by an examination of the cases that have followed Bakke,
below, after Bakke Equal Protection Analysis has never been the same. While the preBakke interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause was that it was intended to protect
blacks in virtue of the observable reality that the equality status of blacks was far below
that of whites in American society, the post-Bakke interpretation of the Clause is that it is
there to protect everyone from laws which contain racial classifications. Since Bakke,
although the Court has not been entirely averse to upholding affirmative action programs
for blacks, the Court‟s tendency to uphold such programs has dramatically diminished.
Post-Bakke Fall-Out
From 1980 to 1989, the Court continued to apply strict scrutiny to racial
classifications regardless of the race of persons affected by the law at issue. There were
cases in this period in which affirmative action programs were explicitly upheld,18 cases
where affirmative action was limited in scope,19 and cases of the explicit protection of
“whites”.20 Then, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company (1989), the Court dealt
a serious blow to affirmative action for blacks when it struck down a Richmond set-aside

18

See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1986).
See, e.g., Memphis Firefighters v. Stotts (1984).
20
See, e.g., Martin v. Wilkes (1989).
19

34

plan requiring that construction companies who were awarded city contracts to award at
least thirty percent of their subcontract to minority-owned businesses. The Court
reasoned that the set-aside plan denied certain citizens – in this case “white” citizens –
the opportunity to compete for a certain percentage of public contracts based solely on
their race.
Then, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña (1995), the Court affirmed its view
that all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. At issue in the case
was a policy of the U.S. Department of Transportation under which general contractors
were given a financial incentive to hire subcontractors run by individuals who were
members of socially and economically disadvantaged groups. It was part of the policy
that general contractors should presume that socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian
Pacific Americans, and other minorities. Accordingly, although Adarand Constructors
had submitted a lower bid, it was passed over as a subcontractor on a federal highway
project in favor of a company that had preferred status under the affirmative action
policy. The Court held that since the policy involved a racial classification, it had to be
held to strict scrutiny, meaning, of course, that it should and did fail.
Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, both decided in 2003 and together
known as “the Michigan cases,” represent the state of the law today on the topic of the
extent to which race and ethnicity can constitutionally be included in higher education
admissions decisions; and simultaneously represent the present state of Suspect
Classification Doctrine in equal protection analysis.

At issue in Gratz was an

undergraduate admissions policy used by the University of Michigan‟s College of
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Literature, Science, and the Arts. According to the policy, each applicant was assigned a
number of points based on several criteria including high school grades, strength of high
school curriculum, standardized test scores, leadership, an essay, and membership in an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group. The total number of points available
was 150 points. Under the policy, 20 points were automatically awarded to any applicant
who was a member of a racial or ethnic minority group. At issue in Grutter was a law
school admissions policy used by the University of Michigan Law School according to
which all of the information in an applicant‟s file was reviewed by admissions officials
individually. Each file included the applicant‟s undergraduate G.P.A., LSAT score, letters
of recommendation, a personal statement, and an essay describing how the applicant
would contribute to life at the law school, including a consideration of diversity. Strict
scrutiny was used by the Supreme Court to examine both policies. The Gratz admissions
policy failed but the Grutter admissions policy was upheld. The Court reasoned that
automatic assignment of 20 points for diversity in the Gratz case was not a policy that
was sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to meet the interest in educational diversity that the
University “claim[ed] justified their program.” The Grutter policy, by contrast, passed
strict scrutiny since it considered each applicant on an individual basis and did not make
an applicant‟s “race” or ethnicity “the defining feature of his or her application.”
Together Gratz and Grutter do not add clarity to the contemporary “meaning” of
the Equal Protection Clause, as developed by the Supreme Court. Why is it the case,
Gratz and Grutter together call us to ask, that adding twenty points to an applicant‟s file
for purposes of balancing the scales between applicants who are members of groups who
have been historically subjugated and applicants who are not is not sufficiently “narrowly
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tailored” to meet the state‟s conceded interest in educational diversity? Why is it the case
that looking at each applicant‟s entire file is sufficiently “narrowly tailored”? What does
“narrowly tailored” mean in this context other than “least restrictive to white applicants”?
If “least restrictive to white applicants” is what “narrowly tailored” means, then,
arguably, Suspect Classification Doctrine operates less as a means for allowing access to
the ideal of equality for historically subjugated and marginalized groups, than as an
empty and vacuous shell of a doctrine, operating no less in service to the interests of the
white majority than did Separate But Equal Doctrine, or the institution of slavery before
it, for that matter.
From Race to Gender and Sexual Orientation
Under Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, strict scrutiny is the standard of
review applicable in cases where a law or governmental policy classifies persons on the
basis of race, and this is true regardless of the race of the person challenging the law. In
other words, race is a “suspect classification.” What this means is that while the early
interpretations of the Equal Protection gave special consideration to laws which
discriminated against blacks, under Suspect Classification Doctrine -- prevalent since
Bakke -- whites are equally as protected by the Equal Protection Clause as blacks. On its
face, this may appear to be a sort of evolution in Equal Protection Analysis. It is
certainly a popular view, particularly here in what many call the “post-racial” era, that the
constitutional protections available to some must be available to all and that there is little,
if any, need in the contemporary era to provide special constitutional protection for
African Americans. Many also argue that all constitutional provisions should necessarily
apply to everyone equally, owing to the ideals of universality and objectivity that many
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understand to be at the heart of the American political system, political liberalism. But,
as I hope the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, Suspect Classification Doctrine has
developed not as a consequence of the directed, intentional, and considered application
of the (so-called) American ideals of universality and objectivity to the realm of Equal
Protection Analysis, but instead as a consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding on
the part of the Supreme Court about how the interpretive process actually takes place, as
well as a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the Supreme Court about how it
should.
As has been done above for the group of people known as blacks, in the sections
of this chapter that follow, the development of Suspect Classification Doctrine for
women and the development of Suspect Classification Doctrine for gay people will be
outlined in detail, with the intention of demonstrating just how internally inconsistent,
value-laden, and deeply context-dependent (i.e., non-universal and non-objective) has
been the Supreme Court‟s application (or in some cases non-application) of the Equal
Protection Clause to the equality rights of blacks, women and gay people over the years.
This exposition will be followed by a detailed analysis of two concepts that have
developed alongside Suspect Classification Doctrine and that have helped to shape and
misshape the doctrine along the way. These are the concepts of “discrete and insular
minorities” and “immutable characteristics.”
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Gender as a Quasi-Suspect Classification
Historically, laws affecting women as a group have been of two kinds: laws
excluding women from the political process21 and laws regarding women as in need of
special protection.22 In fact, while the Supreme Court‟s characterization of laws which
discriminate between persons on the basis of race as highly suspect is “firmly rooted in
the most orthodox interpretations of constitutional history” (Tribe, 2008:1585), the same
cannot be said for laws which discriminate on the basis of gender. Instead, the Supreme
Court‟s historical, as well as contemporary, position is that legalized distinctions between
men and women are often required for “important” governmental interests (Bradwell v.
Illinois (1873); Minor v. Happersett (1875); Goeseart v. Cleary (1948); Kahn v. Shevin
(1974)).
Regarding gender discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause states, in pertinent
part, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall….deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1,
emphasis added.) While this language was originally designed to provide a constitutional
basis for the protection of the citizenship rights of former slaves after the Civil War,
women began to take advantage of the broad language of the Clause (“any person”) very
soon after enactment by bringing federal law suits challenging the constitutionality of
laws which provided one set of legal standards for men and another set for women.
21

For example, women did not have the right to vote until the passing of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920.
22

For example, for many years there were minimum wage requirements for women but
not for men (See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 1937). Another example is women‟s
historical exemption from the military draft (Rostker v. Goldberg 1981).
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And as is the case with racial classifications, judicial review of such laws takes
place according to Suspect Classification Doctrine. According to Suspect Classification
Doctrine, the appropriate level of judicial review for cases of laws which make legal
classifications on the basis of gender is intermediate scrutiny. In practice, where
intermediate scrutiny has been deemed the appropriate level of judicial review,
sometimes the law subject to review is upheld and sometimes it is struck down. There
are no real guidelines available to anyone contesting the law as to the criteria for the
constitutionality of such laws. In the parlance of Suspect Classification Doctrine, legal
classifications between persons on the basis of sex or gender are not suspect
classifications but quasi-suspect classifications. What this means in practice is that,
generally, when there is understood to be some sort of biologically relevant or socially
salient difference between men and women that is thought to necessitate the classification
in order to achieve some sort of “important” governmental interest, classifications on the
basis of gender are upheld.
Early Cases: Exclusion from the Political Process and the Law of the “Creator”
The very first cases of gender discrimination brought before the Supreme Court in
the early years after enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment involved laws which were
routinely upheld. For example, the first case of alleged gender discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment came before the Supreme Court approximately 137 years ago
with the case of Bradwell v. Illinois (1873). The facts of the case are as follows. An
Illinois statute provided that any adult “person” of good character and having the
requisite training, was eligible to practice law in the state of Illinois. Myra Bradwell
applied to the Illinois Supreme Court for a license to practice law. She was found to
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possess the requisite qualifications. Her application was refused, however, on the
grounds that she was a woman. Bradwell appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court claiming that the denial of her application was a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
The Court upheld the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court on the grounds that the
practice of law was not a federal right, and that states were therefore free to enact laws
regulating the practice of law. But Justice Bradley‟s concurring opinion summarized the
spirit of the decision, at 141, where he wrote, “The harmony… of interests and views
which belong or should belong to the family institution, is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband….The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”
Early “Similarly Situated” Rhetoric
Then, two years later, in Minor v. Happersett (1875), Virginia Minor, president of
the Missouri Woman Suffrage Association, was prevented from registering to vote in the
state of Missouri on the grounds that she was not a “male citizen of the United States”, as
the laws of the state of Missouri required, but a woman for whom no right to vote existed
under the laws and the constitution of the state of Missouri. Minor appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, arguing that Missouri‟s laws violated her right to vote in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed. While women
were citizens, and even “persons” in accordance with the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court said, the constitution conferred on women no right to vote.
Accordingly, the state of Missouri was perfectly within its rights to create laws
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preventing women from voting or registering to vote.23 The Court concluded, “[We are]
unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the
right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several States
which commit that important trust to men alone are not [therefore] necessarily void….”
Notable about Minor is that, boiled down to its base elements, the Supreme Court at the
time would rather have held that national citizenship did not in itself confer on anyone
the right to vote, than concede that if women were citizens, women had the right to
vote.24
Then, in Muller v. Oregon (1908), the Court upheld a state law limiting the hours
that women could work. There, the Court held that woman was “properly placed in a
class by herself” owing to her “physical structure and the performance of her maternal
functions.” Accordingly, the Court said, laws designed for the protection of women
would be upheld, even where similar legislation for men could not be constitutionally
upheld.
The reasoning used in Minor and Muller together set the stage for what would
later become oft-repeated rhetoric in equal protection analysis on the topic of gender, i.e.,
language to the effect that where men and women are “similarly situated”, legal
classification between the genders is constitutional but where men are women are not
23

Notably, women did not have the right to vote in the United States until the Nineteenth
Amendment to the constitution was passed and ratified 45 years later in 1920. The amendment
states, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.”
24

It would take a constitutional amendment, the 19th, for there to be an acknowledgement
that national citizenship did entail a federal right to vote, and that this right exists regardless of
the sex of the citizen.
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“similarly situated,” legal classification between the genders violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
Mid-Twentieth Century Developments: Court as Protector Continues
The next significant gender discrimination case did not occur until the midtwentieth century. In Goesaert v. Cleary (1948), the court continued its role of the
protector of women. In Goesaert, several female bartenders in Michigan challenged a
law which banned women from obtaining licenses to tend bar in the state unless they
were the wives or daughters of a male bar owner.25 Finding that the Michigan law did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court wrote, among other things,
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not have authority to “tear history up by the
roots.” The fact that women “may now have achieved the virtues that men have long
claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced,” did
not preclude the states from drawing a sharp line between the sexes. The state of
Michigan had the power to forbid all women from working behind a bar, the Court said,
“since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to
moral and social problems.” The paternalism in Goesaert permeates every sentence of
the decision. It was reasonable at the time for the legislature to believe that “the
oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid‟s husband or father
minimize[d] hazards that confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight.”
In the early cases of gender discrimination brought before the Supreme Court,
then, i.e., Bradwell, Minor, Muller, and Goesaert, laws which discriminated on the basis
25

Section 19a of Act 133 of the Public Acts of Michigan, 1945, Mich. Stat. Ann. §
18.990 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1947) stated that no female could be licensed to tend bar in the state
unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor establishment.
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of gender were upheld and the rationales offered in support of each decision was a
judgment call about the proper role of women in society. In Bradwell, while the Court
claimed that the basis for its decision was the fact that there was simply no federal right
to practice law which the Court was bound to protect; in the rationale for its decision the
Court explicitly prioritized the “harmonious” family over a woman‟s right to her own
career. In Minor, while the Court claimed that the basis for its decision was that there
was simply no federal right to vote available for women, the Court‟s rationale for that
conclusion, i.e., women are citizens but citizenship does not necessarily involve voting
privileges, is so irrational as to lead the casual reader to surmise that there might be some
other, less benign, reason for the conclusion. In Muller, the Court was explicitly
protecting the sanctity of motherhood. In Goesaert, the Court focuses on mysterious
“moral and social problems” that are sure to crop up if women unrelated to the bar owner
(presumed to be male) were allowed to be bartenders, in order to deny women the right to
make a living through a means of their own choosing. The social role of women implied
and which is being legislated in Goesaert is that women need to be both protected and
contained, presumably from some sort of behavior (such as drinking alcohol or engaging
in sexual relations or both) the Court considered immoral. These three cases represent
the early history of equal protection analysis for women, a history that has been
characterized by Justice Brennan in the following way: “[O]ur Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination…rationalized by an attitude of „romantic
paternalism‟ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973).
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Early 1970s: Equal Rights for Women Begin, Rational Basis Test Used
The first case to find in favor of equal rights for women under the Fourteenth
Amendment was Reed v. Reed (1971). The case involved an Idaho probate statute that
gave preference to male over female applicants for the position of estate administrator.26
A minor, Richard Lynn Reed, had died without a will and both of his adoptive parents,
recently separated, had applied to be the administrator of the child‟s estate. The probate
court had recognized the equality of entitlement of the two applicants under the relevant
law, but found that the father, being a male, was to be preferred as an administrator
pursuant to the Idaho law. The Supreme Court found the Idaho law unconstitutional, and
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held
that to give a mandatory preference to members of one sex over the other is to make the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the rational basis test, the Court stated that arbitrary,
legalized differentiation between the sexes violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that
in order to pass constitutional muster, there must be some sort of relevant reason for the
distinction. The Court found no relevant reason in the Idaho probate statute and the
statute was therefore held to be unconstitutional.
Notably, however, the Court did not apply the strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review to this case. It applied the rational basis test, or the standard of review applied to
all cases of alleged discriminatory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, except those
involving race (or ethnicity). In other words, although the Court struck down the
discriminatory law, the court did not hold that cases involving classifications on the basis
26

Idaho Code §§ 15-312, 15-314 (repealed 1972).
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of “sex” or gender were “suspect classifications.” Instead, even after Reed, there was no
presumption of unconstitutionality available for laws which discriminated on the basis of
gender. Instead, although the decision went in claimant‟s favor, the burden of proof had
been on the claimant to show that the rationalization offered by the state for the gender
classification was unjustified.
Frontiero: Immutable Characteristics
The case of Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) is a landmark case because a plurality
of Justices came to the conclusion that strict scrutiny was the applicable standard of
judicial review in gender discrimination cases, i.e., that gender, like race, was a “suspect
classification.” But, the rationale for the plurality‟s decision on this is rather bizarre. As
will be discussed a bit further, below, the reason gender is a suspect classification, held
the plurality, is that gender is an “immutable characteristic” on the basis of which legal
burdens should not be imposed.
The case involved Sharon Frontiero, a married female lieutenant in the United
States Air Force, who applied for benefits for her husband as a dependent under statutes
designed to provide fringe benefits to members of the uniformed services on a
competitive basis with business and industry. Under the statute, a member of the
uniformed services with dependents was entitled to an increased "basic allowance for
quarters" and a member's dependents were provided comprehensive medical and dental
care. The statutes also provided however, that spouses of male members of the
uniformed services were dependents for purposes of obtaining the benefits, but that
spouses of female members were not dependents unless they were factually dependent for
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over one-half of their support on the female member.27 The Supreme Court held the laws
in question violated the Equal Protection Clause. As mentioned above, a plurality of the
Court (i.e., four justices) also held that any law which makes classifications on the basis
of gender should be held to strict scrutiny and considered presumptively invalid.
The plurality explained, “Classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny,” adding,
“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility.” (Emphasis added.)
What differentiated sex from non-suspect statuses and aligned it with the suspect status of
race, said the plurality, is that “the sex characteristic” often bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society. It is important to notice three things about this decision.
First, the Court assumes that there is something called a “sex characteristic.” Second, the
Court articulates that the salient point for purposes of deciding whether a given
“characteristic” is a constitutional basis upon which to make legal distinctions is whether
this “characteristic” bears a relation to one‟s ability to perform or contribute to society.
And third, this test of whether a given “immutable” characteristic is a constitutional basis
upon which to make legally permissible distinctions amongst persons seems to be
invented by the Court out of whole cloth; or, more to the point, seems to have been
invented retroactively after the Court‟s first having decided that discrimination on the
basis of gender was unconstitutional. At no discernible point prior to Frontiero had the
27

37 U.S.C. §§ 401 403, and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072 1076.
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Court used this type of language with regard to cases of discrimination against black
people, i.e., the only suspect class then in existence. At no point prior to Frontiero had
the Court stated that the “immutable characteristic” of blackness (or even the more
general concept of the “immutable characteristic” of race) was a constitutionally
impermissible basis upon which to legally discriminate amongst persons. Instead, the
Court spoke of the issue of whether a given law was discriminatory against black people,
or against “Negros” or against “the colored race,” all terms which imply that it is a
group of persons (a “suspect class”) against which it is constitutionally impermissible to
make legal distinctions under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a particular
“characteristic.” In other words, this “immutable characteristic” language or criterion
that emerges with Frontiero seems to have emerged directly out of the context of gender
discrimination cases.28
Backlash: A Return to the Rational Basis Test
In two cases decided the following year, 1974, Kahn v. Shevin and Geduldig v.
Aiello, the court applied the rational basis rather than the strict scrutiny developed by the
plurality in Frontiero to gender discrimination cases. In Kahn, the Court upheld a Florida
statute which provided an annual $500 property tax exemption to widows but not to
widowers. The Court stated, among other things, that tax laws were permitted to
discriminate in favor of a certain class if the discrimination was founded upon a
“reasonable” distinction or difference in state policy that was not in conflict with the
United States Constitution. The distinction between widows and widowers was
Oddly, this “immutable characteristic” language will be later appropriated by the Court
for usage in cases of racial discrimination, but it will be used not to protect black people, but to
protect white people. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978).
28
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reasonable, the Court held, since gender has never been held to be an impermissible
classification in all instances,29 and since the state's different treatment of widows and
widowers rested upon a ground of difference that had a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the statute. Specifically, the statute was reasonably designed to further the
state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon “the sex for whom
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden,” i.e., women. Similarly, in
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), the Court used the rational basis standard to uphold a law
excluding pregnancy from a list of compensable disabilities, arguing that the
classification of pregnancy as non-compensable was not a sex-based classification.
So, while the Court in Kahn used the rational basis test to carry out its traditional
role of upholding legalized discrimination against women in order to “protect” women,
the Court in Geduldig used the rational basis test to deny the compensability of a medical
condition that is unique to women. In both cases, the discriminatory law in question was
upheld and in neither case was consideration given to the equality rights of women qua
women.
Intermediate Scrutiny: The Un-standard of Judicial Review
Then, in Craig v. Boren (1976), the Court officially inaugurated the so-called
intermediate scrutiny standard for all cases of alleged gender discrimination, a standard
that is still in force today. Craig involved an Oklahoma law that had a higher age
requirement for the sale of a certain type of beer to males than to females. While males
had to be 21 to purchase the beer, females only had to be 18. A male between the ages of
18 and 21 challenged the law on the ground that there was no rational basis for the
29

The court noted, for example, that women had never been drafted into military service.
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distinction being made between the women and men, as required by Reed v. Reed (1971).
The Supreme Court agreed and struck down the law. The test for legalized distinctions
between men and women, the Court said, is as follows: When a given law, policy, or
other state action makes distinctions between men and women or males and females, the
Supreme Court will ask whether the law bears a “substantial” relationship to an
“important” governmental interest, and if so, the law will be upheld. If not, the law will
be struck down.30 In practice this means little more than that there is no way to tell how
the Supreme Court will come out in a gender discrimination case. Over the years, the
Court has invalidated a number of gender-based laws and policies using intermediate
scrutiny, but it has also upheld a number of them.
In Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), using the intermediate scrutiny standard the Court
struck down a Social Security requirement that widowers had to demonstrate financial
dependence on their deceased spouses as a condition for obtaining survivors‟ benefits,
but widows did not have to make such a demonstration; and in Orr v. Orr (1979), the
Court struck down an Alabama law which required men, under certain circumstances, to
make alimony payments to their ex-wives while women similarly situated were exempted
from making alimony payments. And in Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981), the Court struck
down a Louisiana law giving a husband, as “head and master” of property owned jointly
with his wife, exclusive control over the disposition of community property.31 The

Note that Justice Stevens calls gender an “accident of birth” in his concurring opinion,
citing Frontiero v. Richardson, but also notes a long history of discrimination against males in the
age bracket of 18-20 to support his view that the law was unconstitutional.
30
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Article 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code provided, "The husband is the head and
master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the
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Louisiana law at issue, the Court said, “embodie[d] the type of express gender-based
discrimination [it had] found unconstitutional absent a showing that the classification
[was] tailored to further an important governmental interest.” The Court added to the
standard understanding of intermediate scrutiny that where there is facial classification on
the basis of gender, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to uphold the facially
discriminatory law to advance an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the law.32
The Court has also upheld gender-based classifications under intermediate
scrutiny. In Rostker v. Goldberg (1981), for example, the Court upheld the male-only
draft registration law, stating that the exclusion of women from the draft “was not an
„accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about women.‟” Instead, men and
women were “simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a
draft,” the Court wrote. After Orr, Kirchberg, and Rostker, then, it seemed that usage of
the intermediate scrutiny standard in cases of gender-based classifications or policies at
least meant that a preliminary determination would be made as to whether men and
women were “similarly situated” with regard to the social good at issue and if not, the
gender-based classification would be upheld; if so, the gender-based classification would
be struck down.
Then, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), the Court was asked
to decide whether the admissions policy of the nursing school of the Mississippi
revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and
permission of his wife."
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Interestingly, many successful gender discrimination cases using the intermediate
scrutiny standard of judicial review have been cases brought by men. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren
(1976), Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982). Arguably, these cases do not so
much advance the cause of equal rights for women as much as they allow male infiltration into
areas of law traditionally reserved for the protection of women.
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University for Women that excluded males violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Employing the intermediate scrutiny standard of review, the Supreme Court said that it
did. The Court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the state‟s justification for
excluding men from the nursing school, i.e., the need to provide a haven for women from
the male-dominated world of higher education. Instead, the school‟s policy of allowing
men to enroll in its continuing education courses, together with evidence that the
presence of men in the classroom did not adversely affect female classroom performance,
refuted the state‟s rationale for the discrimination. Additionally, the Court held that the
policy of discriminating men from the nursing profession actually perpetuated stereotypes
about nursing as a “woman‟s job,” leading to lower wages for nurses. But, while the
Hogan decision addressed the issue of whether publically-operated professional schools
could limit admission to one sex or gender, it did not address the issue of whether
publically operated educational schools in general could limit admission to one sex or
gender.
In United States v. Virginia (1996), the Court decided this issue. Using
intermediate scrutiny enhanced by a requirement that the state provide an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for its sex-based admission policy excluding women, rather than
just an “important” one, Virginia Military Institute‟s (VMI‟s) male-only admissions
policy was struck down.
What is Quasi-Suspect Classification Status?
In summary, intermediate scrutiny seems to have been developed as a
compromise position between the reasoning offered in Frontiero to the effect that gender
classifications in law were suspect classifications subject to strict scrutiny, on the one
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hand; and the reasoning offered in all of the early cases and the cases decided between
Frontiero and Craig to the effect that gender classifications are not suspect classifications
such that the rational basis standard should be used in such cases. The question is why
the Court shied away from its plurality holding in Frontiero that classifications based on
gender were inherently suspect owing to the fact that gender was an “immutable
characteristic” and moved instead to the position that gender had only quasi-suspect
classification status. The Court has not been explicit about what the features of suspect
classification status are that the Frontiero plurality thought existed in cases of gender
discrimination but the Court in all subsequent cases has not found in such cases. For
example, is gender now thought to be less “immutable” than it was in 1973 (Frontiero)?
Is there another reason for the shift? Is there no reason for the shift? In any event, under
the early cases, women are not protected at all under the Equal Protection Clause but
under Suspect Classification Doctrine, although “gender” is a quasi-suspect classification
subject to intermediate scrutiny in name (i.e., laws making classifications based on
gender are more closely scrutinized than laws making other classifications amongst
persons – except on the basis of race) at least in theory, in practice this plays out as a
standard of judicial review for gender discrimination cases which is inconsistent, unclear,
and dependent upon a great deal of judicial discretion regarding what is an important
state interest and what is not, and what is a law that is substantially related to that
important state interest and what is not.
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Sexuality as a Non-Suspect Classification
William Eskridge claims that there are more laws today designed to adversely
affect sexual minorities as a group than ever before. These laws, he says, take three
forms: those which explicitly discriminate on the basis of sexuality, those which facially
discriminate on the basis of sex but have the overwhelming effect of having an adverse
effect on sexual minorities, and those which, while not facially discriminatory on the
basis of sexuality or sex, have a discriminatory effect on sexual minorities in practice.
Eskridge suggests that all of these laws might be said to violate the principle of equality
behind the Equal Protection Clause (Eskridge 1999: 205) .
But claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexuality have been
made more often under the doctrine of the right to privacy than under the Equal
Protection Clause. 33 And when claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of
sexuality are made under the Equal Protection Clause, such laws are not strictly
scrutinized. Instead, they are assessed according to the rational basis test, or the lowest
level of judicial review. In Suspect Classification Doctrine terms, this means that
legalized classifications based on sexuality are not suspect classifications like race or
ethnicity, nor are they quasi-suspect classifications like classifications based on gender.
Instead, as stated earlier in this chapter, usage of the rational basis test augurs that judicial
restraint will be employed and that the classification in question will likely be upheld. In
other words, as has been discussed, as long as the government is able to articulate a state
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See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), Lawrence v. Texas (2003). The primary issue
decided in these cases is whether intimate sexual activity is a fundamental right, rather than
whether legal classifications based on sexuality violate the Equal Protection Clause. Bowers held
that there was no right to homosexual activity. Lawrence overturned Bowers, finding that sexual
activity between consenting adults was protected under the Right to Privacy.
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interest that can be sensibly characterized as “legitimate” and as long as the classificatory
law can be shown to be “rationally related” to that interest, the law most likely will be
upheld.
But in Romer v. Evans (1996), the first time an equal protection claim was
brought before the Supreme Court that challenged a law classifying persons on the basis
of sexuality, the court applied the rational basis test, but struck down the discriminatory
law. The case involved an amendment to the Colorado state constitution known as
“Amendment 2” (Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b). Amendment 2 precluded all legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect
the status of persons based on their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships.” The Court applied the rational basis test to
Amendment 2 and held that it did not bear a rational relationship to any legitimate
governmental purpose.
However, while Romer v. Evans signifies the Court‟s willingness to strike down
laws which overtly attempt to deny sexual minorities the same rights as everyone else, it
is unclear whether Romer commits the Court to full equality for sexual minorities across
the board (Eskridge 1999: 206). This is because sexuality is not at present a suspect
classification requiring strict scrutiny, sexuality is not a quasi-suspect classification
requiring intermediate scrutiny, and the applicable level of judicial review in such cases
is the rational basis test, the lowest level of judicial review.
Interestingly, however, in 2010, the rational basis test was used by a federal
district court in a case challenging a law classifying persons on the basis of sexuality. In
what many supporters of equal treatment for sexual minorities consider a landmark case,
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Perry v. Schwarzenegger, not the U.S. Supreme Court but a federal court nonetheless
(i.e., the United States District Court for the Northern District of California) held that the
governmental interests offered by the state of California for the California Marriage
Protection Act, also known as Proposition 8 (which banned marriages between people of
the same sex) were not even rational, much less important.34 Proposition 8 was
accordingly struck down . But, the court in Perry stated that the Equal Protection Clause
rendered Proposition 8 unconstitutional under any standard of review and, citing
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) where a “history of purposeful
unequal treatment” was identified as triggering strict scrutiny, stated that the evidence
presented at trial showed that sexual minorities were the type of minority strict scrutiny
was designed to protect. The district court stopped short, however, of identifying
sexuality as a suspect classification, or of identifying gay people as a suspect class, or of
actually applying the highest level of judicial review to cases of discrimination against
sexual minorities.35
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Governmental interests offered by the state of California in support of Proposition 8
were (1) preserving the definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman for its own
sake, (2) decreasing the probability of the potential adverse consequences that could result from
weakening the institution of marriage, (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting over same-sex
parenting, (4) protecting the First Amendment rights of individuals and institutions that oppose
same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds, (5) treating same-sex couples differently from
opposite-sex couples to preserve the usage of “different names for different things,” (6) any other
rational basis Proposition 8 could conceivably advance. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921, 998-102 (2010).
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In a recent and very surprising turn of events, however, President Barack Obama
declared the Defense of Marriage Act -- the 1996 law that bars federal recognition of same-sex
marriage -- unconstitutional. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., announced the decision in a
letter to members of Congress dated February 23, 2011: “The president and I have concluded
that classifications based on sexual orientation” wrote Holder, “should be subjected to a strict
legal test intended to block unfair discrimination.” As a result, he said, the Defense of Marriage
Act “is unconstitutional” (Savage and Sheryl Stolberg, February 23, 2011). In the letter, Holder
indicates that the judges in two pending federal court cases will be instructed to use heightened
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The state of Equal Protection for sexual minorities, then, is as follows. The
Supreme Court presently has even more license than it does in cases of legal
classifications based on gender to use its own discretion to uphold or strike down those
laws. In two recent cases, however, where laws discriminating on the basis of sexuality
were challenged, the rational basis test was applied (once by the United States Supreme
Court and once by a United States District Court) but the law in question was struck
down.
But, although precedent has now been set in federal court for the proposition that
gay people are very likely a suspect class of persons in the way that black people have
been historically owing to a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” (Perry v.
Schwarzenegger), it is also the case that the Supreme Court in recent years, i.e., under
Suspect Classification Doctrine, has switched from a focus on which group is and which
group is not a “suspect class” (e.g., African Americans, women, gay people, the poor, the
disabled) to a focus on whether the legal classification in question (e.g., race, gender, or
sexual orientation) amounts to a suspect classification.
As we shall see below, the switch in Equal Protection Analysis from a focus on
“suspect classes” to “suspect classifications” took place at around the same time as the
infusion into Equal Protection Analysis of the phrase “immutable characteristics” into
gender discrimination cases. With this switch, the Court‟s decisions began to drift away
from considerations of the history of the Equal Protection Clause, or from considerations
of the history of oppression experienced by people of color and women in America that
scrutiny as the standard of review. The Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to support
or not support this position, however.
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necessitated the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, and inexplicably began instead
to focus on the degree of relationship between the classification in a given law (e.g., race,
gender, sexual orientation) and the purpose of the law, the core idea behind Suspect
Classification Doctrine.
Suspect Classifications and Suspect Classes
Under Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, Equal Protection Analysis as it
stands today takes place pursuant to a three-tiered system in which one of three levels of
judicial review will be applied to laws which make classifications amongst persons,
depending upon the type of classification involved. Classifications based on race are
“suspect classifications” and are analyzed according to what is known as strict scrutiny;
classifications based on gender are quasi-suspect classifications analyzed according to
what is known as intermediate scrutiny; and classifications based on sexuality are not
suspect classifications, nor are they classifications which warrant intermediate scrutiny,
but instead are judged by the rational basis test, according to which the classification is
considered constitutionally benign, and will be upheld absent affirmative proof on the
part of a petitioner that the state has no rational basis whatsoever for the classification.
According to Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, the level of judicial review applicable
to a given law is a function of the degree to which a given group trait qualifies as a
suspect classification.
But the question of the degree to which a given group trait amounts to a suspect
classification is answered not in terms of an explicitly given or even consistent set of
clearly outlined criteria, but rather according to the holdings in a series of cases decided
by different Supreme Courts at different times and places, in different contexts and very
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different political climates. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, in the course of
these decisions the Court at some point switched its focus from using the Equal
Protection Clause to remedy harm done to the equality status of persons who, as a group,
had been historically denied equal protection under law; to a focus on using the Clause to
find that certain human traits were impermissible grounds upon which to make legal
classifications among persons. While the early Court interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause as there to protect African Americans, owing to their need for special protection
after the end of slavery, for example, Suspect Classification Doctrine now interprets the
Equal Protection Clause as there to strike down any law that contains a distinction
between persons on the basis of race. Similarly, while the entire point of bringing cases
of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause was to successfully argue that
the equality rights of women were no less valuable than the equality rights of men
(MacKinnon 2007), Suspect Classification Doctrine not only does not protect the equality
rights of women, the doctrine actually operates quite a bit more frequently to protect the
“equality” rights of men! Finally, although it is fair to say that there is no evidence that
the Equal Protection Clause was ever specifically designed to protect the rights of gay
people qua gay people, it is certainly a reasonable inference that to the extent that gay
people are a group whose rights to equality are infringed upon by the government or by
the law, gay people are as entitled under the Equal Protection Clause to protection from
legalized unequal treatment as anyone else.
Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, is problematic for the same reason that
many constitutional doctrines are problematic, i.e., it has developed as a function of
interpretations of the constitution on the part of the Supreme Court without manifest
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awareness on the part of the Court as to how the interpretive process actually takes place;
and without a consistent vision on the part of the Supreme Court as to how it should.
Without this understanding, this self-awareness, Suspect Classification Doctrine is at best
piecemeal, disjointed, and irresponsible, and at worst deeply in violation of the ideals
contained in the text itself, as well as in the companion founding documents like the
Declaration of Independence. Moreover, Suspect Classification Doctrine‟s lack of
interpretive integrity, its lack of a consistent vision as to what the Equal Protection
Clause means or should mean vis-à-vis the rights of marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated groups has resulted in a doctrine that actually fails to protect those whose
status in society is unequal.
Additionally, the terms “suspect class” and “suspect classification” are often used
interchangeably in Suspect Classification Doctrine and when this happens, a profound
misunderstanding – or perhaps simple ignorance -- of the backstory behind the
development of Equal Protection Analysis is evident. A quick look at the case of Plyler
v. Doe (1981) is a good example. In Plyler, the issue was whether a state of Texas law
denying the usage of state funds for the education of children of illegal immigrants
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The state of Texas had claimed at trial that
undocumented aliens were not protected by the Equal Protection Clause. The trial
(District) court disagreed, reasoning that state exclusion of undocumented children from
its schools was just the kind of “invidiously motivated” law the Equal Protection Clause
was there to address. The Supreme Court, however, took both of these positions at the
same time, holding both that the undocumented children were specially protected by the
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Equal Protection Clause36 and that “undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect
class” (Ibid.: 223), concluding -- without explaining how both of these things could be
true at the same time – that the Texas law was unconstitutional and should be struck
down.
To help explain how the concepts of suspect classes and suspect classifications
became confused in Equal Protection Analysis, it is necessary to trace the evolution of
two concepts that developed alongside of Equal Protection Analysis. These are the
concepts of “discrete and insular minorities” and “immutable characteristics.” The
development of these concepts will now be outlined below to add nuance and depth to the
story of how Suspect Classification Doctrine – with all of its strange aspects and internal
inconsistencies – came into existence.
Discrete and Insular Minorities
The Carolene Products Footnote
The Court in 1938 decided the landmark case of United States v. Carolene
Products Company, where we find first mention in Equal Protection Analysis of the
concept of “discrete and insular minorities.” In a famous footnote 4, Justice Stone wrote,
“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and may call for a more searching judicial scrutiny.” The
view that certain groups – those qualifying as “discrete and insular minorities” – are
entitled to a greater degree of judicial concern than other groups as a consequence of
having been excluded from ordinary political processes owing to prejudice, became
“The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of
all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation….” (Plyler 1981: 213).
36
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adopted and integrated into Equal Protection Analysis, according to one theory of judicial
review (Tribe 1988 1465). On this view, laws that involve certain groups of people are
“inherently suspect” and should be subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than
laws that do not involve these groups. Note that Carolene Products was decided just six
years prior to Korematsu v. United States in 1944, discussed above, which held that laws
adversely affecting the rights of a targeted racial group were unconstitutional.
The details of Carolene Products are as follows. The issue in the case was the
constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act of Congress of March 4, 1923. Under the Act,
interstate shipment of skim milk compounded with fat or oil was prohibited. Carolene
Products Company was charged with violating the Act, leading ultimately to an appeal
before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Act. Among other things, the
company argued that the Filled Milk Act violated the Equal Protection Clause since it did
not prohibit interstate shipment of oleomargarine or other butter substitutes. According
to the company, the Act contained an unconstitutional classification between the
manufacturers of filled milk and the manufacturers of butter substitutes. The Supreme
Court held that this was not a classification that violated the Equal Protection Clause, but
Justice Stone‟s footnote four indicated that had a discrete and insular minority group been
involved, like religions, national, or racial minorities, closer judicial scrutiny would likely
be in order.
Carolene Products set the stage for strict scrutiny of laws which burdened
specific groups, i.e., for those it called “discrete and insular minorities,” a concept which,
arguably, later morphed into what came to be known as “suspect classes.”
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1938-1977: Aliens and No One Else
Over the next thirty-nine years, between 1938 and 1977, the Supreme Court used
the phrase “discrete and insular minority” in many cases, but no clear outline of the
concept emerged. The first usage of the phrase took place in a case where the conflict
was between a religious group and a state law which allegedly infringed upon religious
freedom. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis (1940), the majority opinion held that a
law which required students to salute the flag even where their religious beliefs
prohibited it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but Justice Stone‟s dissent
stated, among other things, that in his opinion religious groups were “discrete and insular
minorities” in the Carolene Products sense, such that a higher level of judicial scrutiny
was in order.
The phrase was also used in the 1970 of Oregon v. Mitchell. The laws at issue in
that case were certain amendments to the federal Voting Rights Act, which had lowered
the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 and, based on a finding by Congress that
literacy tests discriminated against African Americans on the basis of race, temporarily
prohibited the use of literary tests. State governments challenged the constitutionality of
the amendments on the basis of federalism concerns. States had the power to regulate
their own elections, the state governments claimed, and Congress had no authority to
enact these amendments. The Supreme Court held, among other things, that age
qualifications for voting are not aimed at any discrete and insular minority, and that as
long as an age qualification is reasonable (e.g., age 21), it does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The implication, however, was that if the state laws had been aimed at
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discrete and insular minorities, sufficient justification would have existed for a higher
level of judicial scrutiny.
The following year in Gordon v. Lance (1971), the Court held that West
Virginia's constitutional and statutory requirement that political subdivisions may not
incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond those established by the State
Constitution without the approval of 60% of the voters singled out no discrete and insular
minority for special treatment and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
That same year, the Court held that aliens were a discrete and insular minority. In
Graham v. Richardson (1971), the Court stated that heightened scrutiny should be used
for laws which impinge upon the rights of aliens since “[a]liens as a class are a prime
example of a „discrete and insular minority,‟ for whom…heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate,” the Court said, citing Carolene Products. 37
That aliens do qualify as a discrete and insular minority group was upheld in three
additional cases of the time period.38 In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong (1976), the Court
added definition to the concept of a “discrete and insular minority” by describing aliens
as a “discrete class of persons” which it defined as “an identifiable class of persons who,
entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the
remainder of the community.”
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The court in Graham cited Oyama v. California (1948); Korematsu v. United States
(1944); and Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) as cases where the Court has held that
classifications based on nationality are inherently suspect; and McLaughlin v. Florida,
(1964); Loving v. Virginia (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) as cases where the Court has held
that classifications based on race are inherently suspect.
38

See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall (1973); In re Griffiths (1973); Examining Board of
Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores De Otero (1975).
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All of the above cases use the phrase “discrete and insular minority” in the same
sense as does the Carolene Products footnote, i.e., as a term used to denote a group or
class of disenfranchised persons who have been and still are subject to widespread social
prejudice such that their access to the regular channels for protecting their own rights to
equality is limited. A group thus described is virtually identical to what the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and progeny have traditionally called and
call a “suspect class.”
In San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the concept of
“discrete and insular minority” was brought up in the context of a discussion of whether
the poor were entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny of laws which discriminated against
them. The Court held that the poor were not a class of persons entitled to heightened or
extra protection from discriminatory laws, the poor were not a discrete and insular
minority, the poor were not a “suspect class.” But, while the Court in San Antonio held
that the poor were not a suspect class for equal protection purposes, Justice Stewart‟s
concurring opinion also noted in dicta that if a suspect class had been involved, strict
scrutiny would have been in order. The Court in San Antonio also articulated what it
called the “traditional indicia of suspectness,” i.e., that the class is
“saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.” 39

Notably, the language used by the Court in San Antonio describing the “traditional
indicia of suspectness” bears a very close relationship to the language used by the Court in U.S. v.
Carolene Products in 1938 to describe “discrete and insular minorities.” Note also that in
Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the Supreme Court upheld its earlier holding that busing should be
restricted to intra-district travel, finding that busing of students across school district lines was
permissible only if all affected districts had been guilty of past discriminatory practices.
39
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In Johnson v. Robison (1974), the Court was called upon to assess the constitutionality
of the denial of benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 196640 to a
conscientious objector who had performed alternative service. The Court applied the
rational basis test and found that the classification at issue was reasonable, i.e.,
constitutional, given that no discrete and insular minority group was involved. So, in
Johnson we see the Court tying the availability of heightened or strict judicial scrutiny to
the question of whether the group in question is a discrete and insular minority. In this
way, the concept of discrete and insular minority operates effectively in the same way as
the more commonly used concept of “suspect class.”
What we see, then, between 1939 and 1977 is the Supreme Court defining the
contours of what it means for a group to be a “discrete and insular minority” and
simultaneously defining the contours of what it means for a group to be a “suspect class,”
i.e., a class of persons entitled to a higher level of protection than other people under the
Equal Protection Clause. In this period, the Court consistently associates the availability
of the strict scrutiny level of judicial review with laws affecting groups that have been
marginalized, disenfranchised, excluded from the political process, subjected to prejudice
and discrimination, and whose equality rights have otherwise been systematically
violated or ignored by the law.
But, in 1978, the Court suddenly, dramatically, and almost-but-not-quite
inexplicably (as we shall see) altered that long-held approach to Equal Protection
Analysis in race cases and decided instead to make the availability of redress under the
Interesting for purposes of the present study is that in Millikin, the Court linked the availability of
redress with a history of discriminatory practices.
40

38 U.S.C.S. §§ 1651-1697.
66

Equal Protection Clause turn on whether the law in question simply mentioned or used
the concept race at all. This new approach would operate completely irrespective of
whether the group affected by the law was disenfranchised, marginalized, or oppressed at
all, and irrespective of whether the law in question operated to adversely affect blacks or
whether it actually operated to benefit blacks. This dramatic alteration of the Supreme
Court‟s approach to Equal Protection Analysis took place in a case called Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke (1978).
Bakke: The Anti-Carolene Products Case
As mentioned above, in 1978, the Court decided Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke. Recall from the discussion above that the judgment of the Court in
Bakke was that laws which entail racial and ethnic classifications are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny without regard to whether the group discriminated against satisfies the
criteria of a discrete and insular minority (as required by Carolene Products). Bakke
represents, then, Suspect Classification Doctrine retaining from the history of Equal
Protection Analysis the concept that racial classifications in law are facially suspect,
while leaving behind the reason why racial classifications in law have historically been
considered facially suspect, i.e., because racial classifications have historically adversely
affect groups of people who have been excluded from the political process and who have
been denied equal protection of the laws as a result of racial prejudice. Bakke signifies,
then, among other things, a clear departure from the Carolene Products line of cases
which grounded the strict scrutiny level of judicial review for suspect classes (“discrete
ad insular minorities”) in the alienation from the political process experienced by
historically disadvantaged groups. With Bakke, then, the Supreme Court switched from
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its historical position that strict scrutiny was in order for laws that affected “suspect
classes” to a new position holding that strict scrutiny was in order for laws which
contained “suspect classifications.” But, what is the origin of this switch? The answer
appears to be found in the emergence in 1973, about five years before the decision in
Bakke, of the concept of “immutable characteristics” in Equal Protection Analysis. The
emergency of the concept of “immutable characteristics” took place within the
development of Equal Protection Analysis surrounding the rights of women.
Immutable Characteristics
Origin of the Concept: Gender as Immutable
The concept of “immutable characteristics” in Equal Protection Analysis began in
the context of gender discrimination. As stated above, a plurality of the Court at one
time identified gender as a suspect classification, using the argument that sex, like race,
was an “immutable characteristic” such that legal burdens could not be constitutionally
imposed on the basis of it. Frontiero v. Richardson (1973). But, there were four justices
in Frontiero who were not prepared to characterize sex or gender in this way, 41 and in
subsequent cases, judicial usage of “immutable characteristics” as measures for the
applicability of strict scrutiny in gender discrimination cases has been inconsistent and
selective. The concept has been mentioned also in select race discrimination cases and in
cases involving discrimination on the basis of sexuality. But, again, that usage has been
inconsistent and selective.

For example, Justice Powell wrote that there would be “far-reaching implications” of
characterizing sex or gender as a suspect classification, justifying his lack of concurrence with the
plurality on this issue as “unnecessary.”
41
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One year after Frontiero was decided, in the 1974 case of Johnson v. Robison,
for example, the Court employed “immutable characteristic” rhetoric to deny
conscientious objectors the status of a suspect class. Among other things, conscientious
objectors do not count as a group in possession of an immutable characteristic, the Court
reasoned. But, that same year, in Kahn v. Shevin (1974), the Court held that a law that
granted widows but not widowers a property tax exemption (obviously a legal
classification based on gender) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and was
indeed constitutional for the reason that the differing treatment for different genders in
that case bore a substantial relation to the goal of the law, i.e., to cushion the financial
impact of spousal loss “upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately
heavy burden.” (355). In its reasoning process, however, and in complete disregard of
the plurality in Frontiero, the majority opinion made no mention of the immutability of
gender that the Court in Frontiero had found so pivotal.42 Then, two years later in the
next gender discrimination case, the landmark case of Craig v. Boren (1976), the Court
flipped again: suddenly, talk of “immutable characteristics” resurfaced. In Craig, the
Court relied on language in Frontiero to the effect that sex was an immutable
characteristic to establish the intermediate level of judicial review mentioned above for
cases of sex discrimination.

42

Notably, the dissent in Kahn did mention both Frontiero and immutable characteristics.
Justices Brennan and Marshall noted, “[A] legislative classification that distinguishes potential
beneficiaries solely by reference to their gender-based status as widows or widowers…must be
subjected to close judicial scrutiny, because it focuses upon generally immutable characteristics
over which individuals have little or no control, and also because gender-based classifications too
often have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments
of society,” citing Frontiero.
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Bakke: Race Discussed as Immutable
When Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke came along in 1978, the concept of
immutability had been employed in gender discrimination cases only. But, in Bakke, the
Supreme Court used the concept of immutability to support its position that all racial
classifications, even classifications against “whites”, could be used for invidious
purposes. Whiteness is just as immutable as blackness, the Court reasoned43, such that a
classification which disadvantages whites is no more unconstitutional than a
classification which disadvantages blacks. Under what is known as “the argument from
immutability,” then, which developed inside Suspect Classification Doctrine, Bakke
stands for two very strange propositions: First, it stands for the proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment‟s Equal Protection Clause is there to protect whites just as much
as blacks, owing to the fact that “race”, in the abstract, is immutable, in complete
disregard for this history of the Clause; and second, it stands for the proposition that,
although there may be some judicial disagreement about whether gender is sufficiently
immutable to justify suspect class status for women, whiteness is certainly sufficiently
immutable to justify suspect class status for whites.
Immutability and “Similarly Situated” Rhetoric
Caban v. Mohammed (1979) is another gender discrimination case in which
immutable characteristic language was employed, this time to protect the equality
“rights” of men. The majority opinion held unconstitutional a New York statute which
denied to unmarried men the authority to block the adoption of their children, but granted

“Race, like gender… is an immutable characteristic….[such that] divisions [based on
race] are contrary to our deep belief that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing,” the Court wrote at 360.
43
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that right to unmarried women. The majority opinion did not employ immutable
characteristic language but Justice Stewart‟s dissent did. Stewart conceded that gender,
like race, was immutable, but stated, without explanation, that even so, gender was
different from race in that gender classifications “are not invariably invalid” (311). When
men and women are not in fact “similarly situated” in the area covered by the legislation
in question,” Justice Stewart reasoned, “the Equal Protection Clause is not violated”
(Ibid.). With Caban, then, we see the Court -- even if only in a dissent -- beginning to
infuse gender discrimination cases with talk of whether men are women are “similarly
situated” and simultaneously backing away from using the concept of the so-called
“immutable characteristic” of sex for the purpose of allowing women to use the Equal
Protection Clause to protect their rights to equality. Predictably, then, and as we shall
discover below, the same “similarly situated” rhetoric will be used by the Court in a
majority opinion later on (i.e., in Michael M. v. Superior Court (1980)) for the purpose of
providing a rationalization for the Court‟s view under Suspect Classification Doctrine
that it is permissible to make legal distinctions (or classifications) between men and
women vis-à-vis the right to equal treatment under the law.
Race Becomes Officially “Immutable”: United Steelworkers
The usage of the concept of immutability was taken up by the Court again in
United Steelworkers v. Weber (1979). There, Justice Rehnquist‟s dissent expressed a
similar sentiment regarding the immutability of race as was expressed in Bakke. Without
feeling compelled to explain the precedential origin of this view, Justice Rehnquist stated,
“The evil inherent in discrimination against Negroes is that it is based on an immutable
characteristic, utterly irrelevant to [the matter at hand]. The characteristic becomes no
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less immutable and irrelevant, and discrimination based thereon becomes no less evil,
simply because the person excluded is a member of one race rather than another,” he
wrote. In other words, for Justice Rehnquist, one‟s race is immutable and therefore
legally irrelevant, regardless of what one‟s race is, such that discrimination based upon
race is unconstitutional per se and without regard to the race of the petitioner.
Accordingly, in racial discrimination cases after Bakke, then, the concept of immutability
begins to infiltrate the language of Equal Protection Cases involving race in ways that
understand “race” itself as a suspect classification rather than understanding black
Americans or African Americans as a suspect class. The focus on immutability, rather
than on a history of prejudice and exclusion from the political process, will facilitate the
Court‟s transition from using Suspect Classification Doctrine to protect African
Americans or black people, to using Suspect Classification Doctrine to protect anyone
who possesses the “immutable characteristic” of race. This obviously includes
everyone.44
In Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), Justice Powell‟s concurring opinion used
immutable characteristic language to support the majority‟s opinion that a minorityowned business set-aside section of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 was
constitutional. While racial classifications should be assessed under the most stringent
level of review because immutable characteristics that bear no relation to individual merit
or need are irrelevant to almost every governmental decision, Justice Powell wrote, the
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From another perspective, this includes no one, or certainly no one in particular who is
a member of a group that is disenfranchised or that has experienced a history of being
disenfranchised. Through this line of reasoning, the concept of “suspect class” loses all of its
theoretical power in discrimination cases, and is replaced by the “color blind” concept of “suspect
classification.”
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minority-owned business set-aside in question was justified as a remedy that served the
compelling governmental interest of eradicating the continuing effects of past
discrimination. The court noted that the set-aside program in question was remedial in
nature, and that, as such, there was no need for Congress to act in a “color-blind” fashion.
As long as the law was “properly tailored” to cure the effects of past discrimination
against certain minority groups, the law should be upheld. Moreover, the Fullilove Court
also explicitly stated that the sharing of the burden of curing the effects of past
discrimination by innocent parties was “not impermissible.” There were only two
Justices – Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist – who dissented, adopting the view that
“the government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of a person‟s
race,” meaning the white contractors who challenged of the set-aside program. “The
color of a person‟s skin and the country of his origin are immutable facts that bear no
relation to ability, disadvantage, moral culpability or any other characteristics of
constitutionally permissible interest to government. In short, racial discrimination is by
definition invidious discrimination,” Justices Stewart and Rehnquist wrote in their
dissenting opinion at 525.
Fullilove, then, evidences the tension within the Court at the start of the 1980s
between those Justices who interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as it had been
interpreted since the beginning – i.e., as a vehicle for the remedial protection of the right
to equality for the historically disenfranchised – and those Justices who were now coming
to interpret the Equal Protection Clause as standing for the proposition that “immutable
characteristics” like race and gender (considered without regard to what race or what
gender, and without regard to any prior history of discrimination or disenfranchisement
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from the political process) were constitutionally impermissible bases for legal
classifications among persons. As is evidenced in the next several Supreme Court cases
discussing “immutable characteristics,” as the tension between these two opposing
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause began to fester and grow, the Court‟s
analysis of just exactly what sorts of traits qualified as “immutable” became increasingly
confused and nonsensical.
Is Mental Illness Immutable?
The case of Schweiker v. Wilson (1980) evidences this confusion. In Schweiker, a
group of mentally ill persons challenged a portion of the Social Security Act that
excluded mentally ill persons from supplemental benefits. Their claim was that this
denial of benefits amounted to an equal protection violation in virtue of the fact that the
mentally ill were a protected class. The Supreme Court upheld the law, but its reasoning
for doing so is confusing and self-contradictory The Court wrote, : (1) Unless a
classification is “inherently invidious,” the Court should defer to the legislature, i.e., the
Court should use the rational basis test to assess the constitutionality of a law. i.e., the law
should be upheld. (2) It was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the
characteristic of mental illness was inherently invidious because the law in question did
not make a classification amongst persons on the basis of mental health. (3) At the most,
this legislation incidentally denies a small monthly comfort benefit to a certain number of
persons suffering from mental illness” (Schweiker at 231).
The Court‟s reasoning in Schweiker, then, amounts to the argument that although
strict judicial review is appropriate when a classification is made on the basis of an
“inherently invidious” (or immutable) characteristic, the denial of federal social security
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benefits to the mentally ill is not a classification amongst persons on the basis of mental
health. So, although the Court‟s explicit claim is that it is not making a judgment about
whether mental illness is a suspect (or “inherently invidious”) classification, the fact that
it upholds the law amounts to the Court‟s implicitly making that very judgment. That the
Supreme Court was indeed claiming implicitly that mental illness was not an “immutable
characteristic” (i.e., not a suspect classification for equal protection purposes) is
supported by the Court‟s citation of certain language used by the lower (District) court
stating that “"[it] is debatable whether and to what extent the mental illness is an
immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth‟” (Schweiker,
footnote 11).
But, the important point about Schweiker is that although the Court arguably
makes the judgment that mental illness is not “immutable,” since that judgment is
implicit rather than explicit the Court does not provide any rationale for that judgment.
There are no scientific or sociological studies cited for the proposition that mental illness
is not immutable, for example. There are no arguments offered in support of that
proposition. In other words, the judgment call on the part of the Supreme Court that
mental illness is not sufficiently immutable so as to amount to a constitutionally salient
characteristic triggering special protection under the Equal Protection Clause amounts to
nothing other than the reality that the Court will uphold discrimination against them. In
this way, the concept of “immutable characteristic” becomes little more than a vehicle for
denying equal protection to disfavored groups.
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“Similarly Situated” Rhetoric Continues
In Michael M. v. Superior Court (1980), the Court revived the connection it found
in Caban v. Mohammed (1979), above, between whether men and women are “similarly
situated” and whether a given law distinguishing between genders is unconstitutional, this
time in a majority opinion. Michael M. involved a statutory rape law which criminalized
males for having sexual intercourse with minors but did not criminalize females for doing
so. Michael M. was 17 ½ years old when he had sexual intercourse with a female under
the age of 18. He was charged with statutory rape. He challenged the law on the grounds
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause in that it criminalized males but not females
for the same behavior. The Supreme Court disagreed. Applying the intermediate
scrutiny test, the Court found that the law in question was constitutional. Men and
women are not “similarly situated” with regard to the ability to become pregnant as a
result of sexual intercourse, the Court reasoned. The law in question, the Court held,
served the important state interest of preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies and the
law in question was therefore substantially related to achieving that interest. The Court
wrote, “The Constitution is violated when government, state or federal, invidiously
classifies similarly situated people on the basis of the immutable characteristics with
which they were born” (Emphasis added). People of different races, the Court
continued, are always similarly situated, but people of different genders need not be.
Leaving aside for the moment the obvious irrationality (or at least testability) of
the implicit claim that there is a link between statutory rape laws and teenage
pregnancies, let us first observe that Michael M. seems to stand for the proposition that
race and gender are both “immutable” but classifications based on immutable

76

characteristics do not violate the constitution unless the people in the groups of people
being compared (blacks and whites or men and women) are “similarly situated.”
Michael M. also stands for the proposition that people of different races are always
“similarly situated,” but people of different genders need not be vis-à-vis the right to
equal treatment under the law. In other words, the Court in Michael M. (and the dissent
in Caban v. Mohammed before it) interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to mean that it
takes a facial classification amongst persons based on an “immutable characteristic” plus
a finding that the two groups of people being compared are “similarly situated” for Equal
Protection to kick in under Suspect Classification Doctrine.
But what is in need of further explication is why the Court understands people of
different races to be at all times “similarly situated” but not people of different genders
vis-à-vis the right to equal treatment under the law. Even if it were fair to say that there
are some clearly identifiable (“immutable” or not) ways to distinguish meaningfully
between men and women that cannot be found to distinguish between people of different
races (e.g., that women can become pregnant but men cannot), the Court has still not
answered the question of why these ways are constitutionally salient with regard the right
to equal treatment under the law. The test of similarly situatedness, then, seems to
operate merely as a way to allow the Court to continue to use a great deal of discretion
(as it always has traditionally) regarding decisions as to when and if legal classifications
between men and women are constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause, a level of discretion that the Equal Protection Clause would seem, at least on the
surface, to forbid.
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Of course, the constitution would only seem to forbid this very high level of
discretion regarding equal rights for women if the unequal status of women in American
society is taken seriously, and if the Court‟s traditional role of “protector” of women (for
their own good) is exposed, named, and identified as constitutionally problematic. It is
difficult to see how this exposure could occur, however, under Suspect Classification
Doctrine. This is because Suspect Classification Doctrine finds any history of
oppression, subjugation, or disenfranchisement of a given group irrelevant to Equal
Protection Analysis, operating instead as if gender (and race an sexual orientation) exists
in a vacuum, independent of the societies in which distinctions amongst persons arise in
the first place and independent of whatever stereotypes and social hierarchies are
contained within those distinctions.
Immutability Linked to “Social and Cultural Isolation”
The 1985 case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. contains some very
revealing reasoning on the topic of what qualifies as an “immutable characteristic” and
what does not. Cleburne Living Ctr. revisited the issue (first raised five years earlier in
Schweiker v. Wilson) of whether the mentally challenged (in this case the mentally
retarded) could be considered a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class. The Cleburne
Living Center, Inc. sought a city permit to lease a building as a home for the mentally
retarded. The permit was denied under a city zoning ordinance which required a “special
use” permit for hospitals “of the feebleminded.” The living center then filed suit against
the city on the basis that the zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause on its
face by unconstitutionally discriminating against the mentally retarded. The Supreme
Court held that mentally retardation was not a suspect classification and not a quasi-
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suspect classification. The rational basis test level of judicial review was therefore
applied to the city ordinance, but, interestingly, the zoning ordinance was nevertheless
struck down. The Court‟s reasoning was that the immutability of the defining trait of a
given group (along with the group‟s political powerlessness) was only relevant insofar as
it pointed to a “social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect
or be concerned with that group‟s interests and needs.” 45 This would appear to be a clear
departure from the Court‟s reasoning in Bakke, for example, that the real issue in Equal
Protection Analysis is the immutability of the trait that is the basis of the legal
classification rather than any sort of socio-cultural considerations attendant to that trait.
But, rather than stating this outright, the Court – still clinging to the concept of
immutability per se – opts instead to state both that mental retardation is not a suspect
classification and that the classification at issue was constitutionally impermissible under
the Equal Protection Clause.
Whiteness Not Immutable but Gender Is
Immutable characteristic language was used in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of
Education (1986), but this time in the dissenting opinion. In that case, the Court affirmed
its view, first stated in Bakke, that all racial classifications, of whatever sort, should be
subject to strict scrutiny, and on this basis struck down a Jackson, Michigan school board
layoff policy according to which, when layoffs became necessary, minority teachers with
less seniority were retained while nonminority teachers with more seniority were laid off.
The school board policy had been adopted to remedy societal discrimination by providing
role models for minority school children. The dissent argued that the layoff policy
45

See City of Cleburne, footnote 24.
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satisfied the constitution in that the stated purpose was diversity and the layoff policy was
designed to achieve that purpose.

“[W]hites have none of the immutable characteristics

of a suspect class,” Justice Marshall wrote in his dissenting opinion, reasoning that strict
scrutiny was therefore not applicable to laws designed to further affirmative action goals.
Of note is the way in which Justice Marshall links the concept of “suspect class” and the
concept of “immutability” as if this link were obvious and as if Justice Rehnquist had
never formally divorced these two concepts in his majority opinion in Bakke.
In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic (1993), several Washington, D.C.
area abortion clinics sued anti-abortion demonstrators, claiming that their demonstrations
violated the equal protection rights of women seeking abortions.46 The Supreme Court
held, among other things, that opposition to abortion did not qualify as invidious
discrimination against women as a class. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disagreed.
Writing that the actions of the anti-abortion demonstrators amounted to “a striking
contemporary example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that
led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,” Justice Stevens reasoned that
since only women can get pregnant, women, as a class, were the target of the
demonstrators‟ lawless actions. The capacity to become pregnant is “the inherited and
immutable characteristic that primarily differentiates the female from the male,” he
wrote. The thing to note in Bray is the way in which the majority opinion purports to see
no connection between abortions and the only people biologically capable of having
them, i.e., women. Owing to this lack of connection, the majority reasons, the rights of
women as a class are not implicated by this case. It is only in the dissent that we find a
46

The abortion clinics sued under §42 U.S.C. 1985(3).
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call to context, a recognition that only women get abortions and that only women as a
class are implicated by anti-abortion demonstrators. That the majority opinion (operating
according to Suspect Classification Doctrine) fails to acknowledge what would appear to
be such an obvious fact seems to indicate that something other than strict application of
the “black letter law” of the Equal Protection Clause might be at work in its decision. If
nothing else, the majority certainly seems confused on the biological differences between
women and men, and if the majority cannot see any biological difference between
women and men, on what basis is gender “immutable” for either sex?
Is Sexuality Immutable?
Those advocating full citizenship rights for sexual minorities have often tried to
use what is known as “the argument from immutability” to make Equal Protection claims
on behalf of gay people. For these advocates, the argument is that sexuality is
immutable, like race and gender, and is therefore an unconstitutional basis upon which to
make classifications between Americans.47 On this view, sexual orientation is a suspect
classification like race, or at least a quasi-suspect classification like gender, and strict
scrutiny, or at least intermediate scrutiny, is therefore the applicable level of judicial
review for laws or policies which make discriminate against persons on the basis of
sexuality or sexual orientation. These arguments have never succeeded. Suspect
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Proponents of these arguments most often cite Simon LeVay, A Difference in
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 Science 1034 (1991)
in support of the claim that sexuality, particularly homosexuality, is “immutable.”
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Classification Doctrine does not now grant, nor has it ever considered sexuality
immutable or sexual orientation a suspect classification.48
Others advocating full equality rights for sexual minorities have suggested that
the argument from immutability is wrong-headed, that since the scientific community is
divided on the issue of whether sexuality is immutable, and since the real issue is that gay
people have a very long history of having been disenfranchised, marginalized, and
subjected to widespread social stigmatization and marginalization in our society, the
argument from immutability should be abandoned in favor of arguments which challenge
us to imagine beyond the standard categories of homo- and heterosexual, or even
bisexual, and to think of sexuality more in terms of a means a societal ordering. (Halley
1993). On this view, Suspect Classification Doctrine, rather than a method for
ascertaining the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause for an identifiable group known
as “homosexuals,” “asks whether the resources of the state are being used to enforce,
confirm, and validate social hierarchies” (Ibid. 567). In other words, for those advocates
of full equality rights for gay people who think the argument from immutability is wrongheaded, the real issue in cases involving whether gay people are specially protected by
the Equal Protection Clause is whether gay people are a suspect class, a discrete and
insular minority in the Carolene Products sense; not the issue of whether sexual
orientation is “immutable” or not.

48

However, as mentioned above, President Barack Obama and Attorney General Eric J.
Holder, Jr., recently issues a letter to Congress indicating that in their opinion, heightened
scrutiny was indeed appropriate for laws involving classifications based on sexual orientation.
Only time will tell if the Supreme Court adopts this view.
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Conclusion
In summary “immutable characteristic” language was first employed by a
plurality of Justices in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) for the purpose of identifying
gender as a suspect classification. The Court has since been inconsistent in its
deployment of the phrase. For example, in Craig v. Boren (1976), the court used
“immutable characteristic” language to replace the strict scrutiny standard of review for
gender discrimination cases articulated in Frontiero with the intermediate level of
judicial review for cases of discrimination on the basis of gender . Curiously, today
gender is still an immutable characteristic, but laws which make classifications on the
basis of gender are subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. Race is also
understood to be an immutable characteristic today, but legal classifications on the basis
of race are thought to generate the higher, strict level of judicial scrutiny rather than
intermediate review. Additionally, the immutability of “race” per se has replaced the
history of systemic and legalized racial discrimination against racialized minorities in the
United States as the main criterion justifying strict scrutiny in cases of race
discrimination and a lack of agreement in the scientific community on the “immutability”
of sexual orientation is arguably responsible for persistent resistance on the part of the
Court to identifying gay people as a suspect class or sexual orientation as a suspect
classification.
One question raised by the development of the concept of “immutable
characteristics” in Equal Protection Analysis is why the immutability of “race” has
reached such heights of constitutional significance, while the immutability of “gender”
has not. Moreover, the question of the usefulness of the concept of immutability in equal
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protection analysis is highlighted in the case of the question of how to protect full
citizenship rights of sexual minorities. Whether sexuality is immutable or not, the key
issue in equal protection analysis, arguably, is not whether the law should be blind to
differences that are “immutable,” but whether a given group has been subject to the kind
of disenfranchisement, marginalization, stigmatization, and oppression that arguably
motivated the inclusion of the Equal Protection Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment in
the first place.
Summary of the Problem and One Possible Solution
Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, associates the level of judicial review to be
applied to a given law (which in almost all cases also determines the fate of a given law)
to the specific trait used to make legal distinctions between persons. Where the trait is
“race,” the highest level of judicial review is applied to the law. This is true regardless of
the race of the petitioner. Where the trait is “gender,” a so-called intermediate level of
judicial review is applied to the law, and this is true regardless of the gender of the
petitioner. Where the trait is “sexual orientation,” the lowest level of judicial review is
applied to the law, which means that gay people as gay people are presently unable to
successfully use the Equal Protection Clause at all to protect their rights to equal
treatment under the law. What this all means is that neither African Americans, nor
women, nor gay people are specifically protected under the Equal Protection Clause
under Suspect Classification Doctrine.
Suspect Classification Doctrine, however, is not the only available way to
interpret the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. As the history of the development
of the case law on this topic, above, was intended to show, there have been a series of
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interpretations of the Clause over the 143 years since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although there are others, the primary meaning of the Clause historically,
other than Suspect Classification Doctrine, was the view that the Clause was designed to
protect groups with a history of having been disenfranchised, marginalized, subjugated,
or oppressed in America. On this view, it is a radical misinterpretation of what the
Clause means to hold that it was designed to invalidate laws that mention specific traits.
There have been other interpretations of the Clause as well over the years. The question
is which of these interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause carries the most weight.
Legal hermeneutics is an approach to legal interpretation which lays bare the
details of exactly how legal interpretation actually takes place. It explains the roles of
history, time, socio-historical context, interpreter(s), prior interpretations, and the legal
text itself in any attempt at ascertaining the meaning of a legal text, any attempt at
“understanding” a given legal text at any given point in time. Legal hermeneutics
explains why various interpretations of a given legal text can and do conflict, and
attempts to provide a well-grounded philosophical basis upon which to prioritize
conflicting interpretations in terms of faithfulness to the interpretive process. Legal
hermeneutics attempts to untangle interpretive conflicts in a way that is illuminating and
productive for all attempts at “understanding” a given legal text by clarifying what takes
place within what I will call a given “interpretive moment.”
In Chapter 3, I will explain the theoretical foundations of legal hermeneutics in
philosophical hermeneutics (to give the reader a fuller picture of why legal hermeneutics
is not just another theory or method of interpretation but an entirely different project),
outline the goals and processes of legal hermeneutics (i.e., legal hermeneutics is more a
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way of demystifying existing interpretive methods than as an interpretive method itself),
familiarize the reader with various contemporary approaches to legal hermeneutics, and
generate an approach to legal hermeneutics that I think addresses some important
interpretive considerations that Suspect Classification Doctrine ignores. Then, in
Chapter 4, I will use the approach to legal hermeneutics generated in Chapter 3 to
untangle the morass of contradictions that is the present method of interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause in the hope of revealing a better understanding of the meaning of the
Clause than Suspect Classification Doctrine provides.
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“We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed.” -- Martin Heidegger1

Chapter 3:

Theory: Legal Hermeneutics: Anti-Method and Constitutional Theory

Introduction
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Suspect Classification Doctrine fails as a vehicle
through which protect the equal protection rights of three identifiable groups: African
Americans, women, and gay people.2 The doctrine is circular, inconsistent, has
developed without an awareness on the part of the Supreme Court as to how the
interpretive process takes place. Accordingly, rather than a sensible basis upon which to
consistently and fairly protect equality rights under the Equal Protection Clause, Suspect
Classification Doctrine instead operates to undermine the right to equality for those it was
arguably designed to protect. Rather than a vehicle through which the equality rights of
the oppressed and the marginalized are vindicated, Suspect Classification Doctrine is a

1

(Heidegger 2008: 67).

2

The fact that these three groups have been chosen to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of
Suspect Classification Doctrine is not meant to imply that Suspect Classification Doctrine is any
more effective for any other marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group, such as the poor, the
disabled, or other ethnic minorities. Instead, these three representative groups have been chosen
to illustrate that the ineffectiveness of the doctrine‟s existing three-tiered approach is a function of
the way Suspect Classification Doctrine ties suspect class status to a given group trait rather than
containing a set of criteria for assessing suspect class status applicable across the board such that
the possibility of protection for other groups can be assessed in a fair and consistent fashion. A
related problem is the fact that Suspect Classification Doctrine presumes that membership in a
given group is exclusive of membership in any other group. In other words, the doctrine provides
no way of addressing the extent to which membership in more than one class might affect the
availability of redress for unconstitutional discrimination. This type of failure is sometimes
referred to as the problem of intersectionality. Another related problem is the problem of quasimembership in a class. For example, Nancy Leong has recently suggested that Suspect
Classification Doctrine is not effective at addressing the discrimination faced by people of socalled “mixed” racial ancestry (Leong 2010). Elsewhere, I have agreed with Leong‟s conclusion
while disagreeing with how she gets there. (See “Antidiscrimination Law and the Multiracial
Experience: A Reply to Nancy Leong,” presented at the first annual Critical Mixed Race Studies
conference, DePaul University, November 2010).
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hodgepodge of conflicting themes and standards that fails to provide those in need the
equal protection of the laws to which they are entitled under the constitution.
The failure of Suspect Classification Doctrine to effectuate the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause is arguably rooted, in part, in a failure on the part of the Supreme
Court to understand what actually takes place when it, as an institution, decides a case;
that is, a failure on the part of the Supreme Court to understand that every decision it
makes as to what the Equal Protection Clause means is necessarily an act interpretation.
The emerging area of philosophy of law known as legal hermeneutics not only openly
acknowledges this fact, but provides a theoretical explanation for why this is the case. In
addition, legal hermeneutics explains why acknowledging that every Supreme Court
decision is an act of interpretation is the first step toward better understandings or
interpretations of laws, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Legal hermeneutics is an approach to philosophy of law that operates between the
analytic and continental traditions. Like the analytic tradition, legal hermeneutics pays
homage to the human need for a certain sense of certainty and stability in the law, while
at the same time acknowledging the observation of various continental legal theorists that
there is radical indeterminacy in the law. In addition, legal hermeneutics disrupts what
some identify as the analytic tradition‟s overly formalistic view of law by rejecting the
notion that human affairs can be finally formalized into explicit rules or even principles;
while at the same time avoiding the classic charge against various continental approaches
that they leave us without a way to decide important legal issues. Moreover, legal
hermeneutics provides evidence that borrowing from continental philosophy to clarify
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legal issues and practices does not inevitably lead to nihilism and relativism, as some in
the analytic tradition claim. On the contrary, the insights of Martin Heidegger, HansGeorge Gadamer and others who developed in the 20th century a theory of interpretation
which has come to be known as philosophical hermeneutics, provide the theoretical
groundwork upon which to investigate, clarify and solve what appear from other
jurisprudential perspectives to be insoluble legal problems.
In Chapter 3, I will situate legal hermeneutics within the landscape of mainstream
philosophy of law, explain the theoretical foundations of legal hermeneutics in
philosophical hermeneutics (to give the reader a fuller picture of why legal hermeneutics
is not just another theory or method of interpretation but is instead an illuminating
analysis of the interpretive process itself), outline the main goals and processes of legal
hermeneutics (i.e., legal hermeneutics is more a way of demystifying existing interpretive
methods than an interpretive method itself, en route to interpretations that more closely
approximate what might be called “objective” than the products of any interpretive
“method”), familiarize the reader with various contemporary approaches to legal
hermeneutics, and identify those aspects of legal hermeneutics that I think will be helpful
in ascertaining a fuller, truer meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment than is generated by Suspect Classification Doctrine.
The primary goal of Chapter 3 is to uncover certain useful themes and approaches
to understanding the law (in this case the Equal Protection Clause) that legal
hermeneutics reveals and that can help us get a better handle on what is actually going on
when we say we have found the “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause or any law.
Other goals of Chapter 3 are to explain why legal hermeneutics could be very useful at
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untangling the morass of contradictions that is Suspect Classification Doctrine, to explain
why legal hermeneutics might be a better of way of understanding the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause than Suspect Classification Doctrine, and to outline those aspects
of legal hermeneutics that will be used to attempt to do that in the project at hand.
Situating Legal Hermeneutics in Traditional Philosophy of Law
Introduction
One of the core issues in philosophy of law is determining the best method of
interpreting or understanding what the law means. A threshold issue in answering this
question is an inquiry into the ontology of law, or the question of just what the law is in
the first instance. Arguably, one primary idea driving traditional philosophy of law is
that if an answer can be found to the question of what the law is, that answer will help
shape and determine ways to assess the legitimacy and authority of the law. A related
idea is that determination of the sources of legitimacy and authority in the law will, in
turn, help us decide which laws to keep and which to discard, as well as help us help us
determine the best way to understand or interpret laws. En route to answering these
questions, philosophy of law can be understood to be approached, generally speaking,
from two distinct and opposing perspectives, i.e., through the lens of analytic
jurisprudence and through the lens of continental jurisprudence.
Analytic Jurisprudence
The analytic tradition in jurisprudence is multifaceted3 but has traditionally
consisted of two main approaches: legal positivism and natural law theory, which are
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Some of the many approaches to analytic jurisprudence include legal positivism, natural
law theory, legal interpretivism, legal realism, legal formalism, legal pragmatism, legal process
theory, and law and economics.
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generally understood to be theoretically opposed.4 Legal positivism is the view that there
is no necessary connection between law and morality; that law owes neither its
legitimacy nor its authority to moral considerations. The validity of law is determined
not by its moral content but by certain social facts. Early forms of legal positivism held
that the relevant social fact was the command of a sovereign backed by force (Austin). It
also held that law was simply a matter of contract between rational, free, and equal
persons (Hobbes 2008). This view was taken up by Jeremy Bentham who insisted that
laws, even if morally outrageous, were still laws (Bentham). In the contemporary era,
H.L.A. Hart famously held that the law is simply a system of rules and nothing more
(Hart 1958). For the legal positivist, to determine meaning in the law is merely to look at
the text of the laws themselves, the so-called “black letter law.”
Natural law theory, by contrast, is the view that there is a necessary connection
between law and morality. Natural law theory has its roots in ancient Greek Stoicism
which held that there were eternal laws that come from nature which direct the actions of
all rational beings (Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius). In the first century B.C.E., the Roman
philosopher and lawyer Cicero developed natural law theory a bit further in the course of
which three central tenets emerged: the idea that law remains unchanged through time
and does not vary with culture, the idea that law is accessible through reason, and the idea
that only a just law is a legitimate law (Cicero 1988). Similar claims became a part of
Christian natural law theory, most famously in the thirteenth century views of Thomas
In recent years, the analytic tradition has taken what is known as the “interpretive turn,”
according to which there is understood by many theorists to have been invented a third main
analytic theory of law -- legal interpretivism – which is said to exist as a hybrid between legal
positivism and natural law theory (Hiley et al. eds. 1991) .
4
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Aquinas. For Aquinas, a citizen has no obligation to obey an unjust law (Aquinas).
Liberal political theorists Thomas Hobbes and John Locke based much of their political
philosophy on natural law theory. Largely influenced by Locke, Thomas Jefferson
included in the Declaration of Independence language about “inalienable” or natural
rights, which for him included “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Contemporary
natural law theory in analytic jurisprudence is grounded in the work of two main thinkers:
John Finnis and Lon Fuller. For Finnis, as was the case with Aquinas, an unjust law has
no authority (Finnis) and for Fuller, an immoral law is no law at all. Instead, a law has
to have what Fuller calls an “internal morality” to be legitimate.5
While the two main approaches to analytic jurisprudence are theoretically
opposed on the question of whether there is a necessary connection between law and
morality, however, it is also the case that both theories are foundationalist in the sense
that both assume that the answer to the question of what the law is, and ultimately to the
The “interpretive turn” in analytic jurisprudence, mentioned above in the previous
footnote, can be understood to be exemplified by the work of Ronald Dworkin. Originally
considered a critique of positivism, Dworkin‟s early work explicitly attacked H.L.A. Hart‟s
ontology of law which proclaimed that law was simply a matter of rules and nothing more. For
Dworkin, such a view fails to account for the role of principles in the law [Citation]. Yes, law
begins with rules but for Dworkin law and political morality are connected at the deepest levels of
moral and political justification. In other words, for Dworkin the meaning of legal concepts
and/or laws themselves is a function of interpretation, or, more specifically, a function of
interpretive practice, which involves written or “black letter” law together with moral and
political considerations. This Dworkinian approach to philosophy of law has come to be known
as analytic legal interpretivism. For reasons that will be made clear later in this chapter, it is
important to note that although analytic legal interpretivism overlaps with legal hermeneutics in
its explicit focus on legal interpretation, legal interpretivism can be differentiated from legal
hermeneutics in that legal interpretivism is based on epistemological foundationalism whereas
legal hermeneutics understands itself as existing outside of the foundationalist/antifoundationalist
continuum. Primarily for this reason, legal interpretivism can be properly called an interpretive
“method” whereas legal hermeneutics cannot. While some might see this distinction as
insignificant, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, the distinction is negatively outcome
determinative in terms of the viability of legal interpretivism as a way of determining meaning in
the law.
5
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question of what the law means, can be found by identifying an ultimate foundation for
the law‟s legitimacy, authority, or meaning. For the legal positivist, that source is the
rules themselves, for the natural law theorist, that source is morality.6
Continental Jurisprudence
The continental tradition in philosophy of law is also multifaceted.7 But, while
each continental theory of law is different, it is also the case that each continental
approach is anti-foundationalist in the sense that for all continental approaches, the goal
of locating law‟s ultimate legitimacy, authority, or meaning anywhere at all is understood
as an exercise in futility.8
The approach to continental jurisprudence known as critical legal studies is an
example. The critical legal studies movement was an intellectual movement in the late
1970s and early 1980s which stood for the proposition that there is radical indeterminacy
in the law. Conceptually based in critical Marxism and the critical theory of the
Frankfurt School , critical legal studies stands for the proposition that legal doctrine is an

Similarly, for the legal interpretivist, that source is legal “principles.”

6
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Some of the many approaches to continental jurisprudence, many of which overlap,
include critical legal studies, Marxist legal theory, deconstruction, postmodernism, critical race
theory, and feminist jurisprudence.
8

It is important here to point out that the line being drawn here between analytic and
continental jurisprudence, while helpful in explaining the overall project (specifically the
rationale for selecting legal hermeneutics as the method of legal interpretation) is in fact fuzzy
and somewhat artificial, particularly on the question of in which category postmodern
jurisprudence, critical race theory, and feminist jurisprudence fit. Although these three
approaches are not directly or explicitly theorized in terms of continental themes, postmodernist
legal theory is indirectly and implicitly informed by post-structuralism and deconstruction; and
critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence are implicitly and indirectly informed by both the
critical legal studies movement and Marxist legal theory. In addition, what all theories of law in
the section on continental jurisprudence have in common is a rejection of epistemological
foundationalism and metaphysical essentialism, two recurring themes in continental
jurisprudence.
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empty shell. There is no such thing as “the law,” for the critical legal theorist,
understood as an entity that exists out of context (Binder 1996, 1999: 282). Instead, law
is produced by power differentials having their origins in differences in levels of property
ownership. The liberal ideal of the “rule of law” devoid of influence from power
differentials (contained in all analytic approaches to jurisprudence) is an illusion. For this
reason, law is inherently self-contradictory and self-defeating and can never be a mere
formality as liberal theory and analytic jurisprudence would have us believe. This way of
understanding the law is known as the “indeterminacy thesis.”
Marxist legal theory begins with the work of Evgeny Pashukanis and takes place
in contemporary form in the work of Alan Hunt, among others. For Pashukanis, law is
inextricably linked to capitalism and hopelessly bourgeois. Outside of capitalism, things
like legal rights are unnecessary since outside of capitalism there are no conflicting
interests or conflicting “rights” to be meted out or over which it is necessary for persons
to fight. In the socialist society that Pashukanis envisions on the other side of capitalism,
what would take the place of law and all talk of individual rights would be a sort of quasiutilitarianism which values collective satisfaction over the perceived need to protect the
individual interests of individual legal subjects (Pashukanis 1924). What contemporary
Marxist legal theory retains from Pashukanis is the view that law is inescapably political,
even merely one form of politics. In this way, law is always potentially coercive and
expressive of prevailing economic relations, and the content of law always manifests the
interests of the dominant class (Hunt 1996, 1999: 355). So described, the content of law
for Marxist legal theorists has no basis, theoretical or practical, in anything
epistemologically foundational or universal.
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Deconstructionist legal theories can be considered post-structuralist like critical
legal studies but are unique in that they center around conceptual oppositions or “binary
concepts”, also known as “binaries”. According to the deconstructionist approach, within
a given conceptual opposition, one term in the opposition has been traditionally
“privileged” over the other in a particular context or “text.” A “text” can be a written
text, an argument, an historical tradition, or a social practice. Jacques Derrida,
considered the forerunner of deconstruction as a philosophy of language and meaning,
famously identified a conceptual opposition between writing and speech, for example,
with writing being the privileged form (Derrida 1976). “Privileged” in deconstruction
means more true, more valuable, more important, or more universal than the opposing
term. (Balkin, 1996, 1999: 368). According to deconstructionist theories of law, legal
distinctions are often masked conceptual oppositions which privilege one term over
another. For example, individualism is privileged over altruism, and universalizability is
privileged over the attention to the particular that is an inherent part of equitable
distribution. These binary concepts and the privileging of one term in each binary lends
an instability to the law, on deconstructionist terms, that is decidedly anti-foundationalist.
Postmodernist legal theories are grounded in a 20th century movement in aesthetic
and intellectual thought which departed from interpretation based in universal truths,
essences, and foundations. Postmodern legal theory departs from a belief in the “rule of
law” or any generalized or universalizable Grand Theory of Jurisprudence in favor of
using “local, small-scale problem-solving strategies to raise new questions about the
relation of law, politics, and culture.” (Minda 1995: 3). Other than this statement, it is
difficult to describe postmodernist legal theory in any general way since the entire point
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of postmodernist legal theory is that generalized theories are vacuous, even impossible;
that instead there are only individual theories, individual authors of theories, and
individual texts/laws. It is fair to say, however, that postmodern legal theorists generally
resist the sort of conceptual theorization routinely practiced by more mainstream legal
academics and analytic philosophers for the reason that more mainstream approaches
unduly emphasize abstract theory at the expense of pragmatic concerns. (Ibid.) The
postmodern rejection of ultimate theories can be construed as a form of antifoundationalism.
Critical race theorists are concerned with the particularized experiences of African
Americans in American jurisprudence. They share with the postmodernists a rejection of
the idea of the existence of one grand and universally applicable theory of law that
applies equally to everyone. There is a hidden category of persons to whom the laws do
not equally and universally apply, for the critical race theorists, and that category of
persons is African Americans (Minda 1995: 167). Key themes in critical race theory are
a call to contextualized theorizing about the law which acknowledges that the lives and
experiences of African Americans in America have a very different juridical tenor than
the lives and experiences of other Americans, a critique of political liberalism (which
bases its apportionment of rights on what critical race theorists understand as the fiction
that African Americans as a group are as capable in American society of accessing and
vindicating those rights as other Americans), and a call for juridical acknowledgment of
the persistence of racism in American society (Delgado 1995,: xv). The critical race
theorist‟s rejection of the existence of universally applicable law can also be construed as
a form of anti-foundationalism.
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Feminist jurisprudence “[goes] beyond rules and precedents to explore the deeper
structures of the law” (Chamallas 2003: xix). It operates under the belief that gender is a
significant factor in American life and explores the ways in which gender, and related
power dynamics between men and women throughout American legal history, have
affected how American law has developed (Ibid.) Feminist jurisprudence concerns itself
with legal issues of particular significance to women such as sexual harassment, domestic
violence, and pay equity. It also approaches legal theory in a way that comports with
many women‟s lived experiences, i.e., without pretending, as mainstream jurisprudence
tends to do, that gender is irrelevant to the outcome of legal disputes. (Ibid.) Of primary
concern to feminist legal scholars is the systemic nature of women‟s inequality and the
pervasiveness of female subordination through law in America. The methodology of
feminist jurisprudence is the excavation and examination of hidden legalized mechanisms
of discrimination to uncover hierarchies in law that operate to the detriment of the ideal
of equal rights for women. (Ibid.) The feminist legal scholar‟s identification of hidden
power dynamics at work in American law can be construed as yet another antifoundationalist perspective on law.
Conclusion
Within mainstream scholarship in philosophy of law, then, there is tension as to
how best to find meaning in the law. Whereas analytic jurisprudence grounds meaning in
ultimate foundations, continental jurisprudence rejects the concept of ultimate,
foundational, and universally applicable meaning outright. Legal hermeneutics, by
contrast, rejects the theoretical continuum in which this tension is thought to arise in
favor of an anti-methodological approach to finding meaning in the law that is at the
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same time foundationless and the closest thing possible to objective meaning. As will be
explained below, according to legal hermeneutics, this anti-method is grounded in what
philosophical hermeneutics reveals as a set of facts about how the interpretive process
necessarily takes place that lends a credibility to interpretations formulated through the
hermeneutical process that no self-proclaimed method of legal interpretation can possibly
achieve.
Theoretical Foundations of Legal Hermeneutics in Philosophical Hermeneutics
Introduction
The question of how best to determine the meaning of a given text (not just a legal
text) has always been the chief concern of the general field of inquiry known
hermeneutics. In this way, all of traditional philosophy of law, including both analytic
and continental approaches, can be understood hermeneutic inquiry. The term
“hermeneutics” can be traced back at least as far as Ancient Greece. David Hoy traces
the origin of term “hermeneutics” to the Greek god, Hermes, who was, among other
things, the inventor of language and an interpreter between the gods and humanity (Hoy
1982). In addition, the Greek term ἑρμηνεύω or “hermeneutice” is found in Aristotle‟s
On Interpretation (Περὶ Ἑρμηνείαςas), which concerns the relationship between language
and logic and meaning.9 Hermeneutics, broadly construed, concerns itself with the nature
of understanding and is often equated with the art or science of interpretation.

9

In On Interpretation, Aristotle wrote that spoken words are the symbols or signs
(symbola) of impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); and written words are the symbols of
spoken words. Although all people do not write or speak in the same way, Aristotle continued,
the impressions of the soul themselves are the same for everyone. (Aristotle, approximately 350
B.C.E., On Interpretation, 1.16a4; translated by E.M. Edghill). Paul Ricoeur has characterized On
Interpretation as a general theory of human understanding. (Ricoeur 1974).
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The specific subfield of hermeneutics known as philosophical hermeneutics,
however, asks not only the question of how best to interpret a given text, but also the
deeper question of what it means to interpret a text at all. In other words, specifically
philosophical hermeneutics takes as its object of inquiry the interpretive process itself and
seeks interpretive practices designed to respect that process.10 Philosophical
hermeneutics, then, can be alternately described as the philosophy of interpretation, the
philosophy of understanding, or the philosophy of meaning. The central problem of
philosophical hermeneutics is how to successfully ascertain anything on the order of an
objective interpretation/understanding/meaning of a given phenomenon or text in light of
the apparent fact that all interpretation/understanding/meaning is ascertained through the
filter of at least one interpreter‟s subjectivity. (Bleicher 1980: 1). Hermeneutics seeks a
theory of interpretation that recognizes each act of understanding as an interpretation,
captures the high degree of complexity and subtlety that is integral to the interpretive
process, and at the same time accomplishes what is arguably the closest thing possible to
an objective interpretation, understanding, or meaning.
Origins: Ast and Wolf
Philosophical hermeneutics can be said to have its theoretical origins in the work
of 19th century German philologist Friedrich Ast. Ast‟s Basic Elements of Grammar,
Hermeneutics, and Criticism (Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik) of
1808 contains an early articulation of the main components of what later became known
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The philosophical hermeneuticist, then, is not committed, at least theoretically, to any
particular interpretive method except to the extent that that method respects what the
hermeneuticist sees as the incontrovertible reality of what takes place when anyone sets out to
determine or understand the “meaning” of any text.
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as the “hermeneutic circle.”11 There, Ast writes that the basic principle of all
understanding is a cyclical process of coming to understand the parts through the whole
and the whole through the parts. This basic principle derives, for Ast, from the “original
unity of all being” (Ast 1808: Section 72) or what Ast called “spirit” or Geist.12 To
understand a text, for Ast, is to determine its inner meaning or spirit, its own internal
development, through a circularity of reason, a dialectical relation between the parts of a
given work and the whole (Ast 1808: Section 76). What Ast called the hermeneutic of
the spirit involves, in turn, developing an understanding of the spirit of the writer and his
or her era, and seeks to identify the “one idea”, or Grundidee, that unifies a given text,
and that provides clarification regarding the relationship of the whole to the parts and the
parts to the whole, with the interpreter always being cognizant of the historical period in
which the text is situated.
Friedrich August Wolf was a contemporary of Ast‟s and a fellow philologist. His
Lecture on the Encyclopedia of Classical Studies (Vorlesung über die Enzyklopädie der
Altertumswissenschaft) of 1831 defined hermeneutics as the science of the rules by which
the meaning of signs is determined. These rules pointed, for Wolf, to a knowledge of
human nature. Both historical and linguistic facts have a proper role in the interpretive
process, for Wolf, and help us to understand the organic whole that is the text. For Wolf,
however, the primary task of hermeneutics was not the identification of the Grundidee or

Generally speaking, the phrase “hermeneutic circle” is meant to convey the view that
an understanding of the whole cannot be had without an understanding of the parts, and an
understanding of the parts cannot be had without an understanding of the whole.
11

12

Ast‟s Geist is commonly understood to have been derived from Herder‟s concept of

Volkgeist.
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focal point of the text à la Ast, but the much more practical goal of the achievement of a
high level of communication or dialogue between the interpreter of the text and the
author, as well as between the interpreter and those to whom the text was to be explained.
Toward a General Hermeneutics: Schleiermacher and Dilthey
As mentioned above, although aspects of the hermeneutics of both Ast and Wolf
have survived into contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, the hermeneutics of both
are also generally understood to be concerned with what later became known as “regional
hermeneutics”, or hermeneutics applicable to specific fields of study. Friedrich D. E.
Schleiermacher, by contrast, was the first to define hermeneutics as the art of
understanding itself, irrespective of field of study. (Palmer 1969: 84). Underlying and
grounding the specific rules of interpretation of the various fields of study, for
Schleiermacher, was a unity grounded in the fact that all interpretation takes place in
language (Ibid.). Schleirmacher thought that a general, rather than regional,
hermeneutics was possible and that such a general hermeneutics would consist of the
principles for understanding of language. (Ibid.) Specifically, for Schleiermacher,
proper interpretation (understanding) was not merely a function of grasping the thoughts
of the author, but of coming to grips with the extent to which the language in which the
thoughts took place affected, constrained, and informed those thoughts. Schleiermacher,
then, is calling our philosophical attention to the fact that when we say we understand
something, we are essentially just comparing it to something we already we know, most
basically a given language. To “understand” is to place something within a pre-existing
context of intelligibility. Understanding is therefore decidedly circular, for
Schleiermacher, but for him this does not amount to the conclusion that understanding is
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impossible. Instead, circularity is how understanding is defined. Understanding
necessarily and structurally entails that the text and the interpreter share the same
language and the same context of intelligibility.
Wilhelm Dilthey continued Schleiermacher‟s pursuit of understanding qua
understanding, but he sought to do so within the specific context of what he called the
human sciences, or the Geisteswissenschaften (Dilthey 1883). The methods of scientific
knowledge, for Dilthey, were too “reductionist and mechanistic” to capture the fullness of
human-created phenomena (Palmer 1969, 100). The human sciences (or humanities)
required instead two particular processes: (1) the development of an appreciation for the
role of historical consciousness in our conceptions of meaning, and (2) a recognition that
human-created phenomena are generated from “life itself” rather than through theory or
concepts (Ibid.). In contemporary hermeneutic theory, the first process is often referred
to as the “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit) of meaning and the second as “lifephilosophy” (Lebensphilosophie), or the phenomenological view that
meaning/understanding can only be had through lived experience (Erlebnis), through life
itself; and not through the examination of concepts, theories, or other purely idealistic or
rational methods (Nenon 1995).
Language, Being, and Understanding: Heidegger
While Dilthey observed that the categorical methods of understanding useful in
science were inappropriate for use in the human sciences, Martin Heidegger switched the
entire hermeneutic enterprise from an epistemological focus to an ontological one. This
switch is customarily referred to as the “ontological turn” in hermeneutics. For
Heidegger, in his classic, Being and Time, the question of the nature of understanding
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(Verstehen) can only be answered by first answering the question of the nature of what it
means to be. Accordingly, Heidegger sets out in Being and Time (2008/1962) to
discover the nature of being qua being. To do so Heidegger goes to the “things
themselves” (die Sachen selbst), in keeping with the phenomenological methodology he
learned from his teacher, Edmund Husserl. Heidegger calls this phenomenological
inquiry into the nature of being qua being “fundamental ontology.” He also calls it
“hermeneutic ontology,” which highlights that for Heidegger being and interpretation are
inextricably linked almost to the point of identity.
This concept is arguably best captured in two of Heidegger‟s key concepts:
Dasein and being-in-the-world. Dasein can be roughly translated as the human way of
being but its literal translation is “being there” or “being here.” With these concepts,
Heidegger is attempting to stress that the human way of being is interactive both with
one‟s environment and with others in the world. To be human is to be active and
involved in one‟s world and with other people, rather than to be in a particular static state.
There are no isolated human subjects separate from the world, for Heidegger, and the
human way of being is not adequately characterized by the traditional philosophical
distinction between subject and object, or between subject and other subjects that
originates for Heidegger in Descartes‟s Meditations. Instead, being, for humans, is
“being-in-the-world”, a term meant to highlight the lack of clear barriers between human
beings and the contexts, or schemas of intelligibility, in which they find themselves.
According to Heidegger, what this means for the phenomenon of understanding is
that it is always a function of how a given human being is in the world. The relationship
between being and understanding is reciprocal. Understanding, for Heidegger, discloses
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to us what it means to be, and who we are affects how we understand things. In other
words, understanding for Heidegger is not a sort of apprehension of the “way things
really are,” as the canonical modern philosophical tradition might think of it, but rather it
is the process of appreciating the manner in which things are there for a particular person,
or group of persons, in the world. Further, the manner in which things are there for us in
the world is a function primarily of shared social and cultural practices. To “understand”
something, then, is to be able to place it within a schema of intelligibility which is
generated by the shared social and cultural practices in which one finds oneself.
Dialogue: Gadamer
In his Truth and Method (1975), Hans-George Gadamer picks up on Heidegger‟s
concept of the hermeneutic circle of understanding that is at the core of what it means to
be human in the world (to being what Heidegger called Dasein), but while it is true that
Gadamer works within the Heideggerian paradigm to the extent that he fully accepts the
ontological turn in hermeneutics (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2009), Gadamer‟s own stated
project in Truth and Method is to get at the question of understanding qua understanding.
Specifically, Gadamer observes that the traditional paths to truth are wrong-headed and
run antithetical to the reality that being and interpretive understanding are intertwined. In
the traditional paths to truth, truth and method are at odds. The methods used in the
tradition will not get us to truth. These methods are critical interpretation (traditional
hermeneutics) and the Enlightenment focus on reason as the path to truth. Both of these
methods have what Gadamer calls a “prejudice against prejudice.” That is, they both fail
to acknowledge the role of the interpreter in determining truth. Traditional critical
interpretation is inadequate because it seeks original intent or original meaning, i.e., it

103

holds on to the fiction that the meaning of the text can be found in the original intent of
the author or in the words of the text themselves. The Enlightenment focus on reason is
an equally inadequate path to truth because it retains the subject/object distinction and
thinks the path to truth is through the scientific method, both of which are wrong-headed.
For Gadamer, the word “prejudice” (Vorurteile) means the same thing as
Heidegger‟s fore-structure of understanding. Gadamer claims that today‟s negative
connotation of prejudice only develops with the Enlightenment (Schmidt 2006: 100).
The original meaning of “prejudice,” according to Gadamer was simply “prejudgment,”
something that is neither positive nor negative. A prejudice is simply a view we hold,
either consciously or unconsciously. All understanding necessarily starts with prejudices.
The prejudices of the interpreter, for Gadamer, rather than being a barrier to truth,
actually facilitate its generation; for the prejudices of the interpreter – or the prejudgments of the interpreter held as a result of the interpreter‟s personal facticity – not
only contribute to the generation of the question being raised in the first instance, but if
taken into account on the path to truth, are then capable of being critically evaluated and
revised, with the result that the quality of the interpretation is improved. Additionally,
prejudices are either legitimate or illegitimate. Legitimate prejudices lead to
understanding. Illegitimate prejudices do not. One of the goals of Truth and Method is
to provide a theoretically sound basis upon which to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate prejudices (Schmidt 2006: 102). Understanding or meaning, for Gadamer, is
a function of legitimate prejudices.
The model for how understanding operates, for Gadamer, is the conversation or
dialogue. In an authentic dialogue, says Gadamer, understanding/meaning is something
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that occurs, and occurs inside of a tradition. Tradition operates as a sort of
Weltanschauung, or worldview, a framework of ideas and beliefs through which a given
culture experiences and interprets the world. Tradition in this Gadamerian sense is a
theoretical grandchild of what Ast called a given text‟s Grundidee or one idea that unified
it. For Gadamer, a legitimate prejudice is a prejudice that survives throughout time,
eventually becoming a central part of a given culture, part of its tradition. Understanding
or meaning is an event, a happening, the substance of which is a fusion of this narrowly
defined concept of tradition and the prejudices of the interpreter. In this sense,
understanding is not willed by the participants. If it were, the dialogue would not be
authentic and understanding/meaning could never be achieved. Instead, the conversation
itself wills the path to understanding. The thing itself reveals the truth. What happens is
that in the course of a given conversation, and as a direct and organic result of the things
themselves being discussed by the particular participants to the conversation, a question
arises. This question becomes the matter at hand, the topic of the conversation. As the
conversation proceeds, the answer will show up as well, and it will be a function of the
“fusion of horizons” between the perspectives or “prejudices” of the participants in the
conversation (Gadamer 1975). This fusion is understanding/meaning. It is the answer to
the question and the closest thing there is to truth. In this way, both the things themselves
and the participants in the conversation themselves together generate both the topic at
hand (the question) and the answer; both the things themselves and the participants in the
conversation together generate the “truth” of the matter, and all of this takes place within
a tradition that gives legitimacy and weight to the meaning generated.
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It is important that for Gadamer the path to truth is phenomenological, i.e., we
must go to the things themselves, and the path is also hermeneutic in that it appreciates
that the prejudice against prejudice is unavoidable. Every interpreter arrives at a text
with what Gadamer calls a given “horizon” (or conglomeration of prejudices) which is
analogous to a Heideggerian “world” or “fore-structure of understanding” and which I
have described as a given schema of intelligibility in which an interpreter finds himself or
herself. A Gadamerian horizon is a shared system of social and cultural practices that
provide the scope of what shows up as meaningful for an interpreter and for how things
show up as well. Picking up on the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer holds that an act of
understanding is always interpretive.
Another key element of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics – one that is
related to his insistence that we cannot ignore the role of the interpreter and the
interpreter‟s prejudices in any interpretation -- is Gadamer‟s insistence that
interpretation/understanding/meaning cannot take place outside of practical application.
Interpretation is more than mere explication for Gadamer. It is more than mere exegesis.
Beyond these things, interpretation of a given text – and it is important that everything is
a text – always and necessarily takes place through the lens of present concerns and
interests. The interpreter always and necessarily¸ in other words, comes to the table of
the interpretive conversation or dialogue with a present concern that is grounded in the
epistemological/metaphysical horizon in which the interpreter dwells. In this way, for
Gadamer, Aristotle got it right that understanding necessarily occurs through practical
reasoning, or phronesis. For Gadamer, “[a]pplication does not mean first understanding a
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given universal in itself and then afterward applying it to a concrete case. It is the very
understanding of the universal….itself” (Gadamer 1975).
But, even more important than this, for Gadamer, the distance in time between the
interpreter and the text is not a barrier to understanding but that which enables it.
Temporal distance between text and interpretation is a “positive and productive condition
enabling understanding” (Gadamer 1975). When we seek to interpret a text, we are
trying to figure out not the author’s original intent but “what the text has to say to us”
(Schmidt 2006: 104)13 and this is a function of the extent to which the author‟s original
intent and the meaning generated by the contemporary context and the contemporary
interpreter agree, i.e., the extent to which the “horizons” of the author and the instant
interpreter fuse or blend.
Post-Gadamerian Philosophical Hermeneutics
Post-Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics takes many forms. I have selected
five particular versions which I think fairly outline the main themes and ideas at work on
the contemporary scene, and which, together with the more classic hermeneutical
theorists already discussed, provide the theoretical basis for the kind of legal
hermeneutics I have selected for the instant project.

13

Gadamer specifically discusses legal hermeneutics in Truth and Method. He writes
that there are two commonly understood ways of determining meaning in the law. The first is
when a judge decides a case. In such a scenario, the judge must necessarily factor the present
facts into the decision. The second is the case of the legal historian. In this second scenario,
although it may seem as if the task is to discover the meaning of the law by only considering the
history of the law, the reality is that it is impossible for the legal historian to understand the law
solely in terms of its historical origin to the exclusion of considerations of the continuing effect of
the law. In other words, determinations of meaning in the law (as is the case of all determinations
of meaning) necessarily and at all times involves practical application.
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Betti
Post-Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics begins with Emilio Betti. Finding
what he saw as an epistemological relativism in the philosophical hermeneutics of
Gadamer, Betti returns to the general hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and
resists the tide of the ontological turn (Pinton 1972, 1973). Betti was a legal theorist who
tried to bring the hermeneutic project back to one of interpretation without reference to
the human way of being. Betti believed in and sought objective understanding or
objective interpretation (Auslegung), while at the same time stressing that texts reflected
human intentions. Accordingly, he thought it was possible to ascertain “the meaning” of
the text through replicating the original creative process, the train of thought, so to speak,
of the text‟s author. Betti believed in the “autonomy” of the text (Bleicher 1980: 58) and
the autonomy values. Objective interpretation was possible, for him, but this objectivity
was based both in terms of a priori epistemological existence à la Plato‟s forms, and in
terms of historical and cultural coherence. (Bleicher 1980: 28-29).
Habermas
Jürgen Habermas, like Emilio Betti, seeks objective understanding
(Habermas1971), but, unlike Betti and in agreement with Gadamer, Habermas believes
that hermeneutics is not and cannot be merely a matter of trying to find the best method
of interpretation. Instead, objectivity of interpretation is grounded in something
Habermas called “communicative action,”14 a sort of Gadamerian dialogue modified by
the recognition that power imbalances often distort what passes for collective

This concept is also known as “communicative praxis,” or “communicative
rationality.”
14
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understanding, and that real consensus – the closest thing available to truth and/or
objective understanding– can only be had where that consensus has been generated
impartially and in circumstances where agreement has been unconstrained, and where
everyone affected by a given disputed issue has been included in the conversation. While
Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics grounded a kind of quasi-objectivity in the
authority of tradition, however, Habermas found this approach insufficiently able to
guide social liberation and progress. The task of hermeneutics is not merely to
deconstruct the process of understanding and/or to somehow ground that understanding
in either method à la Betti or tradition à la Habermas, but to determine rules of
ascertaining universal validity in the social sciences en route to social change. In this
way, Habermas‟s hermeneutics claims that hermeneutics can and does permit the kind of
value judgments of which some critics say hermeneutics is incapable.
Ricoeur
Paul Ricoeur was a contemporary philosophical hermeneuticist who is known for
creating what is often described as a “critical hermeneutics.” For Ricoeur, meaning and
understanding are to be obtained through culture and narrative, as these take place in
time. Influenced by Freud, Ricoeur thought all ideology required a critique to uncover
repressed and hidden meanings that exist behind surface meanings which pass for truth.
In The Conflict of Interpretations (1974), Ricoeur argued that there were many and
various paths to understanding and that each uniquely adds to meaning.
Derrida
The work of Jacques Derrida (Derrida 1976, 1978) is more commonly associated
with a 20th century movement in French philosophy known as deconstruction than with
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philosophical hermeneutics per se. However, there are important similarities between the
two movements. First, deconstruction on its own terms, like hermeneutics, is not a
method. Instead, deconstruction is a critique of authoritative systems of intelligibility or
meaning that exposes the hierarchies of power within those systems. In understanding
itself as outside of existing theoretical schemas, in other words, Derrida‟s deconstruction
is within the hermeneutic tradition. Second, deconstruction is based on Heidegger‟s
concept of Destruktion, a central concept in his hermeneutic ontology. But, while
Heidegger‟s Destrucktion (meaning a project of critiquing authoritative systems of
meaning that are based on structures of foundationalist metaphysics or epistemology)
concludes that every act of understanding is an act of interpretation (Heidegger,
2008/1962), Derrida‟s deconstruction involves identifying that language (“text”) contains
conceptual oppositions that involve the prioritizing of one side of a given conceptual
opposition over the other (e.g. writing over speech). Still, Derrida‟s deconstruction is
clearly in the hermeneutic tradition in that it is designed to highlight the elliptical and
enigmatic nature of language and meaning. This is particularly evident in Derrida‟s
concept of différance, according to which every word in a given language implicates
other words, which implicate other words, in a process of infinite reference and therefore
what Derrida calls “absence” (meaning an absence of definitive meaning).
Hoffman
Susan-Judith Hoffman argues that Gadamerian hermeneutics furthers feminist
objectives, and can be understood as a form of feminist theorizing. Highlighting
Gadamer‟s account of the importance of difference, his notion of understanding as an
inclusive dialogue, his account of prejudices as positive conditions of an understanding
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that must always remain provisional, his account of tradition as that which is transformed
by our reflection, and its account of language (Hoffman, 2003: 103), Hoffman argues that
Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics is in line with feminist theorizing in that it
“overthrows the false universalism of the natural sciences as the privileged model of
human understanding….” (Ibid.: 81). In the process, Gadamer‟s hermeneutics amounts
to feminist theorizing in two important ways. First, it contains a sensitivity to the
historical and cultural situatedness of knowledge and knowledge seekers, and second, it
contains the “critical power” to challenge reductive universalizing tendencies in
traditional canons of thought (Ibid.: 82). That Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics
contained these last two elements was insisted upon by Gadamer himself, who saw his
philosophical hermeneutics as a critique the Enlightenment view that truth could be had
through abstract reasoning, divorced from historical considerations; as well as a call for
the acknowledgment that the path to truth was through the particular rather than through
the universal (Gadamer 1975).
Conclusion
In summary, the following themes emerge from a bird‟s eye view of philosophical
hermeneutics. First, ever since Aristotle, hermeneutics has been the study of the nature
of understanding and the relationship between understanding and interpretation. Aristotle
saw, and the later hermeneuticists have all agreed, that there is no act of understanding
that is not also an act of interpretation. Friedrich Ast showed that the basic dynamic of all
acts of understanding is a cyclical process of coming to understand the parts through the
whole and the whole through the parts, or what is known as the hermeneutic circle. Ast
also showed that in order to understand a text, it is necessary to understand its driving
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force, main theme or idea, or Grundidee. Schleiermacher added that interpretation was
not something that one did in specific ways within specific fields, but something that
necessarily takes place in every single attempt at understanding all the time and in every
field of inquiry. Schleirmacher also showed that this was the case by pointing out that
every act of understanding/interpretation takes place within a given language. To find
“meaning,” we compare the text to things we already know, or to understandings we
already accept as legitimate. Dilthey added the necessary historicality of all meaning or
understanding, that understanding can only take place through lived experience, and that
central to the relationship between lived experience and understanding or meaning is
temporality.
Through his “fundamental ontology,” Heidegger brilliantly identified the
fundamental relationship between (human) existence and interpretation. Meaning,
Heidegger showed, was not ascertained, but created by the manner in which human
beings interact with the world and with each other. Gadamer added to philosophical
hermeneutics the idea that authentic meaning is ascertained through dialogue, that both
the question and the answer emerge as a consequence of the interacting schemas of
intelligibility (“horizons”) of the participants to a given conversation. Betti reminds us
that the hermeneutic goal is not relative meaning but objective meaning. Habermas adds
to the concept of Gadamerian dialogue that we need to be cognizant of any power
imbalances within a given dialogue or conversation, and calls us to use the tools of
hermeneutics to generate social change. Ricoeur reinforces the roles of culture, narrative
and time in meaning, and calls us to be on the lookout for hidden and repressed
meanings. Derrida, too, is concerned about hidden or lost meanings, those not privileged
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by a given culture, language or time period, but no less legitimate. Finally, Susan-Judith
Hoffman calls our attention to the fact that hermeneutics is in line with feminist
theorizing and may be very helpful at achieving feminist objectives.
The Main Goals and Processes of Legal Hermeneutics
Legal hermeneutics provides an alternative to traditional philosophy of law in that
its approach to legal meaning can be understood to avoid engagement with the question
of foundationalism that is characteristic of the traditional approaches. Indeed, legal
hermeneutics can be understood as capturing the strengths of both the foundationalist and
anti-foundationalist approaches while avoiding the weaknesses of situating the question
of meaning along the antifoundationalist/foundationalist continuum.
Legal hermeneutics applies the themes and approaches of philosophical
hermeneutics to the specific question of how best to ascertain the meaning of legal texts.
Rather than offering up a new theory of law, legal hermeneutics “provides us with the
necessary protocols for determining meaning” (Douzinas, Warrington, and McVeigh
1992: 30). Legal hermeneutics provides no specific protocol or theory of law, privileges
no particular methodology or ideology. Instead, legal hermeneutics calls the interpreter
of legal texts first and foremost to the fact that every act of understanding a law is an act
of interpretation; and at the same time highlights that the best interpretation is necessarily
the interpretation that takes conscious and proactive account of what philosophical
hermeneutics reveals as the necessary structures and components of the interpretive
process itself.
Legal hermeneutics, then, is more a way of clarifying the nature of legal
interpretation than a theory of legal interpretation itself. In this way, legal hermeneutics
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acts not only as a middle ground, but as a refreshing alternative to the stand-off between
the foundationalism of the analytic tradition and the anti-foundationalism of the
continental tradition in the philosophy of law. It incorporates both the strengths of the
analytic tradition (a search for “objective” meaning) and the strengths of the continental
tradition (a call to context, language, history, time, power, and particularity) in an attempt
to find meaning in the law that takes sober account – unlike any of the formal interpretive
“methods” -- of the necessary structure of the interpretive process itself.
Contemporary Approaches to Legal Hermeneutics in Constitutional Theory
Introduction
Legal hermeneutics as a theory of constitutional interpretation can be traced back
to the publication of Francis Lieber‟s 19th century work, Legal and Political
Hermeneutics (Lieber 1880). There, Lieber tried to identify principles of legal
interpretation that would bring consistency and objectivity to the interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution (Mootz 1992: 117) while at the same time exposing strict intentionalist
interpretative methods as incoherent (Binder and Weisberg 2000: 48). 15 Over a hundred
and twenty-five years after Lieber‟s landmark text, contemporary legal hermeneutics in
constitutional theory retains Lieber‟s goal of objectivity of interpretation, as well as his
attention to the roles of history, temporality, politics, and socio-historical context in any
attempt to “understand” a legal text.
The question of the nature of legal interpretation is central to constitutional
theory. As many jurists have observed, before we can decide what the constitution

Intentionalist interpretive methods are those in which the so-called “intent of the
Framers” is sought and considered the ultimate authority on what the constitution means.
15
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means, we must first decide the best interpretive method. The choice of method is
constrained to a large extent for a given theorist by where that theorist fits on a
methodological continuum between two loosely defined but fundamentally opposed
approaches to constitutional interpretation that can be called for purposes of the present
discussion “originalism” and “non-originalism.”16 Originalism is the view, generally,
that the meaning of the constitution is to be found by determining the original intent of
the Framers, understood to be most prudently found in the text of the constitution itself.17
By contrast, non-originalism is the view, generally, that the constitution is a “living,
breathing document” meant more as a set of guidelines for future lawmakers than as a
strict rulebook demanding literal compliance.
In the realm of constitutional theory, legal hermeneutics is unique and somewhat
revolutionary in that it not only refuses to align itself with either pole on the
methodological continuum between originalism and non-originalism, it goes one step
further and rejects the continuum itself as wrong-headed.18 Indeed, legal hermeneutics
rejects interpretive method altogether in favor instead of a call to an increased level of
self-reflexivity on the part of the interpreter meant to actively and consciously engage her

What I am calling “non-originalism” is also known by the less neutral term of “judicial
activism,” a pejorative term used by those whose approach to constitutional meaning leans more
toward originalism.
16

This approach has recently been called “textualism” by Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia and others (Scalia 1997).
17

18

The reader should note that the divide between originalism and non-originalism is akin
to the divide between epistemological foundationalism and antifoundationalism.
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in the interpretive process in a way that neither originalism nor non-originalism is able to
accommodate.19
A legal hermeneutical approach to constitutional theory, then, calls the interpreter
of the constitution to consciously recognize the roles of the identity of the interpreter, the
identity of previous interpreters, the identity of the original author, the socio-historical
context in which the text was written, the socio-historical context in which the
interpretation is taking place, the political climate at the time the text was written, the
political climate in which the interpretation is taking place, the extent to which the
meaning of words and concepts relevant to the interpretation have changed or have not
changed over time, the particularity of experience of those affected by a given law, the
extent to which that experience is acknowledged or unacknowledged by previous
interpretations, the relationship between who one is and who one takes oneself to be and
the kinds of interpretive choices one makes, and various other factors which legal
hermeneutics takes to necessarily affect the quality of the communicative enterprise
between the interpreter and the legal text in any attempt to understand or determine the
“meaning” of the constitution. In addition, legal hermeneutics asks the interpreter to
acknowledge up front what it sees as the necessary truth that original meaning is an
illusion and cannot be ascertained. With that acknowledged, the interpreter is then free to
self-consciously examine the extent to which her own prejudices enter into her attempt at
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It should be noted that the legal hermeneutical approach to constitutional interpretation
overlaps in important ways with what Philip Bobbit has called the six “modalities” of
constitutional interpretation: (1) history, (2) text, (3) structure, (4) doctrine, (5) ethos, and (6)
prudence. (Bobbit 1996, 1999: 126). There is also overlap between the legal hermeneutical antimethod and the following approaches to meaning in the law: Dennis Patterson‟s postmodern
account (Patterson 1999), Paul Campos‟s approach (Campos 1992), and the approach of legal
pragmatism (See, e.g., Richard Warner‟s approach; Warner 1996, 1999).
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ascertaining meaning, to add a level of self-reflexivity to the interpretive enterprise that
can only improve the quality of the interpretation.
Political Theory
For Gregory Leyh, legal hermeneutics reveals to us the political nature of every
act of constitutional interpretation. This includes both originalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation as well as nonoriginalist approaches. However, for Leyh,
legal hermeneutics also provides us with some constructive lessons for improving the
quality of our necessarily political acts of interpretation. Specifically, in “Toward a
Constitutional Hermeneutics,” Leyh makes the case for a legal hermeneutics based in the
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans- George Gadamer (Gadamer 1975) in which, as the
self-understanding of the interpreters of legal texts is increased, so is the quality of the
interpretation produced by those interpreters (Leyh 1992). This self-understanding would
include primarily an explicit acknowledgment of the role that history plays in the
development of both understanding and meaning (Ibid.: 370), an explicit
acknowledgment of the “irreducible conditions of all human knowing” (Ibid.: 371), and
attentiveness to the kinds of issues characteristically associated with the interpretation of
all texts, including legal texts. (Ibid.) For Leyh, a call to the constitution‟s “original
meaning”, á la a standard originalist approach, for example, entails certain assumptions
about historical understanding (e.g. that it is fixed and identifiable by subsequent
interpreters) which legal hermeneutics exposes as impossible. What constitutional
theorists need, for Leyh, is not greater insight into the intent of the framers, for this is not
obtainable, but deeper reflection on the issue of the conditions that make historical
knowledge possible at all. (Ibid.: 372). For Leyh, legal hermeneutics “sets for itself an
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ontological task, namely, that of identifying the ineluctable relationships between text
and reader, past and present, that allow for understanding to occur in the first place.”
(Ibid.)
There are two key aspects to Leyh‟s legal hermeneutics: (1) an appreciation for
the role of language in understanding, which sharpens our awareness of the “historical
structures constitutive of all knowledge,” and (2) a recognition of the “enabling character
of our prejudgments and preconceptions as windows to the past” (Ibid.: 372). Taking
these things into consideration, it is impossible, according to Leyh, for us to obtain an
understanding of historical texts such as the constitution without going through the
language we use today, as well as our present day prejudgments and preconceptions, or
what Hans-George Gadamer called our “prejudices.” For Leyh, all reason is historical
and there is a historicity to all inquiry (Ibid.: 375).20 Rather than understanding the
historicity of all inquiry as an impediment between the contemporary interpreter and the
text, however, Leyh suggests that this information should aid us in recognizing that
reason “finds its expression only as it is applied concretely” (Ibid.). In other words,
interpretation is always practical, it always occurs in a particular set of circumstances, at
a particular time and place, and applies itself to a particular set of facts. An
acknowledgement of this reality on the part of the interpreter, for Leyh, adds a level of
awareness vis-à-vis the interpretive process that can only aid in making sound judgments
of constitutional interpretation.

20

“No text simply sits before us and announces its meaning” (Leyh 1988: 375).
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The Law and Literature Movement
Legal hermeneutics is sometimes understood as a branch of what is known as the
“law and literature” movement which began in the late 1980s and continues today in the
work of Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, Gerald Bruns, and Owen Fiss, to name a few
representative theorists. While legal hermeneutics based in political theory is primarily
influenced by the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, legal hermeneutics based in literary
theory is primarily influenced by the deconstructionist philosophy of Jacques Derrida
(Derrida 1990, 1992). The literary legal hermeneuticist, in other words, has developed an
appreciation for the costs of excluding certain types of questions from the process of
ascertaining meaning in the law (Sanford and Levinson, 1988: xi), and there is an active
attempt on the part of the literary legal hermeneuticist to dismantle or undo the
conventional illusion that the structures that support claims to authentic, legitimate or
official meaning are built on solid ground. The role of the interpreter is also highlighted
in these approaches, as is the inextricability of determinations of meaning from the power
dynamics in which they take place.
Jurisprudence Proper
The work of George H. Taylor, Francis J. Mootz, III, William Poteat, and John T.
Valauri is at the vanguard of contemporary legal hermeneutics within the realm of
jurisprudence proper. George Taylor‟s work in legal hermeneutics follows Ricoeur‟s in
philosophical hermeneutics. In his, “Hermeneutics and Critique in Legal Practice,”
Taylor argues that Ricoeur‟s approach to hermeneutics gets it right when it attempts to
mediate the difference between understanding and explanation (Taylor 2000: 1101 et
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seq.).21 Understanding, on this view, is obtained through hermeneutic methods but
explanation is obtained through science. Ricoeur, according to Taylor, sees the
interpretive enterprise as containing both elements. The way Taylor sees it, Ricoeur‟s
emphasis on the narrative nature of meaning acknowledges the roles of both
understanding and explanation in a successful interpretation (Taylor 2000,: 1123). The
usefulness of legal hermeneutics, for Taylor, is that it correctly identifies and brings to
the forefront that there is explanation/fact in understanding/interpretation and there is
understanding/interpretation in explanation/fact; shedding a kind of glaring light on all
“understandings” that might deny this reality. The goals of originalism, on this view, are
simply impossible to reach.
Francis J. Mootz, III agrees with Taylor about the impossibility of our ability to
ascertain the “original” meaning. Accordingly, instead of engaging in what he
understands as the necessarily fruitless exercise of attempting to ascertain original
meaning, Mootz argues, we should instead attempt to find the interpretation that “allows
the text to be most fully realized in the present situation” (Mootz 1988: 605).
David Hoy‟s take on legal hermeneutics involves a focused critique of the
“intentionalist” position in constitutional theory, according to which the so-called “intent
of the framers” is the ultimate authority on constitutional meaning (Hoy 1992). For Hoy,
while the intentionalist believes that no interpretation is needed to locate the intent of the
framers, the hermeneuticist understands that the concept of intended meaning

21

Recall that the distinction between understanding and explanation and the relationship
between the two in the interpretive process was previously identified by the philologist, Friedrich
Wolf, as discussed above.
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presupposes a prior understanding of “meaning” in a different sense of the word. The
concept of an ambiguous sentence highlights this prior understanding of “meaning.” A
given sentence can have two different “meanings” in this prior sense, Hoy explains,
whether either or both of them were “intended” or not (Hoy 1992: 175). The
hermeneuticist acknowledges, in other words, according to Hoy, a difference between
sentence meaning and speaker‟s meaning. However, while the intentionalist incorrectly
presumes that there are only two possible bases for a theory of meaning, intention and
convention (Ibid.), the hermeneuticist understands that there can be no fact of the matter
vis-à-vis sentence meaning. Hoy writes,
“[Hermeneutics] acknowledges semantic complexity. It does not exclude
questions about intention when these are relevant to interpretation, but it
believes that since textual meaning is not reducible to intended meaning,
there are many other kinds of questions that can be asked about texts”
(Hoy 1992: 178). At the same time, Hoy‟s hermeneutics stands for the proposition that
the traditional way that law is practiced operates as a constraint on judicial discretion, it
provides a schema of intelligibility in which a judge must necessarily decide a case. As
Hoy indicates, using discretion to decide what the law means within the tradition of the
practice of law is what judges do all the time. “Only when the judges know that the law
entails one decision and they nevertheless decide something else could they be said to be
rewriting,” writes Hoy (Hoy 1992: 183), and the hermeneutic claim is that this is almost
never the case.22

See also Hoy, David (1987) “Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and
Poststructuralist Perspectives,” Southern California Law Review 58 (1985): 136-76.; and
“Dworkin‟s Constructive Optimism v. Deconstructive Legal Nihilism,” Law and
Philosophy 6: 321-56.
22
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If Hoy is right, then, as Leyh points out as well, there is no act of judicial
interpretation that takes place without interpretation. Such a possibility is an
illusion. Instead, all acts of “understanding” are acts of interpretation including
originalist and/or intentionalist acts of understanding.

Conclusion: Anti-Method
Legal hermeneutics, then, is an approach to legal texts (and legal issues) which
understands that the legal text is always historically embedded and contextually
informed, so that it is not possible to understand the law simply as a product of reason
and argument. Instead, meaning in the law takes place according practical, material, and
context-dependent factors such as power, social relations, racial and sexual differences
and other contingent considerations. As Gerald Bruns has put it:
“Legal hermeneutics is what occurs in the give-and-take – the dialogue –
between meaning and history. The historicality of the law means that its
meaning is always supplemented whenever the law is understood. This
understanding is always situated, always an answer to some unique
question that needs deciding, and so is different from the understanding
of the law in its original meaning, say, the understanding a legal historian
would have in figuring the law in terms of the situation in which it was
originally handed down. The historicality of the law means that its
meaning is always supplemented whenever it is understood or
interpreted. Supplementation always takes the form of selfunderstanding; that is, it is generated by the way we understand ourselves
– how we see and judge ourselves – in light of the law. But, this selfunderstanding throws its light on the law in turn, allowing us to grasp the
original meaning of the law in a new way. The present gives the past its
point.”23

Bruns, Gerald L. (1992) “Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text,”
Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice, Ed. Gregory Leyh, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 23-40.
23
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This seems to mean, at a minimum, that every Supreme Court decision is indeed an
interpretation, which directly undermines all originalist approaches to constitutional
theory.
The claim that every Supreme Court decision is an act of interpretation, however,
is not a claim about the indeterminacy of meaning itself, but a more modest claim about
the impossibility of ascertaining original meaning. The difference between these two
positions is subtle but important. While for the non-originalist, the possibility of
authoritative meaning is an illusion, for the legal hermeneuticist authoritative meaning
exists and is a function of the interpreter‟s taking conscious account of several key factors
which inform and shape the interpretive process. Taking conscious account of each of
these factors when attempting to interpret a given legal text lends to the interpretative
process a sort of legitimacy and authority the possibility of which most non-originalist
positions deny, together with a level of objectivity (or quasi-objectivity) not achievable or
even possible through mainstream interpretive methods.
Legal hermeneutics, then, can be understood as an anti-method in constitutional
theory. As Gregory Leyh has, I think correctly, identified, “[h]ermeneutics neither
supplies a method for correctly reading texts nor underwrites an authoritative
interpretation of any given text, legal or otherwise…..” (Leyh 1992: xvii). Instead, “the
activity of questioning and adopting a suspicious attitude toward authority is at the heart
of hermeneutical discourse. Hermeneutics involves confronting the aporias that face us,
and it attempts to undermine, at least in partial ways, the calm assurances transmitted by
the received views and legal orthodoxies” (Leyh 1992: Ibid.).
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In the next chapter, I will use legal hermeneutics to “lay bare” or untangle the
morass of contradictions that is Suspect Classification Doctrine. The goal of Chapter 4
will be to “understand” the Equal Protection Clause (to ascertain what legal hermeneutics
might reveal as the closest thing to anything on the order of an objective “meaning” of
the Clause) in a way that is more in keeping with what actually takes place when a given
interpreter sits down to determine a given law‟s meaning than Suspect Classification
Doctrine accomplishes. As will be outlined in more detail in the introduction to Chapter
4, this means that in the next chapter, I will attempt to develop two specific
hermeneutical dialogues on the question of what the Equal Protection Clause means using
the hermeneutical tools outlined in this chapter. Each of the dialogues is an outgrowth of
philosophical hermeneutics and each of the tools has been identified by philosophical
hermeneutics as a necessary structural component of the interpretive process. Although
the reader will be able to discern a particular pattern in the way I approach the dialogues,
it is important that the approach taken should not be understood to be the only approach
to legal interpretation consistent with the principles of legal hermeneutics. Instead, the
approach should be understood to be one of many possible hermeneutically credible
approaches. For, one of the key features of legal hermeneutics is that it does not and
cannot advocate any particular method. Instead, legal hermeneutics is integrally and
therefore always open to new interpretive paths and avenues, always exploratory. Legal
hermeneutics, then, is decidedly an anti-method, more an exploration than a quest.
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“What does it mean to be a philosopher of African descent in the American
empire?...We begin with a historicist sensibility, by which I mean that we
do something our colleagues often find very difficult to do: we read history
seriously and voraciously.” – Cornel West1
Chapter 4:

Application: A Legal Hermeneutical Investigation into the Meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause

Introduction
Rather than just another formal method of legal interpretation, legal hermeneutics
was revealed instead, in Chapter 3, to be a set of interpretive tools based in philosophical
hermeneutics and implemented for the purpose of generating meaning in the law that
recognizes and lays bare many of the key features influencing credible meaning that other
approaches to legal interpretation ignore. Specifically, a legal hermeneutical approach to
meaning in the law adds to what I have placed under the general category of analytic
approaches a recognition that the ascertainment of value-neutral meaning is impossible.
Similarly, a legal hermeneutical approach to meaning in the law adds to what I have
placed under the general category of continental approaches a recognition that there is
something called the spirit of the text that constrains that which can properly called a
credible interpretation of a given law. Together, these two recognitions mean that neither
originalism nor non-originalism is an approach to constitutional meaning that respects the
nature of the interpretative process as much as legal hermeneutics does, with the
implication that neither originalism nor non-originalism provides as credible an
interpretation of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as legal hermeneutics does.
This is particularly so because the power of legal hermeneutics, arguably, is
twofold. First, legal hermeneutics exposes originalism not just as wrong-headed but as
1

(West 1992: 191).
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based in fantasy, specifically, the fantasy that original meaning (or “original intent” in the
parlance of constitutional theory) is obtainable. What this means it that all Supreme
Court decisions that claim to generate their authority from being based on the original
intent of the Framers are revealed to be as value-laden as any other Supreme Court
decision.2 It follows, then, that decisions based in “original intent” are as subject to
hermeneutical deconstruction as any other Supreme Court decision – perhaps more -owing to originalism‟s hubristic failure to acknowledge the role (however large or small
in a given case) of the interpretive predispositions3 of the Supreme Court justices.4
Second, legal hermeneutics provides us with tools for prioritizing previous or existing
interpretations of a given legal text (in this case the Equal Protection Clause), providing a
basis that non-originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation do not provide for
deciding what something on the order of an objective (i.e., non-subjective) assessment of
meaning might be within what I have called a given interpretive moment. Chief among
these tools is the concept of the spirit of the text, a concept that legal hermeneutics tell us
is flexible enough to accommodate change over time but stable enough to be helpful for
the purpose of operating as an interpretive guide in a given interpretive moment.

2

i.e., just as value-laden as those decisions originalists would label “judicial activism.”

a/k/a Husserlian “life-worlds”, Heideggarian “worlds” and “forestructures of
understanding,” Gadamerian “prejudices” and “horizons”, etc.
3

4

Recall from Chapter 2 that deconstructionist legal hermeneuticists (those involved in the
Law and Literature Movement) have highlighted the costs of excluding certain types of questions
from the search for meaning in the law. The primary type of question, arguably, that an advocate
of original intent fails to ask, on this view, is How are my own prejudices factoring into the
determination of meaning (the assessment of what “the Framers intended”) I am at present
attempting to find.
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In Chapter 4, then, I will apply legal hermeneutical tools to the question of what
the Equal Protection Clause means in a way meant to account for the spirit of the text, the
contemporary context, and the various schemas of intelligibility (Gadamerian prejudices,
Heideggarian fore-structures of understanding, existentialist facticities) of the Supreme
Court Justices generating previous interpretations.
Toward that end, I have generated two hermeneutical dialogues, each designed to
add a crucial element to the answer to the question of what the Equal Protection Clause
means that is lacking in the more traditional approaches. The first is a dialogue with the
text of the Clause itself, designed to generate the spirit of the text. The second is a
dialogue with previous interpretations of the text, designed provide a theoretical basis
upon which to prioritize the existing major interpretations of the meaning of the Clause in
terms of degrees of hermeneutical credibility. Both dialogues will include what legal
hermeneutics sees as a necessary link between theory and practice in hermeneutically
credible meaning through inclusion in the interpretive process consideration of the
contemporary context in which the present interpretation is taking place.
The dialogues will be presented in the order indicated for the reason that the
outcome of the first dialogue -- an assessment as to what might be the spirit of the Equal
Protection Clause -- is understood to be helpful information toward achieving the goal of
the second dialogue – prioritization of existing interpretations. In other words, in the
second dialogue the extent to which each major, existing interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause is consistent with the spirit of the text derived in the first dialogue will
be significant factor in assessing a given interpretation‟s degree of hermeneutic
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credibility.5 Together, the two dialogues are meant to hermeneutically derive the most
credible of the existing interpretations of the Clause.
Before we begin, however, it is important to explain what I mean by generating a
dialogue. By generating a dialogue, I simply mean that I, as the present interpreter of the
text, will attempt to evaluate the topic of each dialogue (in the case of the first dialogue,
the topic is the spirit of the text; in the case of the second dialogue, the topic is an
assessment of the most hermeneutically credible of the existing interpretation of the text)
while being sensitized to the perspectives, or the Gadamerian “prejudices” and horizons,
of the drafters of the text and the prior interpreters of the text, while also being sensitized
to the spirit of the text. The desired end-product of each dialogue is an assessment as to
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause that is a fusion of the horizons, in the
Gadamerian sense, of both myself and the other parties to each dialogue. The other
parties to the first dialogue are the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause. The other
parties to the second dialogue are the prior interpreters of the Clause, i.e., the Supreme
Court Justices who have developed the various prior interpretations over the years
resulting in what is now known as Suspect Classification Doctrine.
Additionally, and as part of the legal hermeneutical approach to meaning that I am
advocating, please let me be candid at the outset about what I see as my own
“prejudices,” i.e., about what I see as the defining features of my own Heideggarian
“fore-structure of understanding.” I am a woman of mixed racio-cultural heritage
(European, African, Caribbean, and Native American) who believes that sexuality is

5

An inquiry into the context in which each interpretation was made, as well as the
facticities of the various Supreme Court Justices contributing to the various interpretations will
also be used to assess the hermeneutic credibility of the existing interpretations.
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something not definable in terms of labels such as homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, or
the like. I believe that all categorization, including human categorization, is a product of
social forces such as oppression, power, and economics. I have an upper middle class
background and am married with two children. I have a bachelor‟s degree in philosophy
from a large, mid-Atlantic state university, a law degree from an east coast law school,
and am about to receive a doctorate in philosophy from a department which prides itself
in what it calls “pluralism,” or training in both the analytic and continental traditions. In
keeping with the structures and goals of legal hermeneutics as I have developed them, I
ask the reader to take my “prejudices” into account when assessing the credibility of the
conclusion reached in this chapter. I leave it to the reader (the future interpreter of the
Equal Protection Clause) to decide, in other words, whether my “prejudices” are
legitimate or illegitimate -- in the Gadamerian sense -- toward the end of contributing to a
hermeneutically credible meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
I will now proceed through the two dialogues.
Dialogue #1: What is the spirit of the text?
Recall from Chapter 3 that the concept of the spirit of the text in philosophical
hermeneutics has its origins in 19th century philologist Friedrich Ast‟s concept of the
text‟s inner meaning, its own internal development, through a circularity of reason, a
dialectical relation between the parts of a given work and the whole (Ast 1808: Section
76). To find this inner meaning, the interpreter must engage in what Ast called the
hermeneutic of the spirit, which involves developing an understanding of the spirit of the
writer and his or her era, and seeks to identify the “one idea,” or Grundidee, that unifies a
given text, and that provides clarification regarding the relationship of the whole to the
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parts and the parts to the whole, with the interpreter always being cognizant of the
historical period in which the text is situated.
But, as Schleirmacher showed, there is more to a quality understanding of a given
text than an understanding of the writer‟s intentions and historical era. In addition,
quality understanding also requires that the interpreter somehow grapple with the extent
to which the language (and therefore the socio-historical context) in which the thoughts
of the author took place affected, constrained, and informed those thoughts. In other
words, Schleiermacher showed that after the interpreter has determined the author‟s
intended meaning (i.e., what the originalist would call the author‟s original intent), it is
then incumbent upon the interpreter to extrapolate from that meaning a kind of a core
meaning that transcends the tools available to the original author to express that meaning.
The spirit of the text, then, can be understood to be a product of both the original intent of
the writer (understood to encompass as well the writer‟s historical era) and the particular
circumstances in which the text is currently being examined. Dilthey captured this view
with his idea that meaning in the human sciences (of which the study of law is surely
one) always occurs within the lived experience (contemporary social context) of the
person or persons attempting to find that meaning. Heidegger and Gadamer both
reinforced this view in their work and every hermeneutical thinker since has agreed.
Recall also from Chapter 3 that in contemporary legal hermeneutical theory,
Gregory Leyh applies this key hermeneutical insight by noting that reason can only find
its expression as applied concretely (Leyh 1992: 375). Francis J. Mootz, III applies the
same insight by noting that the most hermeneutically legitimate interpretation “allows the
text to be most fully realized in the present situation” (Mootz 1988: 605). And finally,
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David Hoy applies this hermeneutical insight by highlighting the necessary link between
the text and the practical application of the text (Hoy 1992). This key legal
hermeneutical insight arguably calls the interpreter to reserve judgment about the spirit of
the text (from a purely historical standpoint) until that judgment is explicitly tested
against the contemporary practical context in which the text is being interpreted.
Taking this hermeneutical approach, then, in this first dialogue an attempt will be
made to identify the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause, the “one idea” that unifies the
Clause and provides insight into how the Clause relates both to the Fourteenth
Amendment in which it is contained, but also into how it relates to the entire U.S.
Constitution, and even more broadly, how the Clause relates to what Philip Bobbit has
called the American “ethos” (Bobbit 1992: 127), understood as the conceptual
framework behind not only the U.S. Constitution but behind the companion cornerstone
documents of the United States as well.
We will next look at the legislative history surrounding the Clause to get an idea
of what the drafters thought was its purpose; and after that, we will examine the identity
of the writer of the text, as best we can determine it, as well as the socio-historical
context in which the Clause was written, to try to get a sense of the writer‟s value system,
“prejudices,” “horizon,” or “fore-structure of understanding.” But, if we stopped there,
we would neglect to factor in that the spirit of the text as defined by legal hermeneutics is
more than just an attempt to get at the “original intent” of the writer or the historical or
original meaning. To find the spirit of the text, or the “one idea” that unifies it, we have
to also examine the contemporary context in which we are attempting to find that spirit, a
context which adds contemporary relevance to the meaning being generated. To do this,
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we will outline the contemporary context relevant for the present inquiry, i.e., the
equality statuses of the three groups being studied.6
And so, Dialogue #1 will begin with an examination of the text itself.
The Text
The text at issue is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution enacted in 1868 which reads as follows: “No State shall …deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” On its face, this
clause seems to me to mean that no state government (as opposed to federal government)
has the right to protect some people less than other people through its laws. Another
possible meaning seems to me to be that the laws of a given state must apply to everyone
equally.7
The Structure of the Text
The issues to be investigated here are how the Equal Protection Clause relates to
other, individual parts of the Constitution, how the Clause relates to the whole
Constitution, and how the Clause relates to the American ethos as found in not only in the
Constitution itself but in the companion cornerstone documents of the United States.
Starting from the parts of the Constitution physically and temporally closest to the Clause
and working our way out, the first thing to notice is that the Equal Protection Clause is

6

The equality statuses of the three groups being studied in this project has been chosen as
the relevant contemporary context because the question of the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause has been couched in this project in terms of whether the way the Clause is presently
interpreted works for these groups. It is conceded that there are other ways to understand what
the relevant contemporary context is.
The question of what is meant (or should be meant) by the term “equally” – or the
related terms “equal” and “equality” – particularly as the meaning of these terms affects how the
Equal Protection Clause should be understood, will be the subject of future scholarship.
7
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part of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
contains four separate concepts or sentences and reads:
“All persons born or naturalized within the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws” (Emphasis added).
The words of the first sentence are very clear: Anyone born or naturalized in the United
States is a citizen of the United States.8 The second sentence of Section 1, known as the
Privileges or Immunities Clause (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States…”) is very similar to
language found in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution (“The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).9 The
plain meaning of this sentence is that federal “privileges and immunities” cannot be
abridged by state governments. The third sentence of Section 1, known as the Due
Process Clause (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”), is very similar to language in the Fifth Amendment (“[No
person shall be] deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
While the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal government, the Due Process

8

Incidentally, there is virtually no dispute at all in Fourteenth Amendment scholarship
about the fact that the first sentence of Section 1of the Fourteenth Amendment was written for the
purpose of making the citizenship of African Americans permanent and secure after the end of
the Civil War and the abolition of slavery. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk (1967). There is also no
virtually dispute at all about the fact that this same sentence was added to overturn the decision of
Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) which held that blacks could not be citizens of the United States.
9

The original source of this language is the Articles of Confederation, the precursor to
the Constitution.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically applied this law to state governments.
The plain meaning of this sentence is that state governments may not infringe upon the
due process rights of American citizens. The fourth sentence is the one containing the
Equal Protection Clause.
A plain, bare bones sort of reading – that is, a purely textual reading (to the extent
that such a reading is possible) -- of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to me
to be as follows. First, the very first sentence identifies the group of persons to whom the
rest of Section 1 applies, i.e., citizens of the United States, whom it defines as anyone
born or naturalized there. Second, since the thrust of the language of Sections 2 and 3 is
contained in other parts of the Constitution -- the only difference being that the
Fourteenth Amendment reinforces that state governments may not abridge federal rights
-- the plain meaning of Sections 1 through 3 is that anyone born or naturalized in the
United States is entitled to be protected by federal law from state laws that might
otherwise infringe on basic federal rights (privileges and immunities and due process).
If we add to this meaning the plain meaning of the Equal Protection Clause derived above
(i.e., that no state government has the right to protect some people less than other people
through its laws, or that the laws of a given state must apply to everyone equally), we can
arguably see that the plain (textual) meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is that anyone born or naturalized in the United States has certain basic federal rights
(certain privileges and immunities, certain due process rights, and certain rights to be
treated equally under law) that cannot be abridged by state governments.10

10

If this is indeed the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a question
arises as to why Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was added at all. In other words, what
motivated the writer of this section of the Fourteenth Amendment, first, to define what is meant
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Again, working our way out from Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
next thing to notice is that there are four additional sections to the Fourteenth
Amendment. According to the terms of Section 2, “…[W]hen the right to vote in any
election… is denied to [any male inhabitant over age 21],” there will be a penalty.11
Section 3 says that no one who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
United States can hold political office.12 Section 4 says that debts incurred to finance
insurrection or rebellion will not be paid by the United States,13 and Section 5 simply
gives Congress the power to enforce any part of the Amendment. All five sections taken
together, then, create a picture of an amendment to the Constitution designed, at a
minimum, to make clear to the states that federal laws trumped state laws on certain
issues. These issues were basic federal rights (privileges and immunities and due
process), equal treatment under the law, the right to vote, the loss of any right to hold
federal office after having engaged in “insurrection or rebellion” against the United
States, and the issue of who was responsible for the reconciliation of any state debts
incurred as a result of any said “insurrection or rebellion.” And just in case there was any
question about the fact that federal law trumped state law on these matters, Section 5 was
by an American citizen, and second, to simply repeat what was already written elsewhere in the
constitution, and third, to add a specific, new clause about every citizen‟s federal right to be
treated equally by state governments.
According to Justice Marshall‟s dissenting opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974),
the purpose of Section 2 was to give the Southern States a choice, enfranchise former slaves and
their (male) progeny or lose congressional representation. If Justice Marshall is correct, then the
purpose of Section 2 was to cure electoral abuse in the Southern States against African American
voters after the Civil War.
11

12

Section 3 was designed to prevent former members of the Confederacy from holding
state or federal office in the United States.
13

Section 4 ensured that no loss or debt sustained by the Confederacy would be paid by
the United States or any state.
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added to give Congress the power to enforce the Amendment through appropriate
legislation.
The next thing to notice is that the Fourteenth Amendment is one of a set of
Amendments known as the Civil War Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments). The timeline for ratification of these Amendments in relation to
the start and end of the Civil War can be found in Table 1, below:

Table 1. Timeline of Civil War Amendments
Date

Amendment/Event

April 12, 1861

Civil War hostilities begin when the
Confederacy attacks Fort Sumter in South
Carolina.

April 9, 1965

The Civil War ends when Confederate
General Robert E. Lee surrenders at
Appomottax Court House in Virginia.

December 6, 1865

The Thirteenth Amendment is ratified.

July 13, 1868

The Fourteenth Amendment is ratified.

March 30, 1870

The Fifteenth Amendment is ratified.

Note: All dates taken from Finkelman (2006).

A bit of background about the historical time period is helpful. In early 1863, during the
Civil War, President Lincoln, using his authority as commander in chief of the army,
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which freed all slaves living within the
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Confederacy (Franklin 1963).14 Later that year, Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg
Address, a speech offered in dedication of the Soldiers‟ National Cemetery just four
months after the Battle of Gettysburg where there had been a decisive, but bloody, Union
victory (Sears 2003). Lincoln began the Gettysburg Address by reminding the crowd
then present that just eighty-four years prior, in 1776, the United States had begun in
dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal.15 The Civil War ended in
April of 1865 with the surrender of Confederate General Robert E. Lee (Rawley 1966).
In December of that year, the Thirteenth Amendment, which banned slavery everywhere
in the United States, was ratified. The Fourteenth Amendment (containing the Equal
Protection Clause) was ratified in July 1868, and then the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified in March of 1870. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination in voting
“on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
Taken together, these various Civil War Amendments (plus a brief recap of the
historical events surrounding them) suggest that the “one idea” that unifies the Equal
Protection Clause and that provides insight into how the Clause relates both to the
Fourteenth Amendment in which it is contained, but also into how the Clause relates to
the other Civil War Amendments, as well as to the entire U.S. Constitution in which they
are all contained, is that equal protection under the law for black Americans could and

14

The Emancipation Proclamation did not free slaves living in the loyal slave states of
Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware, and Missouri, nor slaves living in certain parts of Virginia and
Louisiana that were controlled by the United States. Lincoln had used his authority as
commander in chief of the army to free slaves through the Emancipation Proclamation, and so
could only free the slaves held by those in rebellion against the United States (Franklin 1963).
15

This is a clear reference to the Declaration of Independence.
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would be federally enforced. 16 What is even more clear from this structural analysis, I
think, is that the reason the awesome power of the federal government of the United
States was being used to literally force the Southern States to treat black Americans
equally was because the reality was that black Americans were clearly not being treated
equally. Quite the contrary. In other words, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause,
based on this structural analysis, is that the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause are
remedial in nature. The Equal Protection Clause was placed in the Fourteenth
Amendment (and appended to the broader United States Constitution) to solve the
problem of the widespread unequal treatment (or subjugation) of black people that had
begun with the institution of slavery and was being perpetuated thereafter in the form, for
example, of state laws enacted after the Civil War that prevented black people from
exercising various basic civil rights and privileges and immunities of United States‟
citizenship like voting in public elections. It was in the face of this manifest and
widespread, unequal treatment (to say the least) of black people that the Equal Protection
Clause was placed in the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the origin of the Clause and
the purpose of the Clause, and in my humble opinion it is the spirit of the Clause based
on this structural analysis. That the Equal Protection Clause was a remedial measure
designed to correct the widespread subjugation of black people (former slaves and their
progeny) is the “one idea”, in my opinion, the hermeneutical Grunidee, that unifies the
Clause and provides insight into how the Clause relates to the Fourteenth Amendment in
16

Citing The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), historian Howard Jay Graham has stated that
the Civil War Amendments were all framed on behalf of black people (“the slave race”). “This, of
course, is especially true of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Graham 1968: 157). In fact, for
Graham, it is “patently absurd” to deny the antislavery origins of the [Fourteenth
Amendment]….” (Ibid.: 161).
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which it is contained, and to the grander U.S. Constitution of which the Fourteenth
Amendment is a part.17
And so, based on this structural analysis, Justice Miller‟s famous statement in The
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) -- the first Supreme Court case in time to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment after its ratification -- to the effect that the Amendment (like the
other Civil War Amendments) had “one pervading purpose,” i.e., “the protection of the
newly made freeman and citizen from…oppression,” seems very well justified.
The Legislative History of the Text
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment can be understood to have
its theoretical roots in a system of constitutional protection for the rights of free “Negroes
and mulattoes” developed by a group known as the American Anti-Slavery Society
during the years 1834 to 1835 (Graham 1968: 185). In the papers documenting the
proceedings of this society, there is evidence of an “ingenious, exhaustive, and above all,
prophetic constitutional attack on slavery” (Graham 1968: 168). These documents show
that what had begun as an ethical and religious attack on slavery transmuted in this time
period into a legal and constitutional attack (Ibid.: 169). Congressman Thaddeus
Stevens, one of the ultimate sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment, was an early
member of this society (Ibid., Woodburn 2007).
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment continues with the
Congressional debates that took place in 1866 during the 39th Congress. That history
substantiates the conclusion that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause is that it was
17

Incidentally, Constitutional historians strongly agree among themselves that the
Fourteenth Amendment had its origins in the antislavery movement (Baer 1983: 57).
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meant to operate as a remedial measure to correct the widespread subjugation of black
people in America. The sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment were Congressman
Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Benjamin Wade (Schnapper 1985: 784). When
Congressman Stevens introduced the Amendment in the House, he characterized its
purpose as “the amelioration of the condition of the freedmen” (Congressional Globe,
39th Congress, 1st Session 2459, 1866). Congressman Stevens went on to make specific
reference to the “all men are created equal” portion of Declaration of Independence,
arguing that since this provision was already in the Declaration, the phraseology to this
effect in the Fourteenth Amendment was clearly just. All that the Equal Protection
Clause added, Stevens argued, was “to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far
that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally on all” (Congressional
Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session 2459, 1866, italics in original). Congressman Stevens‟
Additionally, proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly emphasized in
the Congressional debates of the time period that one of the Amendment‟s primary
purposes was to place in the Constitution itself the principles of section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session 2459, 1866), an Act
whose entire purpose was to give citizens “without regard to race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude….” “full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens….”18 In other words, proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in the

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads, “Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
18
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early Congressional debates repeatedly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment‟s primary
purpose was to address the unequal status of black people.
That the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to address the
unequal status of black people is further supported by the observation that the entire
antislavery campaign – of which the Civil War Amendments were an undeniable
outgrowth -- was essentially a quest for enforcement of United States ideals that already
existed but were being ignored in the slave states (Graham 1968: 169). These ideals were
that all U.S. citizens were entitled to the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship
(per Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution), that all citizens were entitled to due
process of the law (per the Fifth Amendment), and that all men were created equal (per
the Declaration of Independence). It is important, however, that the abolitionist
movement was not exclusively concerned with equal protection under the law for blacks
(Ibid.). Many strains of the movement were also concerned with the equal protection
rights of any and all “dissident and unpopular groups” (Ibid.). 19 Therefore, that aspect of
Suspect Classification Doctrine that stands for the proposition that racial discrimination

punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property,
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and
to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.”
14 Stat. 27-30, April 9 (1866).
19

This is not to say, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment had no other purpose.
Joseph P. James, in his The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggests, for example, that
there were political reasons why the Amendment was pushed. Specifically, according to James, it
was thought at the time that the Amendment would provide a good platform for the Republican
party in the upcoming election (James 1965).
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of any kind against any group that is the evil toward which the Equal Protection Clause is
directed, “the [Congressional] debates reveal overriding concern with the status of one
racial group [i.e., blacks]” (Baer 1983:138).
The Writer
While there were several writers of the grander Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1
– including the Equal Protection Clause – was written by Representative John Bingham
of Ohio (Stephens and Sheb 2008: 18). The writers of the grander Fourteenth
Amendment consisted of two different factions of the Republican party of the day
(Trefousse 1997/2005). One faction were avid abolitionists, known as the Radicals, who
were motivated to support the Civil War by a desire to end slavery and to provide blacks
with the same federal rights, privileges and protections as other Americans (Ibid.). The
other faction was at best indifferent to the abolition of slavery and the rights of blacks,
and had been motivated to support the war by a desire to preserve the union (Ibid.).
Representative Bingham was a Radical. The Radicals had been committed to the
abolition of slavery and to equal treatment for former slaves since at least 1863 when
President Lincoln had signed the Emancipation Proclamation, and many of them had
been committed to the cause well before that (Trefousse 1997/2005). At least since the
Dred Scott decision of 1857 – in which the Supreme Court held that blacks were not
citizens of the United States and could never be citizens owing to the fact that the
Framers of the United States had considered blacks to be “beings of an inferior order”
with “no rights which the white man was bound to respect” Dred Scott v. Sanford, (1857)
– the Radicals had been driven to amend the Constitution to clarify that, in their view, the
Dred Scott decision was wrongly decided (Schwartz 1970: 19).
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Between 1856 and 1859, Representative Bingham made three major speeches in
Congress relevant to his views on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment (Graham
1968, 161, citing Cong. Globe., 34th Congress, 1st Session Appendix 124 (1856); Cong.
Globe, 34th Congress, 3rd Session Appendix 135-140 (1857); and Cong. Globe, 35th
Congress, 2nd Session 981-985 (1859)). All three speeches focus on due process rights.
In the second speech, he stresses that the “absolute equality of all and the equal protection
of each” are American constitutional ideals,” noting that the Constitution makes no
distinction on the basis of either “complexion or birth” (Graham 1968: 57). In the third
speech Bimgham uses the concepts of “natural and inherent rights,” “sacred rights… as
universal and indestructible as the human race,” and “equality of natural rights” to seek
constitutional sanction for his anti-slavery views (Graham 1968: 57). Graham tied these
“natural” rights to the Constitution by highlighting that the Fifth Amendment uses the
word “person” instead of “citizen” (Ibid.). Bingham also made sure that a guarantee of
equal protection of the laws was included in every single draft of Section 1 (James 1965).
Original Intent?
Based on all of the above, to the extent that original intent can be ascertained
(and, of course, per philosophical and legal hermeneutics this is a limited extent), the
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause was not, as Justice Thomas claimed in his
concurring opinion in Gratz, to forbid the use of race in state law, but to remedy the racial
discrimination, oppression, and legalized subjugation being perpetrated against blacks at
the time of the Clause‟s enactment.
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Contemporary Context
But, as has been developed above, the spirit of the text from a legal hermeneutical
perspective is more than just original intent. From a legal hermeneutical perspective, the
spirit of the text in a given interpretive moment also includes consultation with the
contemporary context in which the text is being examined. It seems fairly indisputable
that in the contemporary era, the legal and social equality of blacks has improved since
1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. This improvement of condition
has led some commentators to suggest that, even if it can be fairly said that the original
intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to provide a way for recently freed blacks to
achieve equality in America, this remedial purpose is of little contemporary significance
in terms of how the Equal Protection Clause should be read today (See, e.g., Glazer 1975,
Bickel 1975).20 Since the pressing social problem of severe inequality between blacks
and whites in America that was attendant to the social context in which the Equal
Protection Clause was created and enacted is no longer as acute, these commentators
suggest, understanding the Equal Protection Clause as a remedial instrument for
improving the equal treatment of blacks under the law is outdated, if it ever had any
validity at all (Ibid.). Other conservative commentators -- often the same jurists who
advocate originalism -- argue simply that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended

The Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”), a strong proponent of this view, is a law firm
whose primary activity is to challenge race-based affirmative action programs on the basis that
they infringe upon “individual rights.” The CIR was counsel for the petitioner in both of the
Michigan cases.
20
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to specially protect blacks, usually citing the text itself (containing no specific reference
to blacks) as evidence.21
But, the vast majority of responsible scholarship on this point takes the position
that the equality status of blacks as a group has not, in closer examination, improved as
much as one might have hoped since 1868, particularly in the areas of income, net worth,
and education (Lawson 1992; Waller 2001; Hilfiker 2003). While there is little doubt
that there has been improvement since 1868 regarding the legal and social equality of
blacks, this is not saying much on the question of the equality status of blacks today,
given that the point of reference for blacks as a group was that in 1868 blacks were
widely considered to be patently, manifestly, biologically, irrevocably, morally,
intellectually, and physically inferior to whites (Hoffman 1896/2004; Finkelman 2003;
Finkleman 2001; Griffin 2001; Ridley 1996; Shipman 1994; Davies 1955/1971; Stanton
1960; Fredrickson 1971; Gould 1981; Irvine 1955; Jordan 1974; Lovejoy 1936).
Arguably, there was certainly no way to go but up from there. This view of blacks was
so prevalent in the post-Civil War era, in fact, that widespread attempts were made –
through, for example, the enactment of Jim Crow laws all over the South – to keep blacks
physically separated from whites in any and all public contexts in which the two groups
might come into social contact (Takaki 1990; Woodward 1974; Kluger 1976; Packard
2002; Thomas 1998). The significance of this almost unimaginable and horrific state of
affairs cannot be overstated; for, in effect, black people were the lepers of the mid to late
21

This view is of course in complete disregard for the Congressional debates surrounding
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in complete disregard for the socio-historical
context of the text, i.e., in the aftermath of slavery and in conjunction with two other
Amendments (the Thirteenth and Fifteenth), both of which are prima facie directed at the rights of
blacks.
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nineteenth century social scene in America, and this was particularly the case in the
former slave states.22
So, while it is true that certainly, there was no place to go but up from a social
status similar to that of lepers, the reality of the social condition of blacks in America
today is that it is still dire and quite unequal to that of whites on all frontiers (Oliver and
Shapiro 1995; Squires 1994; Brenner 1993; Dedman 1988; Feagin 1990; Feagin 1994;
Oliver 1980; Collins 2004). There are still dramatic gaps between whites and blacks in
income, wealth, housing, education, and occupation (Ibid., Bonilla-Silva 2010, 209)23
and the overwhelming majority of responsible analysts agree that the persistence of racial
inequality today is due, to a very significant extent, to the persistence and continuing
significance of racism and racial discrimination (Ibid., Feagin 1991, Bell 1992 ). 24
22

The effect on the collective American psyche of the widespread and legally enforced
mark of social inferiority placed on black people by slavery and the Jim Crow laws that followed
after slavery is the cornerstone of what Bill Lawson and others have called the “racial
consciousness” of contemporary American society (See, e.g., Lawson 1995; Banton 1988). For
“racial realists” like Derrick Bell, racism must be understood as a permanent feature of American
society owing to the indelible effect that slavery and Jim Crow laws have had on the
subconscious mindset of every American (Bell 1992). For these thinkers, no responsible analysis
of the state of black people today and/or a suggestion of what do about it can take place unless
this fact of life in America is first soberly taken into account. I compare the social stigma
attached to being black in America to the traditional stigma against leprosy because of the
enforced social separation experienced by both groups (by blacks during the Jim Crow era and by
lepers since the Middle Ages). On the enforced social isolation of lepers, see, e.g., Jopling, W.H.
1991.
23

See Rivera, Amaad, Jeannette Huezo, Christina Kasica, and Dedrick Muhammad.
2009. “State of the Dream 2009: The Silent Depression.” Boston: United for a Fair Economy,
for a detailed report on the severity of income, wealth, housing, educational, and occupation
inequality between whites and blacks in 2009.
This is true despite the popularity of works like Charles Murray‟s Losing Ground
(1984), Murray and Herrnstein‟s The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American
Life (1994), and Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom‟s America in Black and White (1997), in which
the continuing inequality between whites and blacks in America is attributed to the presumed
cultural, moral, ethical, intellectual, or family “deficiencies” of people of color.
24

146

Moreover, and from the perspective of a substantial number of contemporary, African
American critical race theorists, the explanation for the continuing existence of racial
discrimination in America can in turn be most responsibly traced to the unique way in
which the concept of blackness (human “racial” blackness) became indelibly associated
with social inferiority in America through the creation and perpetuation of the institution
of chattel slavery, and the government‟s endorsement of that institution (however explicit
or tacit) from the very beginning of the country‟s creation (Mills 1997; Gotanda 1995;
Harris 1995; Bell 1995; Matsuda 1995; Williams 2000).25
In summary, in the contemporary era, it is far more than fair to say that the social,
legal, educational, and economic status of blacks in America is still quite unequal, and as
a result, blacks as a group are still in need of the kind of special protection that the Equal
Protection Clause was designed to provide. This is particularly true since the ongoing
unequal status of blacks in America can be directly traced to the American institution of
chattel slavery (Mills 1997, Feagin 2010, Vaughan 1995).
Another aspect of the contemporary context is that groups other than blacks who
have also experienced widespread, pervasive, government-endorsed disenfranchisement,
25

Several theorists have observed that the uniquely American institution of chattel
slavery, that contained three elements that other forms of slavery have not contained, i.e., (1) the
association of slave status with a certain set of phenotypical physical traits (i.e., what are
commonly understood to be “black” phenotypical traits), (2) the idea that slave status was
hereditary, and (3) the idea that the slaves themselves were a form of property associated with the
real estate on which they worked like buildings or livestock, together created in the American
psyche a kind of ineradicable association between phenotypical physical traits associated with
being from the African continent and inferior social or legal status. The question of the degree to
which the American institution of chattel slavery was, in fact, endorsed by the federal government
from the beginning is a contested question. However, there is much scholarship supporting the
view that the original constitution itself (the main body to the exclusion of the Amendments)
contains several provisions meant to accommodate those among the Framers who were
slaveholders (Mills 1997). The constitutional provisions most often cited as supporting slavery
are Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3; Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 15; Article I, Section 9,
Paragraph 1, and Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3.
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marginalization, subjugation, and oppression often argue by analogy that the Equal
Protection Clause should protect them in the same way that it has protected blacks. Both
feminists (Chamallas 2003; MacKinnon 2007; Levit and Verchick 2006) and proponents
of gay rights (Eskridge 1999; Koppleman 2002) for example, have made this argument.
Members of each of these groups have argued that their group should be provided the
same level of equal protection under the law as blacks. With the sole exception of ethnic
minorities, the Supreme Court has disagreed. As was shown in Chapter 2, neither women
nor gay people are protected under the Suspect Classification Doctrine. Additionally,
subjugated group after subjugated group has come before the Supreme Court asking for
strict scrutiny of laws that discriminate against them; and again, with the sole exception
of ethnic minorities, the Supreme Court has routinely rejected these arguments, and has
offered instead either no protection at all or limited protection.26
But, as is the case with African Americans, while there is certainly no doubt that
the legal and social status of women has dramatically improved since women were
denied the right to vote, unable to own property, unable to work in the occupation of their
choice, unprotected by state criminal codes from rape within marriage, etc., during the
early years of the formation of this country (Ryan 1975; Carroll 1976; Hecker 1914),
there is also no doubt that women as a collective in contemporary America are far from
being treated equally under the law (MacKinnon 2007). As recently as 2008, the U.S.

26

See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) (no protection for age
discrimination); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) (no protection for the
developmentally disabled); Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (1972) (illegitimate
persons provided some measure of protection); Shapiro v. Thompson (1973) (protection for
nonresidents and aliens); The indigent have never been protected as a class or group.
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Department of Labor reported that women still earn about 75 percent of what men earn,27
the “glass ceiling” is pervasive (da Costa 2009), women still handle over twice as much
of the household labor as men after marriage (Stafford 2008), continue to experience
unequal treatment in society in virtue of their status as mothers (MacKinnon 2007: Ch.
9), and the list goes on and on.
Similarly, gay people are also among the groups of people in contemporary
America for whom the ideal of equality has never been a reality. Arguably, the unequal
treatment of gay people under the law in the contemporary era is particularly visible with
regard to the fundamental right to marry, which is currently denied to gay people in 45
states (all but Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont and New Hampshire). As I
argued at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association in 2006, these
restrictive state marriage laws trigger just the sort of issues that slavery and Jim Crow
laws raised in the late nineteenth century for black people (Botts 2006).28
In summary, the contemporary context of the Equal Protection Clause, then, is
one in which the equality status of blacks is still starkly poor. The contemporary
situation for women is similar. And although there are many studies showing that gay
people as a group fare better than blacks and women with regard to income, wealth, jobs,
and education, the unequal status of gay people is marked by widespread, governmentally

27

U.S. Depart of Labor Statistics 2009

28

In the nineteenth century, the question was whether states had the right to enact laws
regulating where black people could sit or drink from a water fountain in public places; in the
contemporary era, the question is whether states have the right to enact laws regulating the choice
of marriage partner for consenting adults. It is my claim that in both cases, the debate is over
whether a marginalized group has the same right as others to a fundamental social good.
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endorsed, social and legal inequality in the form of the denial of basic citizenship rights
like the right to marry.
What this means for our assessment of what the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause is in the present interpretive moment is that a hermeneutically credible spirit of
the Equal Protection Clause is required to take into account the persistent and widespread
unequal status of blacks, women, and gay people in the contemporary era. In other
words, if it were the case that the equality status of blacks, women, and gay people were
approaching or on part with the equality statuses of whites, males, and straight people,
respectively in the contemporary era, then, since the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause
is that it is there to provide a remedy for unequal status, then an interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause on par with Suspect Classification Doctrine might be in order.
However, since it is not the case that blacks, women, and gay people‟s status in society is
equal with whites, men, and straight people respectively, then a hermeneutically credible
interpretation of the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause in the contemporary era, i.e., the
present interpretive moment, is that the Clause is there to protect these groups for
remedial purposes. In other words, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause is that it
protects marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups of whatever kind, as long as they
are marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated. It is not available for use, however, by
groups who are not marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, i.e., it is not available for use
by whites, men, or heterosexuals, for example.
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The Answer: The Spirit of the Text
From the perspective of legal hermeneutics, then, the question of what the spirit
of the Equal Protection Clause is today, in the interpretive moment of the early twentyfirst century America, can be understood to be a function of the text of the Clause, the
structure of the Clause, the intent of the Clause as found through the values and political
ideals of its writer, and the contemporary context of the Clause, i.e., “what the text says
to us” (Schmidt 2006: 104).
We have seen that the text, structure, and intent of the Clause all indicate that the
Clause was designed as a remedial measure to correct the observable and existent,
unequal treatment of blacks in America after the Civil War. We have also seen, however,
that the greater abolitionist movement of which the writer of the Equal Protection Clause
was a part did not understand its quest for equal treatment under the law as exclusively
limited to blacks. Instead, the abolitionist movement of the late nineteenth century
understood the ideal of equality contained in the Equal Protection Clause as designed to
protect other groups as well, as long as those groups were marginalized. In other words,
the combination of the text, the structure, the intent of the Clause, and the contemporary
context seem to indicate that the spirit of the Clause, that is, what the text “says to us,” is
that the Clause was designed to operate as the constitutional basis for providing a remedy
in federal court, for blacks and any other marginalized group, to use in the face of
manifest and widespread unequal treatment under law.
In the contemporary context, there is no question that the social groups known as
women and gay people are just the sort of group the writer of the Clause had in mind
when drafting it. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
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excerpts from abolitionist writings of the period clearly support the analogy between
equal treatment under the law for blacks and equal treatment under the law for women. It
is true that there is no evidence in the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment
that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to protect gay people. However, there are
at least two responses to those who might claim that this is evidence that the Equal
Protection Clause should not be used to protect gay people in the contemporary era.
First, there is evidence to support the view that the social group known as gay
people did not exist in 1868 in the way that it does today (Kinnish, Strassberg, and Turner
2005; Foucault 1981; Halperin 1990; Weeks 1980). If the group did not exist, it could
hardly have been considered on the Congressional floor. Therefore, absence of
discussion regarding whether the Equal Protection Clause should apply to gay people
proves nothing about whether the Clause should be available for use by gay people today.
Second, the issues surrounding equal treatment under the law for gay people are very
similar to the ones surrounding equal treatment under the law for blacks and women in
the mid-nineteenth century, i.e., issues of marginalization, social stigmatization, social
segregation (if only informal), prejudice, stereotypes, etc. Finally, now that gay people, as
a group, are calling the unequal status of gay people vis-à-vis basic fundamental rights
like the right to marry to the collective attention of the world, i.e., now that this unequal
status has become a part of the contemporary interpretive context, the time has come to
include gay people in those explicitly protected under the Equal Protection Clause.
In summary, what all three groups have in common, arguably, is demonstrably
pervasive unequal treatment under law in the form of laws explicitly or implicitly
separating off the group from other members of society for the purpose of denying the
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group equal access to a series of social goods, rights, or privileges It should be noted that
it is also the case that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause does not seem to admit of
different levels of judicial review to be applied to laws affecting different subjugated
groups. Instead, as has been shown, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause seems to be
that where a given group is found to be subject to widespread unequal treatment under
the law (i.e., where the group is marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, a law which
discriminates against the group should simply be subjected to strict scrutiny, i.e., it
should be considered presumptively unconstitutional such that the burden would then
shift to the state to demonstrate some overwhelmingly compelling state interest that
should override the concern of the group, and that the law in question is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.
Therefore, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause in the contemporary context
seems to be that it operates in the present interpretive moment to protect members of any
marginalized, oppressed, and/or subjugated group from unequal treatment under law.29
And while legal hermeneutics explicitly acknowledges that the particularized experience
of oppression of different marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated is quite different, legal
hermeneutics also highlights that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause seems to
indicate, in addition, that the interpretation that different levels or kinds of equality are

29

Conversely, however, the spirit of the text of the Equal Protection Clause does not
seem to include, however, that the Clause operates, or should operate, to protect members of
groups who are not members of marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups. This is not to
say, however, that the rights of those who are not members of marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated groups should not be respected or protected under the constitution. It is just to say
that the Equal Protection Clause is not an available mechanism for that purpose. Rights to equal
treatment under law, on this view, as contained in the Equal Protection Clause, were specifically
designed and are specifically tailored to right unequal treatment under law for members of
marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups only..
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available for different oppressed groups – à la Suspect Classification Doctrine -- is not
hermeneutically sound. These two concepts combined seemed to indicate that the spirit
of the Equal Protection Clause is that if a given group is marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated, then members of that group may use the Equal Protection Clause to challenge
laws that discriminate against members of the group. In practice, this seems to mean that
a hermeneutically credible interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause contains, as a
threshold inquiry, the question of whether a given group qualifies as marginalized,
subjugated, or oppressed.
The answer to this question, in turn, seems most credibly answered, from a
hermeneutical perspective, by consideration of the contemporary context. If it turns out
that the group does qualify as marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated in the interpretive
context at hand, then a person who is a member of the group has standing to bring a suit
under the Equal Protection Clause. By the same token, in order to challenge a law on
Equal Protection Clause grounds a person who is not a member of a group that has
already qualified as marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated would have to prove, as a
threshold matter, that he or she is a member of an additional the marginalized, oppressed,
or subjugated group. Absent such a showing, the person would not be allowed to bring
an Equal Protection challenge.
In Dialogue #2, I will place this understanding of the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause in dialogue with the major, competing interpretations of the Clause in an effort to
determine which of these competing interpretations is most hermeneutically credible
based on the extent to which the interpretation is consistent with the spirit of the text.
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Dialogue #2:

Which of the Existing Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
is the most Hermeneutically Credible?

In Dialogue #2 I will place the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause as derived in
Dialogue #1 in hermeneutical conversation with the major, competing interpretations of
the Clause of the past 143 years (i.e., since the Clause became a part of black letter
constitutional law with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868), as I
understand them. The goal of Dialogue #2 is to use legal hermeneutical tools to rank the
existing major interpretations in terms of degrees of hermeneutical credibility, with the
concomitant goal of selecting the most hermeneutically credible of all previous, major
interpretations.
The structure of these dialogues will be to first measure a given interpretation
against the spirit of the text as derived in Dialogue #1, and then to measure the
interpretation in terms of the “prejudices”, or the values, political dispositions, and
personalities, of the Supreme Court justices who were involved in the creation the major
interpretation. As a given Supreme Court is composed of nine Justices, in the interest of
space and relevance, my analysis of the “prejudices” of the Supreme Court Justices on a
given Supreme Court will be limited to, at most, two or three Justices: the Chief Justice,
the writer of the majority opinion of the case, and a third Justice if he or she is revealed
through historical analysis to have had a significant hand in developing a particular
interpretation. Of note, although the Chief Justice of a given Supreme Court (who lends
that Court its name, e.g., “the Marshall Court”) has one vote like all other justices and has
extra duties that are largely administrative, rather than substantive (Rosen 2007), it is also
the case that the style or “temperament” of the Chief Justice of a given Court can have a
great influence on a given decision is, particularly on how unanimous it is, for example,
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owing largely to the Chief Justice‟s diplomatic skills, but also owing to the Chief
Justice‟s leadership skills and overall amiability (Ibid.). As Robert J. Steamer has noted,
since the Chief Justiceship is a “constitutional office second in national authority and
prestige only to the president,” and since the duties of the Chief Justice are undefined in
the Constitution, “the incumbent…has been given carte blanche to use his personal
talents, whatever they may be, to add to the warp and woof of America‟s never quite
completed constitutional tapestry” (Steamer 1986: xii). Owing to this almost entirely
unregulated “carte blanche,” special consideration will be given in the analyses that
follow to the facticities and prejudices of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Courts that
influenced decided the major interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly,
the writer of the majority opinion is often the party who originated that opinion and/or
who had the most influence upon developing it. For this reason, the facticities and
“prejudices” of the writer of a given opinion will be examined as well. Additionally,
where it appears from the historical evidence that a Justice other than the Chief Justice or
the writer of the majority opinion had a significant influence on an opinion, that Justice‟s
“prejudices” will be examined as well.
The reader should recall that Gadamerian “prejudices” are just Heideggarian
facticities. On the concept of facticity, Heidegger explains, “[T[his expression means: in
each case „this‟ Dasein in its being-there for a while at a particular time (…) insofar as it
is, in the character of its being, „there‟ in the manner of be-ing” (Heidegger 1999: 5). In
other words, facticity merely describes how a given human being is at any given moment
in time and Gadamerian “prejudice” is simply the starting point from which all
interpretation/understanding necessarily begins. The term “prejudice” as used here, then,
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does not have pejorative connotations. Rather, “prejudice” is simply the point of entry
through which a given interpreter enters into the hermeneutic circle. The goal of
hermeneutical credibility, then, does not require us to reject an interpretation that can be
found to be a function of “prejudice.”30 Instead, the goal of hermeneutic credibility
requires merely that the interpreter‟s “prejudice(s)” or “horizons” be acknowledged,
taken into account and considered as relevant interpretive information.
Additionally, recall that, for Gadamer, not all “prejudices” are illegitimate. To the
extent that a given “prejudice” is in keeping with what Gadamer called the “tradition” of
the text at issue, that “prejudice” contributes legitimately to hermeneutically credible
meaning. For purposes of this dialogue, the “tradition” at issue is taken to be very similar
to what Bobbit and others have called the American “ethos” (Bobbit 1992: 127),
understood as the conceptual framework behind not only the U.S. Constitution but
behind the companion cornerstone documents of the United States as well, and, most
significantly, understood to contain the ideal of equality as found in the Declaration of
Independence.
The reader is forewarned that the legal hermeneutic inquiry I will employ in
Dialogue #2 into the prejudices of the Supreme Court Justices contributing to the major
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause is inquiry into the personal lives and
personal value systems of the Justices involved. In mainstream constitutional
jurisprudence, these factors would be considered irrelevant to the credibility of any
interpretation handed down. But, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, to ignore
the personal lives and personal value systems of the previous interpreters of the Equal
30

Most notably, because from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, all
interpretations (i.e., all understandings) are a function of “prejudice.”
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Protection Clause would be to ignore what legal hermeneutics reveals to be a key
component in the assignment of meaning, i.e., the identity of the interpreter(s). Recall
from Chapter 3 that for Heidegger, understanding (Verstehen) and how the one doing the
understanding is in the world exist in a reciprocal relationship of meaning that Heidegger
calls hermeneutic ontology. Since the human way of being (Dasein) is to be actively
involved in interaction with one‟s environment (being-in-the-world), the metaphysical
distance that those in the analytic tradition take for granted as existing between
interpreter and that which is interpreted is revealed as a fiction. If Heidegger is right,
then the distance in mainstream legal theory that some jurists take for granted between
the personal lives and value systems of Supreme Court Justices and the decisions handed
down by those Justices as to The Meaning (with a capital “T” and a capital “M”) of a
given law – any law – is simply impossible. Instead, every interpreter enters into the
interpretive process with a given “fore-structure of understanding” which the interpreter
necessarily brings to bear on any “understanding” that arises. In other words, to
“understand” is always to interpret. To interpret is always to understand. The
phenomenon of interpretation and the phenomenon of understanding exist in a
tautological relationship of identity.
Moreover, inquiry into the personal lives and personal value systems of Supreme
Court Justices is particularly important since the Supreme Court is spoken of customarily
as if it exists independently of the human beings who comprise it, and as if the same
Supreme Court makes every constitutional decision. “The Supreme Court” is spoken of
as if it had a continuity, a stable, consistent composition supporting the (false) view that
objective interpretations as to the meaning of the United States Constitution can and do
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spring forth from it. As Jeffrey Rosen puts it, “Everything about the Court‟s majestic
rituals – from the white marble palace to the black robes – is designed to minimize the
human element and to convey the impression that the Court‟s opinions are, if not the
word of God, the impersonal pronouncements of a Delphic oracle” (Rosen 2007: 5).
But, legal hermeneutics reveals that to understand the Supreme Court in this way is
simply a manifestation of what Gadamer called the “prejudice against prejudice” at work
in mainstream methods of textual legal interpretation. To overcome this particular
(illegitimate) prejudice, i.e., the road to more credible textual interpretation is necessarily
paved instead with an investigation into the Gadamerian “prejudices” and “horizons” of
the Justices, into their Heideggarian “fore-structures of understanding”.
Toward that effort, what follows is an attempt to lay bare the human element that
legal hermeneutics understands is necessarily at work in every interpretation, including
Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. There will be an attempt
to expose, in other words, the leanings and predispositions of the human beings that have
significantly determined the ways in which the Equal Protection Clause has been
interpreted since its inception in 1868.
In summary, insofar as a given major interpretation is in keeping with the spirit of
the text and appears to have been affected more by the “legitimate” than by the
“illegitimate” “prejudices” or value systems of the various Supreme Court justices
influencing the interpretation, the interpretation will be understood to be hermeneutically
credible. Insofar as a given major interpretation is not in keeping with the spirit of the
text and/or appears to have been influenced more by the “illegitimate” than the
“legitimate” prejudices of the various Supreme Court justices influencing the
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interpretation, the interpretation will be understood be lacking in hermeneutical
credibility. That said, I will now outline what I understand as the major Supreme Court
interpretations that have developed over the years to make clear the subject of inquiry of
this dialogue.
The Major Interpretations of the Clause31
There seem to me to be four major interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
that have developed over the years, from the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868 to the present, each corresponding to a particular historical era. These
interpretations are: (1) the interpretation that the Equal Protection Clause protects blacks
only, prevalent from about 1873 to 1895, (2) the interpretation that “equal” in the Equal
Protection Clause mean separate, prevalent from about 1896 to 1953, (3) the
interpretation that there are “suspect classes” of people who deserve special protection
from discriminatory laws, popular from about 1954 to about 1973, (4) Suspect
Classification Doctrine, in which the Supreme Court seems to have lost all awareness of
the historical context that informed the Equal Protection Clause, prevalent from about
1978 to the present. These interpretations and their eras, as I understand them, together
with the relevant case law of the period in question, are gathered together for quick
reference below in Table 2.

31

It is conceded that what constitutes a major interpretation is a judgment call on my part.
However, it is fair to say that there have been interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause that
have had long careers, that have generated a good deal of “progeny” or scholarly literature over
time, and that have been understood by practicing lawyers as the “binding precedent” of a given
era. I am defining as “major” all interpretations that meet these criteria (from my perspective, of
course).
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Table 2. Major Supreme Court Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
Era

Group

Cases

Interpretation

Interpretation #1

blacks

Clause applies to ex-slaves
(blacks) only

Clause Protects Blacks
Only
(1868-1895)

women

The Slaughterhouse Cases
(1873), Strauder v. West
Virginia (1880), The Civil
Rights Cases (1875)
Bradwell v. Illinois (1873),
Minor v. Happersett (1875).

gay people

No cases

N/A

blacks

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada (1938), Korematsu v.
U.S. (1944), McLaurin v. OK
State Regents (1950), Sweatt v.
Painter (1950).

“Equal” in equal protection
can mean separate; Separate
usually means inferior.

women

Muller v. Oregon (1908),
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948).

Clause does not apply to
women; Women must be
“protected” from equality

gay people

No cases

N/A

Blacks

Brown v. Board of Education
(1954), Brown II (1955),
Loving v. Virginia (1967),
Alexander v. Holmes Co. Brd.
of Ed. (1969), Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Brd. of
Ed. (1971), San Antonio
Independent School District v.
Rodriguez (1973).

Separate But Equal
overturned; “all deliberate
speed”changes to
desegregation “at once”; antimiscegenation laws violate
the EPC; busing approved to
overcome segregation: strict
scrutiny appropriate where a
“suspect class” is involved,
but education not a
fundamental right

women

Reed v. Reed (1971)

Sex discrimination violates
the EPC (rational basis test
used) no rational basis for
sex discrim., rights of men
protected

gay people

No cases

N/A

Interpretation #2

Separate But Equal
(1896-1953)

Interpretation #3

Suspect Classes
(1954-1973)

Clause does not apply to
women

(cont.)
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Table 2. (cont.) Major Supreme Court Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
Era

Group

Cases

Interpretation

Interpretation #4

blacks

Washington v. Davis (1976),
Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke (1978),
Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980),
City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Company (1989),
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña (1995), Gratz v.
Bollinger (2003), Grutter v.
Bollinger (2003).

Discriminatory impact not
enough to invalidate law.
Laws containing racial
“classifications” are
discriminatory; Dissent in
Fullilove stresses that all
racial classifications
unconstitutional; Croson
holds that a minority set-aside
program excluding whites
violates the EPC; Adarand
holds that all racial
classifications are
unconstitutional; Michigan
Cases together hold that
affirmative action programs
must be “narrowly tailored”.

women

Frontiero v. Richardson
(1973), Kahn v. Shevin (1974),
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974),
Craig v. Boren (1976),
Califano v. Goldfarb (1977),
Orr v. Orr (1979), Kirchberg v.
Feenstra (1981), Rokster v.
Goldberg (1981), Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan
(1982), U.S. v. Virginia (1996).

Frontiero plurality uses
“immutable characteristics” as
basis for using strict scrutiny;
Kahn holds that gender is not
an impermissible
“classification”; Geduldig
holds that pregnancy is not a
sex-based classification;
Craig inaugurates
intermediate scrutiny;
Califano protects widowers as
much as widows. Orr holds
that women must make
alimony payments to men;
Kirchberg holds that gender
classifications not “narrowly
tailored”; Rokster upholds
male-only draft; Hogan holds
that men can go to nursing
school;Virginia holds that
women can go to VMI.

gay people

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986),
Lawrence v. Texas (2003),
Romer v. Evans (1996), Perry
v. Schwarzenegger (U.S.
District Court, 2010).

No right to “homosexual
sodomy” mutates into a
fundamental right to
consensual sexual intimacy;
Discriminatory law struck
down using rational basis test
in Romer. Federal court (not
the S.Ct.) follows suit.

Suspect Classification
Doctrine
(1973-present )
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With the major interpretations listed, I will now use legal hermeneutics in an
attempt to prioritize these four interpretations in terms of degrees of hermeneutical
credibility. As mentioned above, the procedure to be used is that for each interpretation I
will first compare the interpretation to the spirit of the text as derived in Dialogue #1,
after which I will examine the Gadamerian “prejudices” of the Supreme Court Justices
who contributed significantly to developing the interpretation (including an assessment as
to whether these “prejudices” are “legitimate” or not in the Gadamerian sense). At the
end of Dialogue #2, I will then make a judgment call, based on all of this information, as
to which of the four major interpretations is the most hermeneutically credible.
Interpretation #1: Clause Protects Blacks Only (1868-1895)
The Interpretation
The very first cases to decide the “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause after
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment (and, arguably, the key doctrinal cases of
this era) were The Slaughterhouse Cases and Bradwell v. Illinois, both decided in 1873.
Recall that Slaughterhouse held, among other things, that the Equal Protection Clause
applied only to blacks and Bradwell held that the Clause did not apply to women.
Comparison to the Spirit of the Text
Comparing this interpretation of the Clause to the spirit of the text, i.e., that the
Clause operates to protect any marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group from
unequal treatment under the law, Interpretation #1 (“blacks only”) seems to fare well in
one sense but to not fare well in another sense. The interpretation fares well in the sense
that it contemplates rights under the Equal Protection Clause in terms of groups (i.e,
blacks and women) and also in the sense that it understands blacks to be specifically
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protected. Since blacks are arguably the prototypically marginalized, oppressed or
subjugated group in the United States, and since Interpretation #1 protects blacks,
Interpretation #1 is consistent with the spirit of the text. Interpretation #1 does not fare
well, however, in the sense that it specifically excludes women from protection under the
Clause. If it can be fairly said that women are a marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated
group, then the fact that Interpretation #1 specifically excludes women is problematic and
detracts from the hermeneutical credibility of the interpretation.
Supreme Court Prejudices
The next inquiry is into the “prejudices” of the Supreme Court Justices generating
Interpretation #1 and whether those “prejudices” can be fairly said to be “legitimate”
(supportive of the hermeneutic credibility of the interpretation) or “illegitimate” (i.e.,
damaging to the hermeneutic credibility of the interpretation) in the Gadamerian sense,
i.e., whether the “prejudices” can be said to be in keeping with the Gadamerian
“tradition” I have identified as the most relevant on the question of the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause, i.e., the ideal of equality as found in the Declaration of
Independence. Recall from above that the idea is that to the extent that the prejudices
affecting the interpretation are legitimate (i.e., in keeping with the ideal of equality), the
prejudices add hermeneutic credibility to the interpretation affected by the prejudice; but
to the extent that the prejudices affecting the interpretation are illegitimate (out of step
with the ideal of equality), the prejudices detract from the hermeneutic credibility of the
interpretation influenced by the prejudice.
The Supreme Court deciding the earliest decisions interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause (The Slaughterhouse Cases and Bradwell v. Illinois) was the 1873
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Court, which was headed by Salman P. Chase. Chief Justice Chase had replaced the
notorious Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who infamously wrote what is commonly
understood as one of the most nefarious Supreme Court decisions ever handed down
affecting the rights of blacks, Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856), mentioned above. 32 While
Taney had been stubborn, unsociable, and possessed an “inflated sense of judicial power”
(Rosen 2007, 12), Chase was well-liked, welcomed by other members of the Court, and
congenial (Silver 1957). Chase was widely understood at the time of his appointment to
have been very much on the side of the newly emancipated blacks (Ibid.: 204), and his
Chief Justiceship was heralded in the press as ushering in a new, more humane, era of
American jurisprudence (Ibid.). But, although President Lincoln appointed Chase, the
two did not always see eye to eye.33 In fact, as early as 1865, it seemed that Chase might
very well oppose Lincoln Administration policies in his decisions (Ibid.: 209). The point
for purposes of the present inquiry is that Chase was a humanist who supported the
emancipation of the slaves, but he can hardly be characterized as having been politically
“in bed”, to use the term of politics, with the President who appointed him. In other
words, Chase was known for his humanity and his independence.
Justice Samuel F. Miller delivered the opinion of the Court in both The
Slaughterhouse Cases and Bradwell v. Illinois. Miller was born in Richmond, Kentucky,
obtained a degree in medicine and practiced medicine for twelve years (Commission

32

The Taney Court notoriously wrote in Dred Scott that in their opinion the Framers
thought that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”
This clash can arguably be attributed to the fact that it was widely known that Chase‟s
real and abiding ambition was not to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court but the President
of the United States, am ambition that was never realized (Silver 1957).
33
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1992). In Richmond, “nobody was rich and nobody was poor; there were very few
slaves” (Cushman 1995). The eldest of eight children, Miller was very close to his mother
growing up helped her a lot with the family responsibilities (Cushman 1995). Miller then
developed an interest in law and started studying it, after which he was admitted to the
bar in 1847 (Commission 1992). He had no formal legal education (Cushman 1995).
Miller is said to have been “energetic and unpretentious” (Cushman 1995: 177). Miller
was married twice (Ibid.). His first wife died (Ibid.). His second wife, with whom he had
two children, was “high-spirited and warm-hearted” (Ibid. 178). Miller denounced
slavery, calling it “the most stupendous wrong, and the most prolific source of human
misery, both to the master and the slave” (Ibid., 178). When the state of Kentucky
refused to abolish slavery, he freed his slaves anyway and moved to a free state, Iowa
(Ibid.). Miller was concerned when asked to join the Supreme Court that had rendered
decisions like Dred Scott v. Sanford (Cushman 1995: 179). He said he “hated” Chief
Justice Rober B. Taney for delivering that decision (Ibid.).
Chief Justice Chase, then, was an independent-minded humanitarian and Samuel
F. Miller was a self-educated lawyer who was close to his mother and detested the
institution of slavery. It would seem that the “prejudices” of two such persons would
therefore be “legitimate” vis-à-vis the decisions they informed, in the sense that these
particular “prejudices” do not seem to be at odds, but rather seem to be in keeping with
the ideal of equality contained in the Declaration of Independence.
Comparing Interpretation #1 to the spirit of the text, this interpretation seems
hermeneutically credible to the extent that it protects the rights of groups, particularly
blacks, but not hermeneutically credible to the extent that it excludes women. The
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“prejudices” of the Chief Justice and the writer of both opinions seem “legitimate,” i.e.,
in keeping with the ideal of equality, that is, the “prejudices” do not seem to undermine
the credibility of their decisions as to the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Interpretation #2: Separate But Equal (1896-1953)
The Interpretation
The key cases decided in this era, arguably, were Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),
Muller v. Oregon (1908), and Goesaert v. Cleary (1948). The interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause of this era is that the equality rights of blacks were satisfied by separate
facilities for blacks, as long as those facilities were “equal” and that women have no right
to equality vis-à-vis their choice of profession, or the right to long hours, and this state of
affairs is for women‟s and society‟s own good. On this view, “social inequality” is not
redressable by appeal to the Equal Protection Clause only “legal inequality.”
Interestingly, the difference between social and legal inequality seems to parse out in
such a way that operates to perpetuate and support the legalized subordination of blacks
(in the form of Jim Crow laws) and women (in the form of laws preventing women from
adopting the career of their choice). Somehow, on this view, the racial segregation of
public facilities as well as the decision that the state can pass laws preventing women
from tending bar or limiting the hours they could legally work are both examples of
social inequality rather than legal equality.
Comparison to the Spirit of the Text
Comparing Interpretation #2 to the spirit of the text, i.e., that the Equal Protection
Clause operates to protect any marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group from
unequal treatment under the law, it seems that Interpretation #2 does not fare well. The
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interpretation that there are socially salient differences between blacks and whites, and
between women and men – differences that warrant separate public facilities for blacks
and for whites, and that also warrant preventing women from working at the jobs of their
choice for whatever hours they choose – is arguably revealed as a clever mechanism
designed to perpetuate the oppression and subjugation of these groups without doing so
explicitly. Interpretation #2 therefore fails when compared to the spirit of the text.
Supreme Court Prejudices
Melville Weston Fuller was the Chief Justice for both Plessy and Muller. Fuller
was the direct descendant of someone who came over on the Mayflower and dropped out
of law school without graduating in 1855 (Steamer 1986: 120). He attended but dropped
out Harvard Law School after only six months (Ibid.). Muller “use[d] strong political
rhetoric to criticize Abraham Lincoln” at one point (Ibid.: 121) and condemned Lincoln‟s
Emancipation Proclamation, saying that it “annul[led] the constitutions and laws of
sovereign states, [overthrew] their domestic relations, [and] depriv[ed] loyal men of their
property….” (Ibid.: 121). His attitude toward abolition was similar to that of Taney (the
Chief Justice who made the Dred Scott decision, referenced above) (Ibid.: 121). Fuller
supported state constitutional provisions that rejected black suffrage, barred black
migration, and helped segregate Chicago schools (Klarman 2004: 16).
Justice Henry B. Brown was the writer of the Plessy (separate but equal) decision
and Justice David J. Brewer was the writer of Muller (state law could limit the working
hours of women). Brown was born in New England into a Puritan family (Cushman
1995). Brown went to Yale College and attended both Yale and Harvard law schools
(Commission1992). He was a U.S. Marshal and an Assistant Attorney for the Eastern
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District of Michigan (Ibid.). When the Civil War rolled around, he hired a substitute to
perform his military service (Cushman 1995). He was not in favor of emancipation
(Ibid.). People saw him as warm and sociable (Ibid.). During his years on the Supreme
Court, Brown‟s decisions were generally centrist, opting to try to find a compromise and
avoiding dissents (Ibid.). Brewer was born in what is now Turkey into a missionary
family (Commission 1992).

He attended Wesleyan University for two years and then

Yale (Ibid.). He went to Albany Law School and graduated in 1858 (Ibid.). He was a
District Court judge for four years and the Kansas Supreme Court for fourteen years
(Ibid.). While there, Brewer‟s decisions were conventional but often individualistic
(Cushman 1995). Brewer has traditionally been understood as conservative and
“sympathetic to business interests and the rights of property” (Cushman 1995: 253).
Brewer was very receptive to the argument made by the attorney for the State of Oregon
in Muller that long working hours had terrible effects on the health, safety, and morals of
working women (Ibid.).
Fred M. Vinson was the Chief Justice on Goesaert v. Cleary (upholding a
Michigan law banning women from obtaining licenses to tend bar unless they were the
wives or daughters of a male owner). Vinson was born in Louisa, Kentucky and had a
friendly, warm, relaxed demeanor and was known for his ability to “conciliate the views
of warring factions” (Steamer 1986: 244). From a small town, Vinson was born into
“modest circumstances” (his father was the county jailer) but through his own hard work
moved into the “highest circles of national government” (Ibid). Vinson went to public
schools and received both a bachelor‟s degree and law degree from Center College (Ibid.,
245). Vinson served on the federal bench for six years after which he became President
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Roosevelt‟s “chief troubleshooter” during the war years of 1943 and 1944 (Ibid). When
Harry Truman became president, he named Vinson as secretary of the treasury. A strong
bond soon developed between Vinson and Harry Truman (Ibid 246). Then, on June 6
President Truman nominated Vinson to as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Ibid.,
247). Vinson had deep intellectual strength but was also arrogant (Cushman 1995: 421).
Vinson had great success on the issues of race relations and civil rights (Ibid.). He wrote
the Court‟s unanimous opinions in three civil rights cases, Shelley v. Kraemer (1948),
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950), and Sweatt v. Painter (1950). Vinson‟s
views on women are not clear from the historical record, so it is difficult to determine
whether or how any prejudices he might have had regarding women as a group may have
affected his decision in Goesaert.
Justice Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion in Goesaert. Frankfurter was born
in Vienna, Austria in 1882 (Commission 1992). He graduated from the College of the
City of New York and Harvard Law School (Ibid). He was first in his class in all three
of his years at Harvard (Cushman 1995). He worked as an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as a legal officer in the War
Department‟s Bureau of Insular Affairs, and eventually the Secretary of War
(Commission 1992). In the 1920s, Frankfurter helped defend victims of the raids on
alleged communists during the “red scares” (Cushman 1992). He was a friend of the
NAACP and had a founding membership in the ACLU (Ibid.). He was nominated to the
Supreme Court by Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 5, 1939 (Commission 1992).
Frankfurter‟s wife was an “astonishingly bright woman, every bit her husband‟s
intellectual equal” and he had many friends in all walks of life (Ibid.). Frankfurter was in

170

favor of judicial restraint (Ibid.). He is known to have said, “[I]t is not the duty of judges
to express their personal attitudes on [„grave and complex problems…that excite the
public interest‟], deep as their individual convictions may be. The opposite is the truth; it
is their duty not to act merely on personal views” (Cushman 1992).
It appears, then, that Chief Justice Fuller was no intellectual giant and that he was
a defender of the philosophy behind Jim Crow, i.e., that blacks should be kept separate
from whites. Such a prejudice obviously influenced the Court‟s decision in Plessy.
Further, because this prejudice seems out of step with the ideal of equality contained in
the American ethos, this prejudice seems to be illegitimate. I found no data that might
inform Chief Justice Fuller‟s “prejudices” on the concept of female equality. The
evidence available on the life of Justice Henry Brown, the writer of Plessy, indicates
mostly that he was the kind of person to go along with the crowd (“avoiding dissents”),
so it is unclear what his relevant prejudices might have been.

Brewer, who wrote

Muller, was a conservative who likely thought, as was the conventional conservative
wisdom of the day, that women were in need of protection. All of this information taken
together arguably detracts from the hermeneutic credibility of Interpretation #2.
Regarding Goesaert v.Cleary, Chief Justice Vinson‟s views on women‟s equality
are unclear from the information available and Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion,
favored judicial restraint. Together, these facts – especially Frankfurter‟s preference for
judicial restraint – seem to indicate that neither Justice would favor remedial measures to
equalize the status of women in society, i.e., that neither Justice was particularly in favor
of having a role in effectuating the ideal of equality for women. This information , as
well, detracts from the hermeneutic credibility of Interpretation #2.
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Interpretation #3: Suspect Classes (1954-1973)
The Interpretation
During the period from 1954 to 1973, the Supreme Court struck down racial
segregation in public schools (Brown v. Board of Education), outlawed antimiscegenation laws across the country (Loving v. Virginia), and for the first time found
that discrimination against women was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause,
albeit only using the rational basis test (Reed v. Reed). In all of these cases, the Court
explicitly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as operating to provide a remedy for
the unequal treatment suffered by blacks and the unequal treatment suffered by women
throughout the history of the United States. The Court was consistent throughout the rest
of this period that discrimination against blacks and discrimination on the basis of gender
were both constitutionally impermissible. The Court in this period used strict scrutiny as
the level of judicial review applicable in cases of racial discrimination, and eventually
established intermediate scrutiny as the level of review in cases of discrimination against
women.
Comparison to the Spirit of the Text
Comparing Interpretation #3 to the spirit of the text, it seems that Interpretation #3
fares fairly well in the sense that it ties Equal Protection to groups rather than, as later
interpretations will do, tying Equal Protection to particular traits. However, recall from
Dialogue #1 that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause also seems to require that strict
scrutiny should be the applicable level of judicial review regardless of the type or kind of
marginalized, subjugated, or oppressed group involved. To the extent that Interpretation
#3 applies different levels of judicial review to the different marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated groups, then, it does not seem to be hermeneutically credible.
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Supreme Court Prejudices
During what I am calling the Suspect Class period, Earl Warren was the Chief
Justice from the beginning to 1969 and Warren Burger was the Chief Justice thereafter.
During his time as Chief Justice, all Supreme Court scholars agree that Earl Warren had a
very strong effect on how all of the cases were decided (See, e.g., Cushman 1995;
Steamer 1986; Choper 1987; Commission 1992; Schwartz 1993).
Earl Warren was born in 1891 in Los Angeles (Cushman 1995: 436) to parents
who were born in Scandinavia. Warren attended the University of California at Berkeley
and then attended the university‟s open law school (Ibid.). He enlisted in the army and
became a district attorney. A 1931 survey said Warrant was “the best district attorney in
the United States” (Ibid.). He married a Swedish-born woman, Nina Palmquist Meyers
and had six children with her (Ibid.: 437). “The importance of Nina and the family to
Warren and his career cannot be overstated,” according to the Supreme Court Historical
Society (Ibid.), as his home and family life “provided the foundation for his scale of
values throughout his professional life” (Ibid.). Warren is not understood to have been a
profound legal scholar, but had excellent leadership skills (Ibid.: 438). At the first
conference discussing Brown v. Board of Education, Warren stated that segregation could
only be justified if blacks were inherently inferior, placing at the center of the
conversation not legal scholarship but the “ultimate human values involved” (Ibid.).
The fore-structure of understanding/horizon of Earl Warren seems to be one of a centered
and balanced family man who was guided in his decisions more by the heart than the
head. Warren also wrote the decisions in both Brown v. Board of Education and Loving
v. Virginia.

173

The Court that decided Reed v. Reed (finding for the first time that discrimination
against women was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause but using the rational
basis test) was the Burger Court. Chief Justice Warren Burger was born on September
17, Constitution Day, in 1907 in St. Paul, Minnesota (Cushman 1995: 481). He had
many jobs as a child, including a daily newspaper route and helping make theatrical
backdrops on the weekends (Ibid.). He was greatly influenced by his mother and
contributed to the family finances (Ibid.). Burger went to night school and worked as an
accountant (Ibid.: 482). He went to the St. Paul College of Law at night and graduated
magna cum laude, after which he taught at the law school for seventeen years as an
adjunct professor of contracts (Ibid.). He also joined an established law firm and
practiced there for twenty-one years (Ibid.). He met and married a schoolteacher and
had two children with her (Ibid). Burger served as assistant attorney general for the Civil
Division of the Justice Department, and was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit for thirteen years. President Nixon nominated Burger to be
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on May 21, 1969 (Ibid.: 483) where he almost always
voted on the side of the greater consensus (Ibid.: 484). In what the Supreme Court
Historical Society calls a “historic irony,” because Nixon had appointed Burger, Burger
delivered the opinion in a 1974 case that led to Nixon‟s resignation (Ibid.), United States
v. Nixon (1974). Burger‟s decisions “generally took each case on its own merits, paid
close attention to the facts, and were narrowly crafted to the issues at hand” (Ibid.).
Burger‟s judicial style has been called “moderate, balanced, and pragmatic” rather than
political influenced by any particular politics (Ibid.: 485). The forestructure of
understanding, the horizon or prejudice of Chief Justice Burger seems to have been one
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in which he made decisions on a case-by-case basis, trying as much as possible to operate
as a disinterested third party in his decisions, even to the point of being the one to have to
fire the person who hired him when he was called upon to do so. Burger also wrote the
decision in Reed v. Reed.
The three representative decisions selected to discuss Interpretation #3 were all
written by the Chief Justice of the Court. Whatever the prejudices of these Chief
Justices, then, they are all over the decisions they decided. Particularly in the case of Earl
Warren, it is well known that he had a strong influence over every decision that came
before his court. While not known as a top legal scholar, Warren was well known as
having a commitment to racial equality. Such a prejudice is definitely in keeping with
the tradition we are taking to operate as a guide to the legitimacy of a given
interpretation, i.e., the ideal of equality contained in the Declaration of Independence.
This “prejudice” therefore lends a high degree of credibility Interpretation #3. Chief
Justice Burger‟s prejudices, because he also wrote the decision in Reed v. Reed, heavily
influenced the decision there, according to the legal hermeneutical approach to
interpretation. So, the decision in Reed, i.e., that discrimination against women violated
the Equal Protection Clause, but also finding that neither heightened nor strict scrutiny
was the appropriate level of judicial review for cases of alleged discrimination against
women, seems in keeping with who Burger seems to have been, i.e., a pragmatist who
preferred compromise to taking sides. The question is whether such a prejudice
(pragmatism) is in keeping with the ideal of equality, and it does not seem that the answer
to that question is obvious.
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Interpretation #4: Suspect Classification Doctrine (1973-present)
The Interpretation
Suspect Classification Doctrine has had a long reign and at bottom is the view that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain human traits
and not others, and provides different levels of protection depending upon the trait. The
focus of Suspect Classification Doctrine is individual rights rather than groups rights; that
is, Suspect Classification Doctrine prohibits discrimination on the basis of race regardless
of the race of the petitioner and prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender regardless
of the gender of the petitioner. It does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. For racial discrimination, Suspect Classification Doctrine uses strict
scrutiny, for discrimination on the basis of gender, the doctrine uses “intermediate”
scrutiny, and uses the rational basis test for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
Comparison to the Spirit of the Text
Suspect Classification Doctrine does not fare well when compared with the spirit
of the text. Most obviously, the doctrine protects individuals rather than groups.
Additionally, it does not operate to protect the rights of marginalized, oppressed, and
subjugated groups, but instead often operates to protect members of historically nonmarginalized, non-oppressed, and non-subjugated groups. Additionally, instead of
applying strict scrutiny across the board (for example to a law that discriminates upon
the basis of any problematic “trait,”), Suspect Classification Doctrine applies different
levels of review, depending upon the trait. Suspect Classification Doctrine then
completely fails the initial test of comparison to the spirit of the text of the Equal
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Protection Clause and for that reason can safely be placed at the bottom of the list of
hermeneutically credible existing major interpretations without regard to consideration of
the Supreme Court prejudices affecting it. However, for the sake of completeness, I will
make a few brief remarks about the Rehnquist Court, which lasted almost twenty years
and under which Suspect Classification took hold and became established as the standard
way of thinking about the Equal Protection Clause.
Supreme Court Prejudices
All of decisions comprising Suspect Classification Doctrine were made during the
Rehnquist Court years, which had a very long reign – from 1986 to 2005 – and played a
huge role in developing Suspect Classification Doctrine. Chief Justice Rehnquist was
born the son of a paper salesman on October 1, 1924 (Cushman 1995: 496). He served in
the Army Air Corps during World War II, after which he obtained a B.A. and M.A. in
political science at Stanford (Ibid.). He obtained another M.A. from Harvard and then
went to Stanford Law school, graduating first in his class (Ibid.). He had a reputation as a
strong advocate of conservative political views (Ibid.: 497). Rehnquist married Natalie
Cornell in 1953 and had three children with her (Ibid.). He moved to Phoenix in part
because of its conservative politics (Ibid.). Rehnquist often spoke of states‟ rights and
limited federal judicial power in his early years on the Court (Ibid.: 498). He was in
disagreement with the other eight members of the Court that the Equal Protection Clause
applied to discrimination against illegitimate children, resident aliens, and women (Ibid.).
Rehnquist “insisted that the Equal Protection Clause had only marginal application in
cases of racial discrimination,” he “urged the Court to overturn Mapp v. Ohio (1961),”
which applied the Exclusionary Rule to the states, and was “hostile to Miranda v. Arizona
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(1966),” which required police to read suspects of their rights before interrogation (Ibid.,
499) Rehnquist dissented in Roe v. Wade (1973), which granted women the right to
choose an abortion, and dissented in United Steel Workers of America v. Weber (1979), in
which the Court denied the Equal Protection made by a white worker who claimed that
the company he worked for, Kaiser Aluminum, had discriminated against him because
he was white (Ibid.,: 499). Rehnquist was characterized by Newsweek as “The Court‟s
Mr. Right” (Newsweek, July 23, 1979: 68) and by the New York Times as “doctrinaire,”
and “right-wing,” and the Court‟s “most predictable conservative member” (New York
Times, July 12, 1981, §4: 22). Rehnquist stated at one time that he had joined the Court
with a desire to counteract the Warren Court decisions (New York Times, March 3, 1985,
Magazine: 33). When Rehnquist was a Supreme Court clerk, he wrote a memo on
Brown v. Board of Education explicitly urging that Separate But Equal Doctrine was
“right and should be affirmed” (Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 1986).
Clearly, then, Rehnquist‟s “prejudices” were along conservative lines. During his
tenure as Chief Justice, there was a clear shift in Equal Protection Analysis from a focus
on group rights to a focus on individual rights. This was a clear shift away from the spirit
of the Equal Protection Clause as I have developed it, rendering Interpretation #4,
Suspect Classification Doctrine, the least hermeneutically credible of all of the major
interpretations as I have developed them.
The Answer
As I hope Dialogue #2 has shown, of the four major interpretations, Interpretation
#4, Suspect Classification, has the lowest degree of hermeneutic credibility. This is so
because it is wholly out of step with the spirit of the text since it does not protect groups
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at all and instead protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of traits.
Additionally, Interpretation #4 assigns different levels of protection to different traits, a
concept which is antithetical to the spirit of the text which demands that all
unconstitutional discrimination be prohibited to the same degree. The conclusion that
Suspect Classification Doctrine is the least hermeneutically credible of all the major is
reinforced by the discovery that the “prejudices” of Chief Justice Rehnquist are wholly
out of step with the ideal of equality as contained in the Declaration of Independence.
Interpretation #2, Separate But Equal, is the next lowest in hermeneutic
credibility. Interpretation #2 is better than Suspect Classification Doctrine in that it
acknowledges that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause is such that groups should be
the subject of investigation rather than individuals or traits. However, the fact that
Separate But Equal Doctrine operates to socially stigmatize historically marginalized,
oppressed, or subjugated groups rather than to increase their level of equality in society
makes Interpretation #2 the next lowest in hermeneutic credibility.
Just above Interpretation #2 is Interpretation #1, “Blacks Only.” When compared
to the spirit of the text, Interpretation #1 fares well in the sense that it focuses on group
rights rather than the “traits” of individuals. It also fares well in the sense that it allows
for the special protection of blacks, arguably the prototypical marginalized, oppressed,
and subjugated group in American society. Interpretation #1 does not fare well, however,
in that it explicitly fails to protect the rights of women, assuming it is fair to say that
women are a marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group.
Finally, Interpretation #3, Suspect Classes, has the most hermeneutic credibility
of all of the four major interpretations. It protects groups rather than protecting
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discrimination on the basis of the “traits” of individuals. It understands that the spirit of
the Equal Protection Clause was that it protects marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated
groups as well. However, recall from Dialogue #1 that the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause also seems to require that strict scrutiny should be the applicable level of judicial
review regardless of the type or kind of marginalized, subjugated, or oppressed group
involved. To the extent that Interpretation #3 applies different levels of judicial review to
the different marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups, then, it does not seem to be
hermeneutically credible. Still, compared to the alternatives, Interpretation #3 seems to
be the most consistent with the spirit of the text of all of the interpretations. Additionally,
Interpretation #3 was heavily influenced by Chief Justice Earl Warren who, by all
accounts, held as a guiding principle in his tenure as Chief Justice, using the Equal
Protection Clause for its intended purpose, i.e, achieving the ideal of equality for
everyone.
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”[Legal] hermeneutics is normative because although it implies that a text
is always seen through the lenses of the intervening history and tradition
of interpretations, it holds that an interpretation that is more conscious of
this intervening history is better and less dogmatic than one that is less
conscious of it.” – David Couzens Hoy1
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations for Future Research
Discussion
This project arose out of a long-standing concern I had since law school that the
way the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was being interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the contemporary era (roughly since the mid to late 1980s) was
problematic in two key ways. First, the interpretation was out of step with what I had
been raised to believe was the purpose of the Clause: namely a vehicle for use by people
of color to challenge and then have struck down laws designed to marginalize, oppress, or
subjugate them. Second, the various Supreme Court decisions I read in law school were
not consistent as to the meaning of the Clause, i.e., read together the cases did not seem
to me to admit of any sort of consistent or coherent legal doctrine. In jurisprudence class,
I thought I discovered the root of this inconsistency when I learned about the Critical
Legal Studies Movement. From the perspective of Critical Legal Studies, there was
actually no “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause to be found. Instead, every
Supreme Court decision was a function of politics. Recall from Chapter 3 that from the
perspective of Critical Legal Studies, it was no surprise that Equal Protection
jurisprudence was inconsistent and self-contradictory. All law, from the perspective of
the Crits, is inconsistent and self-contradictory. All law is politics and nothing more.
The reason that there have been many interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
1

(Hoy 1992:184)
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throughout the years, on this view, is that what the Equal Protection Clause means will be
decided by different people at different times depending on their particular political
persuasion, and there was nothing more to the Clause‟s “meaning” than this.
But, could that be all there was to the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, I
asked myself? When Thurgood Marshall stood before the Supreme Court in 1952 to
argue in Brown v. Board of Education that the only justification for separate schools for
children of different races was not a constitutionally sound one, but one designed to keep
a people who were at one time slaves as near that stage as possible, was there no credible
basis for him to have made that argument? Was there no credible basis for the Supreme
Court to have concluded in Brown that separate schools were “inherently unequal” under
the Equal Protection Clause? The word “separate” just means detached, away from,
other than. Surely, “separate” does not inherently mean unequal. If we look only to the
word “separate” itself, that is, if the “meaning” of the word is just to have its standard
dictionary definition; if we take, in other words, a standard analytic approach to what the
“meaning” of “separate” is in the phrase, “separate schools,” then there is no reason why
separate schools could not be equal. But, the Supreme Court did not merely say in Brown
that separate schools for black children and white children were unequal in fact, leaving
open the possibility that separate schools could also have the possibility of being equal.
No. Instead, the Supreme Court declared that “separate” schools were inherently unequal,
i.e., intrinsically unequal or essentially unequal. Leaving aside the philosophical question
of whether anything can be inherently any particular way (i.e., leaving aside the question
of the possibility of intrinsic value), let us the examine the question of just what the
Supreme Court did, in fact, “mean” by stating that separate schools were inherently
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unequal. It seems to me obvious that the only thing the Court could have meant is that in
the particular socio-historical context of public school education in 1954 in the United
States, separate schools for children of different races were inherently unequal.
Was this an accident? How did it happen that the link between “separate” schools
and the fact that the schools for children of one racial group were clearly of a lower
quality than the schools for children of another racial group? Was it mere chance that
caused the schools of black children under Jim Crow to be almost always of a lower
quality than the schools for white children? Could it have happened, in other words, that
the schools of white children under Jim Crow had been the ones to have ended up as the
“inherently” lower quality schools? In other words, was the mere fact that children of
different races were segregated from each other the root cause of the “inherent”
difference in quality between the schools of black children and the schools of white
children? To state this question differently, was the “immutability” of race and the
making of distinctions between children on the basis of that immutable trait the evil that
had to be rooted out and eliminated as a basis upon which to make distinctions between
groups of children in public education? Did the mere fact of black children‟s only going
to school with each other cause the “inherent” unequal status of their schools?
It seems to me that the answer to all of these questions is obviously no. But, it
also seems to me that the Supreme Court got it right when it declared in 1954 that
separate schools between black children and white children were at that time “inherently
unequal,” and I arrive at that conclusion by taking a hermeneutical approach to
determining what “inherently unequal” meant in the context of segregated public schools
for black children and white children in 1954. As discussed in Chapter 3, the meaning of
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any text, from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, is derived from looking not
just at the words of the text (as an analytic approach to meaning would suggest) but at the
historical context in which the text was written, by looking as well at the grander text in
which the text to be examined is situated, at the writer of the text and his or her
Gadamerian “prejudices” so that those prejudices can be examined in terms of their
legitimacy, and ultimately by looking to the spirit of the text and the “tradition” in which
it takes place.
From a legal hermeneutical perspective, the “inherent” inequality between schools
set aside for black children and schools for white children in 1954 is based in the
historical reality that the schools for black children were set up in the first place to
maintain social segregation between black children and white children, i.e., to maintain
white supremacy after the Civil War. In other words, the phrase “inherently unequal”
means incapable of being equal owing to the history of marginalization, subjugation, and
oppression of black people in the United States. The issue in Brown, in other words, was
not whether racial segregation in the abstract was problematic, regardless of the races of
the children involved. Instead, the issue was that black children were not getting a
quality education in virtue of the long history in the United States of the oppression of
black people, and all of the socioeconomic ills that resulted from that oppression,
including generations and generations of subpar educational opportunities.
I raise the question of the meaning of the phrase “inherently unequal” to highlight
what I believe to be the most attractive feature of approaching legal interpretation
hermeneutically, i.e., the addition of substance and a kind of epistemological superiority
to a given legal interpretation through consultation with factors that philosophical
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hermeneutics reveals to be at the very core of what happens any time anyone sits down to
understand any text, including a legal text. Those factors include an examination of the
historical context in which the text was written, a sober assessment of the intentionality
of the interpreter(s), and a search for what Ast called the “one idea”, or Grundidee, that
ties together the parts and the whole of a given text giving the text a kind of teleological
content and simultaneously giving the meaning of the text a kind of normative
dimension; and it is this normative dimension that sets legal hermeneutics, as I have
derived it, apart from approaches that are more typically continental approaches, as I
have described them, in the sense that legal hermeneutics provides a basis upon which to
prioritize one interpretation over another, i.e., a basis upon which to make value
judgments about degrees of objectivity of different interpretations.
Conclusion
So, it is my conclusion that, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, in any
given interpretive moment, there are some interpretations that are better than other
interpretations. It is also my conclusion that in the present interpretive moment,
Interpretation #3, Suspect Classes, is the most hermeneutically credible of all of the four
major interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause as I have developed them, for the
primary reason that it understands that the spirit of Equal Protection Analysis is that it is
there to protect groups of people who are marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, rather
than to protect individuals who are not members of marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated groups .
It seems, however, that a fuller legal hermeneutical investigation into the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause would lead to a slightly different interpretation of the

185

Clause than that outlined by Interpretation #3. Specifically, while the Suspect Class
approach links the degree of judicial review available in a given case to whether the
petitioner is a member of a particular group , an interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause that is more consistent with the spirit of the text would provide the same level of
judicial review to anyone who is a member of any marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated
group, i.e., strict scrutiny.2
The threshold question, then, in any Equal Protection case, on this view, would be
whether the group to which the petitioner belongs is marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated. If so, the Equal Protection Clause is available for use to challenge a
discriminatory law and strict scrutiny would apply. If not, the Equal Protection Clause is
not available for use to challenge a discriminatory law at all. In other words, once a
given group is understood to be marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, strict scrutiny
would be the appropriate level of judicial review to apply to any law that discriminates

2

It is important to make clear that I am making the strong claim that the interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause derived in this work is the best interpretation available in the present
interpretive moment regarding what the Clause means. I am not merely making the weak claim,
in other words, that the interpretation derived here is one of many equally viable interpretations.
If I were making the weak claim, then there would be no difference in legitimacy or objectivity
between a legal hermeneutical interpretation and any continental/anti-foundationalist approach,
and one of the primary motivations behind this project is to demonstrate that legal hermeneutics
is an improvement upon these approaches in terms of the possibilities for objective, or at least
quasi-objective interpretation. In other words, the claim being made is that legal hermeneutics,
properly handled, will lead to the closest thing possible to a correct interpretation at any given
time. An additional claim being made is that the greater the sophistication or degree of detail or
precision of the set of hermeneutical tools used to derive a particular interpretation, the greater the
degree of objectivity of the interpretation derived. The more we know, for example, about the life
and values (the facticity or schema of intelligibility) of a previous interpretive agent, the better we
are able to assess the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his or her prejudices, for example. Still, all
hermeneutical roads lead to Rome, so to speak, within a given interpretive moment, the idea
being that the various interpretations derived through legal hermeneutics within a given
interpretive moment will not differ in any substantial degree. So, while relativity of method in
any particular legal hermeneutical search for meaning is assumed within a given interpretive
moment, relativity of outcome is not, substantially speaking.
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against a member of that group in virtue of being a member of the group, regardless of
which particular marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group is involved.
Recommendations for Future Research
The Ideal of Equality
In a sense this entire project hinges on the answer to the question of what is meant
by “equality” in the Equal Protection Clause, in equal protection jurisprudence, or in the
American ethos. A fuller or more complete hermeneutical investigation into the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause would therefore include hermeneutical inquiry into the
meaning of “equality” in these ways. The preliminary framework for such an
investigation would be an investigation into the meaning of equality in the Declaration of
Independence, since although the Constitution itself makes no mention of equality, the
Declaration of Independence does, and as one of the companion foundational documents
of the United States, the Declaration can be understood to be preliminarily constitutive of
the American ethos on the topic. Another question to investigate, then, is the relationship
between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, or between the
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause. But, even if the answer to
this question turns out to be that the relationship between these two foundational
American documents is a close one, the next question to investigate would be What is the
spirit of the Declaration of Independence? The answer to this question would begin with
any historical data available as to the intentions of the drafter(s) of the document, and
then proceed to put those intentions in historical context. The next question would be
how the concept of equality is understood in American society today, as this, too, would
inform a legal hermeneutical assessment of the spirit of the Declaration.
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Another path to take on the question of the meaning of equality in the American
ethos would be to trace the historical progression of the concept of equality within liberal
political theory, arguably the theoretical context in which all of the foundational
American documents were composed. Such a project might begin by comparing Plato‟s
conception of (political) equality (as found in the Republic) to Aristotle‟s (in his Politics).
The development of these two, differing concepts of equality would then be traced into
specific themes in classical social contract theory (Hobbes‟s conception in Leviathan,
Locke‟s conception in The Second Treatise of Government, and Rousseau‟s conception in
On the Social Contract) and also just beyond classical social contract theory into modern
democratic political theory (e.g., in de Tocqueville). I would then look to several
contemporary renditions of the concept of equality in, for example, Marx, Rawls, Nagel,
Nozick, and Amartya Sen for information on competing themes in the current
understanding of equality.
Another way to examine the concept of equality is through challenging what is
understood to be the theoretical difference between equality of opportunity and equality
of outcome. Many critical legal theorists (and critical race theorists as well) claim, for
example, that the equality of opportunity touted by mainstream liberal theorists is
equality of outcome in the Aristotelian sense in disguise, i.e., the idea that equals are
entitled to equal shares of primary (and even secondary) social goods and unequals are
entitled to unequal (inferior) shares of primary (and secondary) social goods. The path I
would take would likely be similar, guided by the idea that whenever equality is
discussed, equality of outcome is always the issue at hand, forcing those with more
libertarian sensibilities to make one of two commitments: either they must admit that
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equality of opportunity always ultimately and necessarily comes down to equality of
outcome, such that liberal rights theory is undermined at its core; or they must make the
equally disturbing confession that they accept the Aristotelian concept of equality:
equality for equals and inequality for unequals. Either way, the case is made for remedial
(i.e., affirmative) action for marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups pursuant to
the Equal Protection Clause.
Women and Sexual Minorities
The project would be improved as well by strengthening the case for the
applicability of the remedial nature of the Equal Protection Clause to women and sexual
minorities. This could be accomplished in at least four general ways. First, a structural
analysis of the Reconstruction Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments), considered together, could be used to point out, for example, that of all
three of the Reconstruction Amendments, only the Fourteenth makes no reference to
either black people or slaves. Instead, the language used is general, leaving open the
possibility that groups other than blacks were meant to be specially protected by the
Amendment. Second, the historical record of the proceedings of the 39th Congress (or
any other Congresses between the enactment of the reconstruction Amendments and the
19th Amendment, giving women the right to vote) could be examined for explicit
references on the part of the writers of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment linking the rights of women to the rights of African Americans. Third, more
detailed investigation into how the abolitionists who wrote the Equal Protection Clause
defined the term “dissident and unpopular groups” would be helpful to establish the
theoretical origins of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for gay people.
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Finally, more facts could also be added about the present unequal status of women and
the present unequal status of gays.
The Perspectives of the Groups Themselves
Another of the areas of future research recommended is into the perspectives of
the three groups themselves (blacks, women, and gay people) on the question of what the
Equal Protection Clause means. Recall from the approaches to legal hermeneutics of
both Jürgen Habermas and Susan Judith Hoffman outlined in Chapter 3 that hermeneutic
credibility is increased when the dialogue as to the meaning of a given text proactively
includes consultation with the perspectives of those affected by the meaning, particularly
when those affected are powerless. The approach to legal hermeneutics I am advocating
and hope to develop further in future research will always actively attempt to include in
dialogues on the meaning of any law the perspective or perspectives of those affected by
a given law. That said, it is conceded that prospect of being able to ascertain anything on
the order of a univocal voice for a given oppressed group is absurd on its face. However,
it seems also fair to say that vis-à-vis the experience of being oppressed as a group in
American society, there are trends and approaches to the question of what it means to be
a member of a given oppressed group in relation to the American ideal of equality that
can be understood to be representative of the majority, or at least a substantial number, of
the members of a given oppressed group. A given interpreter (a Supreme Court Justice)
may approach these dialogues with an idea already formed as to the nature of the
inequality of a particular group, i.e., with a given Gadamerian “prejudice” on the topic
(e.g., women might need equal pay for equal work), for example, but must always be
open to what women actually say are the core issue(s) of inequality for them, and use
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their understanding of what equality would mean for them, rather than the interpreter‟s
“prejudiced” view.
Marginalized, Oppressed, or Subjugated?
Yet another recommended area for future research is on the question of how to
define “marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated.” The interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause derived in this work hinges on an initial determination as to whether
the petitioner challenging a particular law as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause is a member of a marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group. There seem to be
two challenges with this aspect of the recommended interpretation. First, on what basis
will a determination that a group is marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated be made?
One hermeneutically credible way seems to be to take a look at history. Justice Thurgood
Marshall has recommended this approach for determining whether a given group should
qualify as a suspect class, which is almost the same question as my question of whether a
given group qualifies as marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated. In City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985), Justice Marshall wrote in his dissent at footnote 4,
“No single talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications
offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore warranting heightened or strict
scrutiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide…..The political
powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait are relevant….only
insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason
to respect or be concerned with that group’s interests or needs…,”(Emphasis added).
Justice Marshall continued, “[T]he lessons of history and experience are surely the best
guide as to when, and with respect to what interest, society is likely to stigmatize
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individuals as members of an inferior caste or view them as not belonging to the
community. Because prejudice spawns prejudice, and stereotypes produce limitations
that confirm those stereotypes on which they are based, a history of unequal treatment
requires sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges endure. In separating those groups
that [qualify for strict scrutiny, i.e., are, in my terms, marginalized, oppressed, or
subjugated] from those that [do] not, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”
However, it seems important to a hermeneutically credible interpretation that the
issue of whether a given group is marginalized, oppressed or subjugated is arguably not
properly defined solely in terms of history. Owing to the hermeneutical call to test all
interpretations in terms of what they “say to us” in the present moment, it would seem
that it is more important to ask whether the group in question qualifies today, in the
present interpretive moment, as marginalized, oppressed or subjugated. For, according to
our hermeneutically derived best interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is only
those groups who are able to use the Equal Protection Clause to challenge laws
discriminating against them. History seems to be a great indicator such that if the group
was marginalized, etc., in the past, then that lends credence to the view that the group is
still being marginalized. However, hermeneutically credible meaning is always informed
by the present as much as the past, and if the stigma attached to being a member of a
certain group is no longer socially or legally salient, then it seems part of the flexibility of
legal hermeneutical approaches to interpretation that that group could no longer use the
Equal Protection Clause to challenge laws which make classifications involving them as a
group. Still, more research on the topic of how best to define “marginalized, oppressed,
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or subjugated” would help to make legal hermeneutics more practically viable as an
approach to constitutional interpretation.
Philosophy of Race, Gender, and Sexuality
Another recommended area of future research is into the philosophies of race,
gender, and sexuality. Arguably, the Supreme Court‟s switch from a focus on a history
of oppression (á la the Carolene Products footnote/“discrete and insular minority”
approach that is at the core of the Suspect Class approach) to a focus on “immutable”
traits (i.e., the Suspect Classification Doctrine approach) has been based in ignorance of
contemporary scholarship on the degree to which the traits in question (i.e., race and
gender) are actually quite mutable. It is impossible for anyone to possess the immutable
trait of race according to this scholarship, for example, white or black or anything else,
because race itself has absolutely no basis in biology. In other words, most
contemporary philosophy of race takes for granted not only that is race not immutable,
but that it is in fact a concept having so heavy a basis in societal forces like power and
economics that despite its absolute lack of biological content, the concept is actually
taken to be immutable. Very similar conclusions have been drawn by contemporary
scholarship in the philosophy of sex and gender.
The issue of the immutability or non-immutability of sexual orientation is
contested in much contemporary philosophy of sexuality. In an interesting twist,
however, it is the fact that historically sexual orientation has been take to be nonimmutable that has formed the basis for the exclusion of gay people from qualifying as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class in Equal Protection Analysis and even for the exclusion of
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sexual orientation from qualifying as a suspect classification. It is for this reason that
some gay rights activists argue in favor of the immutability of sexual orientation.
But, this approach seems misguided and counterproductive for those seeking to
use the Equal Protection Clause to protect the rights of gay people for the following
reason: If sexual orientation is “immutable,” then this means it is immutable for both
homosexuals and heterosexuals and everyone in between. But, more disturbingly, taking
the position that sexuality is immutable could possibly result – as has been the case with
the perceived immutability of race and gender – in people who possess the trait of
sexuality but have no history of having been oppressed in virtue of having this trait (i.e.,
heterosexual people) bringing challenges under the Equal Protection Clause claiming that
their rights as heterosexuals are being violated in virtue of, for example, gay people being
given the right to marry. A better approach for anyone interested in gay rights seems to
me to be to focus on the marginalization, subjugation and oppression experienced by gay
people as a group in society, and to argue in favor of bringing the focus back to group
rights in Equal Protection Analysis rather than on immutable traits. Further research on
the degree to which gay people experience discrimination, marginalization, etc., would be
helpful toward this end.
Group Rights in a Liberal State
The approach to Equal Protection Analysis derived in this work relies on the
concept that certain groups have rights as groups in American society. This has been a
long-contested question in American political and legal theory. An additional
recommended area of future research, then, is cogently developing a theoretical basis for
group rights within liberal political theory, particularly for historically subjugated groups.
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My inquiry is informed by the observations of Charles Mills, Carol Pateman, and others,
for whom the traditional manner of attempting to deal with rights – i.e., the social
contract -- fails to account for the reality that individuals who are black, or who are
women, or who are members of other historically subjugated and marginalized groups are
not, and have never been autonomous in the sense required for social contract theory to
work for them.
The autonomy required to consent to the social contract, on this view, requires
equality, and for these groups the ideal of equality has never been, and to this day is not,
a reality. Two central theses I hope to develop in future research are (1) that for blacks,
women, and other marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups, the concept of group
rights is required to achieve the ideal of equality, but more fundamentally (2) that the
concept of equality in political and legal theory necessarily involves the concept of group
rights.
Robert St. Martin Westley has written an outstanding dissertation on the topic of
group rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Westley 1993). Westley‟s thesis there is
that the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., the Equal Protection Clause) should protect group
rights rather than individual rights because the racism that necessitated antidiscrimination
law in the first place is something that happens to groups and not to individuals. All
oppression, Westley argues, happens to groups and not individuals so that
antidiscrimination laws designed under the liberal political paradigm to protect the rights
of individuals miss the point and are therefore highly ineffective at what he sees is the
ultimate objective of all antidiscrimination law, i.e., the elimination of the ideologies that
fuel oppression such as racism. I think Westley is on to something regarding his view
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that oppression (whether in the form or racism, sexism, homophobia or the like) happens
to groups, not individuals, and I think his work in this area, if teased out a bit, would be
helpful in supporting my thesis, which is not that the Fourteenth Amendment should
protect group rights, but that it does. This may seem like a minor distinction but I think it
can have grave consequences for the likelihood of either of our suggestions being
accepted by mainstream jurisprudence. In other words, I am not making a normative
claim but a descriptive claim. I am making a claim about the nature of reality, not about
how I wish the world would work, and I am basing that claim in philosophical insights
going back to Aristotle about the relationship between text and interpreter.
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